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Abstract: This dissertation examines the role of television reform within twentieth 
century social movements in the United States.  Typically, scholars have examined the 
relationship between activists and television through the lens of media representation: 
how the mass media have depicted and defined social movements, and how activists have 
negotiated with the media that publicize their goals. This dissertation, in contrast, 
examines the role of media reform within social movements themselves.  By 
investigating the television reform campaigns of civil rights activists, feminists, 
conservatives, the progressive left, and educational groups, this dissertation reveals how 
American reform movements have responded to an increasingly mass-mediated culture 
and have tried to mold television to reflect their moral and political beliefs.  This 
dissertation explores not only the myriad ways activists have approached television 
reform, but illustrates how these campaigns have responded to changes in the television 
industry, broadcasting policy, and American culture more broadly.  This dissertation also 
charts the rhetorical strategies that the reformers have used to legitimate their stake in 
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media policy and practices and to convince of the importance and power of the medium 
that they are trying to change.  Television reform fights have been battles not only over 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
In a class on television and American culture, I showed my students the 1983 
made-for-TV movie The Day After.  The film was a meditation on the horrifying 
consequences of a nuclear attack between United States and the Soviet Union on a 
number of individuals living in or around Lawrence, Kan.  When it premiered, the film 
had functioned as a cautionary tale against nuclear proliferation.  For my purposes in the 
course, the film also countered the more conservative television programming common in 
the 1980s and provided us with an opportunity to discuss the made-for-TV movie format. 
However, I also assigned the film because I wanted to see it myself.  I was eight 
years old when ABC aired the movie and my father had not allowed me or my eleven 
year old brother to watch it.  Pediatricians and psychiatrists had concluded that the 
violent scenes of the attack and the gruesome images of radiation poisoning on survivors 
could traumatize children and cause nightmares.1  The film’s make-up artist had 
examined film footage of survivors of the atomic attack on Hiroshima and, based on 
these images, tried to render the film’s victims as realistically as possible; such images, 
medical professionals and parents feared, would be too difficult for children to see.2  
Though my father watched the program, my brother and I were banished from the living 
room that night, left to wonder what images accompanied the sound of the program that 
we could hear through our bedroom walls. 
                                                
1 Tom Shales, “Nightmare for a Small Planet: ABC’s ‘The Day After’,” The Washington Post, November 
18, 1983, sec. C1; Peter Perl, “The Day After: Nation Girds for Firestorm,” The Washington Post, 
November 20, 1983, sec. A1. 
2 Stephen Farber, “How a Nuclear Holocaust Was Staged For TV,” The New York Times, November 13, 
1983, sec. 2:1. 
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Concerns over The Day After were not confined to its effects on children.  While 
anti-nuclear groups embraced the film, political conservatives fought to keep it off the 
airwaves for fear that it would provoke a “public hysteria” against nuclear proliferation.  
Accuracy in Media, a conservative media watchdog group founded by Reed Irvine in 
1969, sent letters to 450 potential sponsors to deter them from buying advertising time 
during the broadcast.3  Reverend Jerry Falwell threatened to organize a boycott of any 
company sponsor, while other groups demanded that ABC’s affiliates refuse to air the 
program.4  The network ultimately was able to strike a compromise; after the film, it 
aired a 45 minute panel debate about nuclear weapons, whose participants included 
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara, Secretary of State George Schultz, astronomer Carl Sagan, and National 
Review founder William F. Buckley 
The public uproar over The Day After, now mostly forgotten, was but one 
instance of a much larger phenomenon that has existed concurrently with television itself.  
Since television emerged as a mass medium in the late 1940s, activists and social 
reformers have viewed it as a tool with tremendous power to shape the nation’s political 
and moral attitudes.  In turn, they have launched campaigns that have targeted 
broadcasting policy, programming content, and station practices in order to reform 
television to better reflect their values.  Though their reform strategies have varied, as 
have the specific goals of their campaigns, activists have shared the belief that television 
reform is central to achieve wider social change.   
                                                
3 Sally Bedell Smith, “ABC Film Depicting Consequences of Nuclear Attack Stirring Debate,” The New 
York Times, October 6, 1983, sec. C25. 
4 Perl, “The Day After,” A1; Tom Shales, “’The Day’: Aftermath,” The Washington Post, December 4, 
1983, sec. F1. 
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This dissertation examines the relationship between television reform and social 
movements in the second half of the twentieth century.  Comprised of five distinct case 
studies of television reform campaigns, this dissertation charts the breadth of activist 
goals and strategies and illustrates how television reform has been an enduring part of 
projects for social change during this time period.  Specifically, in this dissertation I 
examine the work of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) in the early 1950s to remove derogatory depictions of African Americans from 
television programming; the efforts of educators and philanthropists in the 1950s and 
1960s to reimagine television’s social role outside of commercial broadcasts, culminating 
in the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967; the National Organization for Women’s (NOW) 
campaign in the 1970s to pressure broadcasters to diversify their programming and to 
hire more women to positions of power; the activism of the Media Research Center 
(MRC), a conservative watchdog group that has charted “liberal bias” in mainstream 
news organizations since the 1980s; and the combined efforts of political progressives 
and conservatives in 2003-2004 to fight against the deregulation of media ownership.   
The central concern of my project is to understand why activists consistently have 
turned to television reform as part of their campaigns for social change.  How has 
television reform activism helped achieve larger social movement goals?  In turn, how 
does this activism illuminate the importance of television in conceptualizing twentieth-
century reform?  In posing these questions, my aim is to rethink the relationship between 
television and social reform in the United States.  Scholars long have acknowledged the 
role of television broadcasts in shaping public perceptions of social movements.5 They 
                                                
5 For example, Sasha Torres has charted the mutually beneficial relationship between civil rights activists 
and emerging network news departments in the early 1960s, and Todd Gitlin has examined the often 
fraught relations between the New Left and television networks.  See Sasha Torres, Black, White, and In 
Color: Television and Black Civil Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Todd Gitlin, The 
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also have analyzed how changes in television programming—for example, the 
transformation of representations of minority characters--have mirrored shifts in 
American attitudes fostered by reform movements.6 In these works, the television screen 
has acted as a societal mirror, narrating the work of activists or documenting social 
change brought on by reform campaigns.  In contrast, I argue that television itself has 
been a battleground within twentieth century social movements. My project illustrates 
how activists have tied the reform of television to the realization of a better society.  
First and foremost, this dissertation tells a story of American social movements 
through the lens of television reform.  Each of the activist communities under discussion 
here has asserted that social change in an age of mass media by necessity involves the 
culture industries.  To borrow a phrase from the cold war, activists have insisted that 
reforming American society has required a battle for the “hearts and minds” of the polity-
-a transformation of the images and stories circulating within the culture.  Material 
changes, in this view, can only be accomplished if accompanied by forms of cultural 
expression that accommodate or are sympathetic to the reformers’ vision of a better 
society.  Consequently, this dissertation contends that television reform illuminates the 
unique predicament of social reform in the postmodern era, a time when the circulation of 
images and signs composes the basis of both epistemology and ontology—what 
constitutes knowledge and what forms the basis of our reality. 
                                                                                                                                            
Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2003). 
6 In this area, scholars have traced how representations on television have shifted alongside social changes.  
There is a tremendous amount of scholarship that examines television through this lens.  A few examples: 
J. Fred MacDonald and Donald Bogle examine how images of African Americans the continuities and 
variations in depictions of African Americans and situate their readings within social history.  Bonnie Dow, 
in her examination of feminists and television similarly contextualizes the transformations of images within 
a broader conversation over feminism in the U.S.  See J. Fred MacDonald, Blacks and White TV: African 
Americans in Television Since 1948 (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1992); Donald Bogle, Prime Time 
Blues: African Americans on Network Television (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2001); Bonnie 
Dow, Prime-Time Feminism: Television, Media Culture, and the Women’s Movement Since 1970 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996). 
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I have chosen these specific case studies because they illustrate both the 
continuities and variations amongst television reformers.  My case studies cover 
television reform campaigns from each decade since TV’s arrival in American homes, 
and they illustrate not only the persistence of television reform within social movements, 
but also the shifting strategies employed by citizens’ groups as they have adapted to the 
new political climate and challenges of their era.   In addition, the activists have had 
different political and social objectives; this dissertation demonstrates that the desire to 
reform television has fired the imaginations of a wide array of activists groups and has 
not been the purview of a particular political ideology. Furthermore, each of the activist 
groups has used different means to achieve its reform objectives; in the case studies I 
chart the myriad ways that activists have tried to reform television through economic, 
political, or cultural pressures.  
To be sure, these activists are television reformers.  They have not sought to 
transform the television industry radically, to convince others to “kill their TVs,” or to 
create an alternative media.  Rather, they have worked within structural and legal 
frameworks to reshape and redirect existing institutions and practices. This emphasis on 
reform speaks to the middle-class orientation of the activist groups under discussion.  
Though they frequently have had different political and social objectives, these activists 
have embraced a middlebrow worldview that believes in the possibilities of social 
mobility and change, the sanctity of individual rights, and the essential soundness of the 
structural arrangements that govern American institutions.  The activists furthermore 
have had clear reform goals, an institutional structure that enables effective reform 
activity, and the financial resources to see through activist campaigns.7   
                                                
7 Omitted from my narrative are grassroots organizations and activists committed to a radical, rather than 
reformist, political agenda.  In choosing my subjects, I do not intend to valorize reformers over radicals, to 
suggest that these groups constitute the more significant activist community, or to imply that television 
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The television of this dissertation is over-the-air broadcast television.  While cable 
television--in the form of community antenna TV (CATV)--is nearly as old as broadcast 
television, the activists at the center of this dissertation have targeted their reform 
activities toward broadcast TV.  The key difference between broadcasting and cable, 
from a regulatory perspective, is that they utilize different distribution systems: 
broadcasts initially came over publicly-owned airwaves, cable programming over 
terrestrial cables.8  Broadcasting policy has hinged on the responsibilities of broadcasters 
to the public because of their use of a scarce public resource.  When the FCC turned to 
cable regulation in the 1960s, it initially was unclear how to define cable and how to 
shape the contours of the policy that would regulate it.  Some saw it as an expansion of 
broadcast television and imagined that it would be subject to analogous public interest 
requirements; others saw it as a common carrier—like the telephone or telegraph—under 
which regulations would ensure equality of access and participation.  Ultimately, 
however, cable regulation has operated under neoliberal principles that overwhelmingly 
have defined cable as a private enterprise with few obligations to the television public.9   
                                                                                                                                            
reform solely has been a middle class concern.  I have focused on these groups because, in this historical 
and cultural context, they have had the greatest fighting chance at realizing their objectives.  For this initial 
study, I hoped to analyze activists who both broadcasters and regulators would recognize as legitimate 
stake-holders in television reform.  To be sure, this focus limits the scope of the conclusions I can draw 
from my analysis. 
8 Though later both systems would use different methods of transmission, notably microwave relays, 
satellite, and digital signals. 
9 I owe many thanks to John McMurria for his generous feedback on the development of cable policy and 
the distinctions between broadcasting and cable regulation in the United States.  
Community Antenna Television systems served populations outside of the reach of broadcast signals; 
viewers would receive imported broadcast signals over terrestrial signals.  The development of what we 
now think of as cable begins in the 1960s as cable providers looked to expand the services they could 
provide to consumers and the FCC began placing restrictions on the development of cable, often in the 
service of protecting broadcasters.  In 1968, the Supreme Court gave the FCC the authority to regulate 
cable and the commission solicited comments from cable operators, broadcasters, and the public to help 
map their cable rules. In 1972, the FCC established rules that, among other provisions, required cable 
systems to carry the local broadcast signals aired in their markets (“must carry rules”); in certain large 
markets to provide space to public, educational, or government stations; and to respect quotas set by the 
commission on how many local and distant signals a system could import and on the kind of content it 
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Broadcast television not only has operated under a different regulatory structure, 
but also has played a unique role in the social imaginary.  Activists continually have 
ascribed to broadcast television the power to provide a shared national experience and to 
define who matters within the public sphere.  Significantly, this understanding of 
television has spanned its history.  The NAACP first monitored television programming 
in the late 1940s, when its reach was incredibly limited.  The MRC and the media 
ownership activists agitated for broadcast television reform in a post-network era, when 
the rise of cable, home video, and later the Internet substantially reduced the hegemony 
of broadcast television.  Yet activists continually have imagined broadcast television as 
the nation’s electronic public square, even when this role has been simply nostalgic or 
illusionary.  The persistence of this view points to broadcast television’s symbolic power 
within American culture and demonstrates why television reform activism continually 
has played a role in social movements.   
By focusing on television reformers, I do not imply that the medium of television 
is singular in its attention from public interest reformers.  The history of American 
entertainment is also a history of public interest campaigns to protect audiences from the 
potentially harmful impact of popular culture.  Film and radio elicited public concern, for 
example, from the religious activists who sought to sanitize racy pre-Code Hollywood 
films to the middlebrow moral guardians who sat on listener councils to monitor early 
                                                                                                                                            
could air.  In the 1980s, many of these restrictions—especially those related to content and those designed 
to protect the interests of broadcasters—were repealed. In 1984, Congress passed the Cable 
Communications which formally gave the FCC jurisdiction over cable.  The act gave local and state 
governments the power to award franchises and to determine the qualifications necessary for systems to be 
awarded local franchises.  It placed limitations on the amount that can be charged for a franchise fee, 
prohibited broadcast/cable cross-ownership, and put franchise renewal in the hands of local municipalities.  
The 1996 Telecommunications Act largely deregulated cable.  See Megan Mullen, The Rise of Cable 
Programming in the United States: Revolution or Evolution? (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 62-
77; Erwin G. Krasnow, Lawrence D. Longley, Herbert A. Terry. The Politics of Broadcast Regulation 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), 25-27; Thomas Streeter, Selling the Air: A Critique of the Policy of 
Commercial Broadcasting in the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 178-179. 
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radio programming.10  I emphasize television reform because television’s pervasive and 
influential role in American life.  As James Baughman notes, by the mid-1950s “most of 
the older mass media accepted the obvious: TV had won the war for the largest share of 
time Americans spent consuming the mass media.”11  Douglas Kellner concurs that, by 
the 1960s, television functioned as the primary medium that unified the nation as it 
“bound the country together in rituals of national mourning and national drama, and 
demonstrated that it was now the new national force.”12  Television has been the crucial 
form of mass communication of the latter half of the twentieth century. The medium’s 
location in the home, the immediacy and liveness of its broadcasts, and its national reach 
combined to establish television’s unique cultural power and its function as a primary site 
of public discourse.   
Television has been a site of a national public culture, where what it means to be 
member of the public is articulated and made visible.  It instantiates images of citizenship 
and political behavior, and also creates the shared texts that bind audiences as part of a 
national community. It has been part of the intimate and mundane rituals of everyday life, 
and it has provided the stories and images that contribute to our understanding of 
ourselves within our social world.  Television  not only displays for us how to behave, 
                                                
10 The monitoring of motion pictures is just about as old as movies themselves.  As Lary May illustrates, 
censorship boards arose as early as 1909 when the National Review Board formed in New York to review 
and censor films.  Perhaps more importantly, Hollywood studios adopted a Production Code to regulate the 
content of its pictures in 1930; the Production Code Administration, developed to enforce the Code, formed 
in 1934.  Though myriad pressures convinced the studios to self-censor, the activism of Catholic groups 
and children’s welfare activists played a central role.  The Motion Pictures Association of America 
replaced the Production Code in 1968 and adopted in its stead a ratings system.  See Lary May, Screening 
Out the Past: The Birth of Mass Culture and the Motion Picture Industry (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1980), 54-60; Gregory D. Black, Hollywood Censored: Morality Codes, Catholics and the Movies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).  Radio listener councils of the 1930s functioned in an 
advisory capacity to stations, often in the service of ensuring proper moral standards for programming.  For 
a discussion of radio councils, see Donald Guimary, Citizens’ Groups and Broadcasting (New York: 
Praeger, 1975), 19-32. 
11 James Baughman, The Republic of Mass Culture: Journalism, Film and Broadcasting in American Since 
1941 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 59. 
12 Douglas Kellner, Television and the Crisis of Democracy (Boulder: Westview, 1999), 49. 
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look, dress and speak but also--through the stories it tells--provides us with the discursive 
frames to understand the relationship between the individual and society, the role of 
institutions, the values that form the foundation of our moral code.13  It contributes to 
how we think of ourselves as political citizens and as cultural citizens, shaping the 
parameters of how we construct both identities. 
It is therefore unsurprising that television reform has played a role in social 
movements.  Fights to reform television fundamentally have been battles over American 
society itself.  In defining the “problem” of television, activists in essence have 
rearticulated the central critique of American culture that has motivated their wider 
reform activities.  For the NAACP, the problem with television was its use of denigrating 
images of African Americans that bolstered and legitimated forms of economic, social, 
and political discrimination; for educators and philanthropists, the problem with 
television was that it contributed to—rather than worked against—the educational crisis 
sweeping the nation in the postwar period; for NOW, the problem with television was 
that it duplicated, in its programming and its hiring practices, the marginalized role of 
women in American society; for the MRC, the problem with television was that it 
perpetuated a liberal worldview and silences conservative voices; for the 2003 media 
ownership activists, the problem with television was that it diminished diversity and 
impedes the functioning of a healthy democracy.  For each of these communities, in other 
words, television has functioned as an emblem of what is wrong in American culture, and 
its reform as an opportunity to change American society. 
                                                
13 The two works that, in my opinion, best address this role is John Hartley’s chapters on cultural 
citizenship and DIY citizenship in The Uses of Television and Horace Newcomb and Paul Hirsch’s 
foundational essay “Television as Cultural Forum.”  See John Hartley, The Uses of Television (London: 
Routledge, 1999); and Horace Newcomb and Paul Hirsch, “Television as a Cultural Forum,” in Television: 
The Critical View, 6th ed., ed. Horace Newcomb (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 561-573. 
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Television reformers, furthermore, have contributed to the discursive construction 
of television—of what television is and how to understand its social role.  In my analysis, 
I examine how reformers define television--cultural forum, political soapbox, 
disseminator of stereotypes, brain-rotting entertainment, hazard to children, tool of 
corporate capitalism, and so on--and how they understand its impact on viewers.  The 
activist campaigns have functioned both as acts of protest against, and simultaneously as 
opportunities to define, the object of their reform.  This dissertation charts the rhetorical 
strategies that the reformers have used to persuade not only of their own stake in media 
policy and practices, but to convince of the importance and power of the medium that 
they are trying to change. In sum, I show that television reform fights are battles not only 
over television programming and policy, but over the meaning of television itself and 
how collectively we should understand its role in American society. 
 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, TELEVISION, AND REFORM 
Close to three thousand people attended the third National Conference on Media 
Reform, held in Memphis, Tenn. in January 2007.  Activists, academics, policy-makers, 
legislators, celebrities, filmmakers, and concerned citizens gathered for three days to 
outline organizing strategies, discuss policy issues, learn about current media reform 
issues, and participate in a community with a shared sense that something is terribly 
wrong with media practices and programming.  And while many of the organizations 
represented at the conference were formed primarily as media reform organizations, 
many others used media reform as a means to another end.  For civil rights activists, 
feminists, anti-war protesters, and child welfare activists media reform was a necessary 
part of their bigger agendas: to battle sexism and racism, to end the war in Iraq, and to 
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create an environment hospitable to raising healthy children.  Social reforms were tied 
inextricably to media reform, the creation of a better society contingent on changing the 
media.  As this dissertation argues, this relationship has deep historical roots: television 
has played a role in reform movements from the 1950s to the first decade of the twenty-
first century.   
Previous scholars generally have pointed to two epochs of broadcast reform.  
During the first, from 1928-1934, a coalition of educators, intellectuals, church 
organizations, labor groups, and private foundations worked to change the direction of 
broadcasting policy in the United States.  The federal government had regulated radio 
since 1912, when Congress gave the Commerce Department the authority to license users 
of the electromagnetic spectrum.  Fifteen years later, Congress passed the Radio Act of 
1927 which established a temporary agency, the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), 
which was charged with granting broadcasting licenses to applicants who could best 
serve the “public interest, convenience, or necessity.”  The FRC, in granting licenses and 
allocating frequencies, favored commercial radio stations, especially those owned or 
affiliated with emerging national radio networks.  Emerging from this policy was a 
system of broadcasting that side-lined or ignored groups who had been involved with 
radio for years, but who existed outside of the industry that was forming at this time, such 
as labor unions, political groups, and educators.  In addition, this coalition of activists 
feared that commercial stations would squander the potential of broadcasting, shunting 
aside edification for entertainment, quality for popularity.  The goal of this early 
broadcast reform movement was to change the basis for broadcasting policy so that 
multiple communities could have access to the airwaves and to prevent the dominance of 
commercial networks.  When Congress passed the Federal Communications Act in 1934, 
which was almost a word-for-word repetition of the 1927 Act, it marked the failure of the 
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broadcast reform movement to achieve the changes it sought.14  The policies mapped in 
these acts for radio would later apply to television. 
The second notable period of broadcasting reform, according to scholars, was in 
the late 1960s and 1970s.  In United Church of Christ v. FCC (1966), a U.S. Court of 
Appeals reversed a long-standing policy and ruled that members of the broadcasting 
public have legal standing to participate in administrative hearings, in particular in the 
license renewal process.  Activist groups across the country filed petitions with the FCC 
to deny license renewals of stations that failed to meet the needs of their communities.  
Understanding that the politics of representation was a crucial part of civil rights 
struggles, public interest groups used the petition-to-deny to pressure or threaten 
broadcasters to change both their programming patterns and employment policies.  This 
period of media activism all but disappeared by the end of the 1970s.  Petitions-to-deny 
were costly to activist groups already stretched thin financially and, by this time, it 
became clear that though activists had the legal right to file petitions, the FCC rarely 
failed to renew a license because of one.15 
One of the goals of this dissertation is to examine television reform as a continual 
practice, rather than something limited to brief historical windows and inspired primarily 
by external actions of  the state (in the first era, the drafting of broadcasting legislation; in 
                                                
14 The seminal work on this subject is Robert McChesney’s Telecommunications, Mass Media and 
Democracy: The Battle for the Control of U.S. Broadcasting, 1928-1935 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993).  McChesney points to myriad reasons why this campaign failed, and emphasizes the lack of 
unity amongst the activists and the public relations campaign that the networks launched in retaliation in 
which they defined commercial, “free” broadcasting as quintessentially American.  At the end, he suggests 
that after the failure of this movement, no substantial challenge to American broadcasting has been brought. 
15 See Krasnow, Longley, and Terry, 55-57; and  Kathryn Montgomery, Target: Prime Time: Advocacy 
Groups and the Struggle Over Entertainment Television (New York: Oxford University Press). For detailed 
histories of the United Church of Christ case see Kay Mills, Changing Channels: The Civil Rights Case 
that Transformed Television (Jackson: The University of Mississippi Press, 2004).  Steve Classen’s 
Watching Jim Crow provides an account of civil rights struggles over television in Jackson (which 
culminated in the United Church of Christ Case).  See Steven D. Classen, Watching Jim Crow: The 
Struggles Over Mississippi TV, 1955-1969 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 
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the latter, a court decision redefining what constituted legal standing).  Activists have 
been flexible in their approaches to television reform and have responded to shifting 
industrial conditions and regulatory climates in mapping their reform strategies.  While 
many of the activists here used political channels for reform—proposing legislation, 
filing petitions with the FCC, and bringing lawsuits against regulators and broadcasters—
other reform efforts have involved consumer boycotts or campaigns to shift public 
perceptions of the media.  Perhaps more importantly, by focusing on a wide range of 
reform campaigns, this dissertation shows how activists consistently, rather than 
sporadically, have implicated television in their fights for wider social reforms.  This 
corrective is more than academic.  By constructing this narrative, this dissertation 
fundamentally rethinks not only what constitutes television reform, but how to 
understand its purpose.  Specifically, it shifts the focus of television reform off of the 
medium itself and onto how television reform activities have been mobilized by social 
movements.  Much like the participants at the National Conference on Media Reform, 
activists have looked to television reform not primarily as a way to transform the 
medium, but as a way to meet their broader reform objectives; changing television was 
put to the service of achieving other goals.    
By placing television reform at the center of a discussion of reform communities, 
this dissertation exposes the political importance of mediated images to the success or 
failure of the social movements themselves.  As the mass media have become 
increasingly more pervasive in American life, activists have reasoned that a key to social 
reform lies in the transformation of American popular culture.  As activists have made 
civil rights claims as members of broadcasting publics, they have restructured the 
contours of what political rights look like in a mass-mediated society.  Within this 
 14 
framework, the fight for responsible images and narratives has joined claims for 
economic opportunities and political equality. 
My study of television reform campaigns also complicates how historians have 
characterized political activism in the second half of the twentieth century, in particular 
the relationship between reform and consumerism.  Lizabeth Cohen, in A Consumer’s 
Republic, has argued that the distinction between “consumer” and “citizen” often 
disappears in postwar America.  Though the model of the consumer-citizen has taken 
many forms, perhaps most salient for this project is the way that activists have pursued 
political goals through consumer pressures.  Political and economic behaviors in the 
consumer’s republic thus become blurred, as economic choices take on political 
consequences, and consumerism is recast as patriotic behavior.  One of Cohen’s 
interventions is to illustrate how consumerism factors into the political landscape of the 
postwar era and to break down the rigid binary between the consumer and citizen that 
often animates discussions of political economy.16 
For Cohen, television as a commercial medium intensified the postwar emphasis 
on consumerism and, as a consequence of its reliance on advertising, conflated audiences 
with markets or niches to sell goods to.  Like radio before it, television exacerbated the 
importance of consumerism to the vision of the good life and instructed Americans to see 
themselves and their identities tied to their consumer choices. Kathy Newman similarly 
has argued that as commercial radio stations constituted their listeners as consumers, they 
simultaneously showed audiences that acts of consumption could exert tremendous social 
and political influence.  She illustrates how listeners—primarily women—mobilized this 
                                                
16 Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New 
York: Vintage Books, 2003). 
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power to protest advertising excesses generally, and commercial radio specifically.17  
Like Cohen, Newman argues for a politicization of consumerism and shows how 
consumer activism has functioned as an effective way to influence American institutions. 
Commercial broadcasting has played a central role in this development. 
Television reform, on the one hand, fits nicely into Cohen’s framework of the 
consumer’s republic.  Broadcasting reformers have drawn on these competing identities, 
consumer and citizen, in their efforts to transform television.  Some of the instances of 
reform battles, like the NAACP’s battle against Amos ‘n’ Andy, take the form of 
consumer protest.  These protests show not only the deep connection posited between 
what we watch and the viewpoints that hold sway culturally and politically, but to the 
power of consumers to transform the visual iconography and stories told on its screen.  
Additionally, activists have used legal and regulatory means to transform objects of 
consumer society, specifically television shows and advertisements.  In this, television 
reform efforts are part of a wider shift chronicled by Cohen toward the citizen-consumer 
and the porousness between economic choice and political activity.  As social movements 
have enlisted television reform as part of their wider social justice campaigns, they 
simultaneously have attested to the politicization of consumer culture. 
However, as many of the case studies here illustrate, television reform battles 
were often opportunities to protest, rather than to exploit, the commercial underpinnings 
of broadcasting.  Many television reformers have connected commercialism to a 
denigrated form of culture, and have recast television as a medium that could ennoble 
individuals, enlighten citizens, and eradicate social inequalities if only it could detach 
itself from consumer society.  If, as Cohen argues, mass consumption characterizes post-
                                                
17 Kathy M. Newman, Radio Active: Advertising and Consumer Activism, 1935-1947 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2004). 
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war American life, then television reform battles mark moments of contestation and 
conflict over the consumers’ republic itself.  Many activists have used television reform 
to disentangle citizenship from consumerism.  Redefining the relationship between 
broadcasters and audiences as political, rather than economic, activists have looked to 
television reform as a way to assert their membership within the civic body and to 
redirect broadcasters to prioritize their legal obligations to their communities, rather than 
their economic obligations to their sponsors.  
 
TELEVISION, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE PUBLIC 
Television in the United States, like radio before it, sits at the intersection of 
politics and economics, citizenship and consumerism, the private and the public, the local 
and the national.   The vagaries of American broadcasting policy, beginning with the 
regulation of radio, has contributed to the complex place of television within American 
culture and has structured how we understand its social role.  Importantly, broadcasting 
policy has been both constraining and enabling for television activists.  Throughout the 
dissertation, I stress broadcasting policy because of its important role in shaping the 
possibilities of television reform and because of its contribution to how broadcasters, 
regulators, and activists have constructed the relationship between television and the 
public.  
Dating back to the Radio Act of 1927, Congress determined to retain public 
ownership of the airwaves and license their use to private entities.  The broadcasting 
license has been a fundamentally local contract; broadcasters’ responsibilities have been 
to serve the local community reached by their broadcast signal.   The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), since it was formed in 1934, has had the power to 
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grant, renew, or revoke a license based on whether a licensee or applicant capably could 
serve the “public interest, convenience, and necessity.”  Echoing directly the language of 
the public utility legislation of the Progressive Era, the Radio Act of 1927 and the 1934 
Federal Communications Act put broadcasting squarely in the legislative tradition of 
industries tied to the maintenance of the “common good” or the “public interest,” or as 
particularly central to the successful functioning of society.  Thus broadcasting, 
according to Congress, was to be a fundamental part of American life, so fundamental 
that it merited federal regulation much like railroads, electricity, telephony, and 
telegraphy.18  However, what exactly the “public interest” meant in this context and how 
regulators should determine whether it has been served would be contentious issues for 
the duration of broadcasting history. 
Initially, regulators decided that commercial stations, especially those owned or 
affiliated with national networks, best satisfied the public interest requirement of 
American broadcasting policy.   The result has been a broadcasting system dominated by 
national networks, though regulated at the local level.  It is also a system in which private 
broadcasters support themselves through advertising, selling audiences’ “eyeballs” to 
sponsors, yet who have the legal obligation to serve the “public interest” as a condition of 
their broadcasting license.  Broadcasters technically have had to address their audiences 
simultaneously as citizens and consumers: as the sponsors’ eyeballs and as the legitimate 
owners of the airwaves through which they send their broadcast signal.  Though often 
part of a national network, they also have had a primary responsibility to local audiences. 
                                                
18 I am drawing here on Robert Britt Horwitz’s important work, The Irony of Regulatory Reform: The 
Deregulation of American Telecommunications.  Horwitz thoroughly documents the development and 
dismantling of regulatory bodies and the attending redefinitions of the public interest and of the relationship 
between the state, the public, and industry.  The irony, as Horwitz illustrates, is that deregulation ultimately 
served the same function as regulation: to bolster and stabilize economies of scale.  See Robert Britt 
Horwitz, The Irony of Regulatory Reform: The Deregulation of American Telecommunications (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989). 
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These tensions--television’s status as a regulated industry, yet one simultaneously 
enmeshed within consumer culture and its function as a national medium, yet one that 
first and foremost is responsible to local audiences—have made television an important 
and attractive site of reform activity.   
Fundamentally, broadcasting policy positions the public as audiences of,--rather 
than producers or participants in--broadcasting.  As media scholars have argued for 
decades, it was broadcasting policy that created and solidified this arrangement; some of 
the early experiments with radio had imagined it as a highly democratic and participatory 
medium.19  Of central importance to this dissertation, however, is how activist groups 
have drawn on their status as publics and have used political channels to alter 
programming, policies, and practices of broadcasters.  While reform campaigns have 
responded to shifts in regulatory climates, and the redefinition of the public interest that 
has accompanied them, activists continually have centered their rhetoric on citizenship 
claims—claims legitimated and encouraged by the very basis of broadcasting policy.  
Furthermore, broadcasting policies, laws, and court decisions have provided openings to 
activists for their reform campaigns and have given them specific tools to challenge the 
practices of broadcasters.  Activists have participated in the policy arena both by 
reconstituting the public and the public interest and by using law and policy to achieve 
specific reform objectives. 
This dialogue, between members of the public and the state, often has been 
omitted in scholarly work on the history of broadcasting policy and regulation.  In 
analyzing how regulators, legislators and the courts have defined the “public interest, ” 
some scholars have characterized the  FCC as a “captured” agency--a shill for the 
                                                
19 The key work on this subject is Susan Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-1922 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987). 
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industry it was created to regulate, sidelining or ignoring the interests and needs of the 
public itself.  For others, Congress has hampered the good intentions of the FCC and has 
obstructed the commission’s attempts to regulate broadcasters.20  What unites many of 
these narratives is a shared conviction that broadcasting policy has served the interests of 
the broadcasting industry, thus leaving the public vulnerable and unprotected.  This 
dissertation shows how members of the public also have functioned as actors within the 
policy arena. Broadcasting policy has provided activists with both a discursive frame to 
guide their reform campaigns, and the rhetorical legitimacy to wage the battles in the first 
place.  Furthermore an implicit, and sometimes explicit, premise of much of this 
scholarship is that a fundamental tension exists between the corporate interest and the 
public interest.  Significantly, my work illustrates the limitations of this binary to 
understanding how publics have approached the object of reform and their relationship to 
it. 
Thomas Streeter’s Selling the Air provides a crucial framework to understand the 
relationship between the state, the broadcast industry, and the public.  Streeter defines 
broadcasting policy as a set of social practices, television itself as a “legal inscription on 
technology.”21  The parameters of broadcasting policy are not natural or determined by 
technological considerations, but result from a set of assumptions by policymakers, 
people who Streeter maintains form an interpretive community.  The interpretive 
community at play here includes members of the FCC, lawmakers, and judges.  
Historically, this interpretive community has viewed broadcasting through the lens of 
corporate liberalism. Liberalism, with its emphasis on the autonomy of the individual and 
                                                
20 See Frank L. Baird, “Program Regulation on the New Frontier,” Journal of Broadcasting (Summer 
1967): 231-243; James L. Baughman, Television’s Guardians: The FCC and the Politics of Programming 
1958-1967 (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1985); William B. Ray, FCC: The Ups and 
Downs of Radio-TV Regulation (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1990). 
21 Streeter, 3. 
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the sanctity of private property rights, fundamentally sees a division between the free-
acting individual and the demands of the social; the corporation, predicated on the 
pooling of private interests, disrupts this distinction.  Corporate liberalism developed as a 
strategy to reconcile this tension.  If the property rights of the individual are sacrosanct 
under classical liberalism, market protections for the corporation become central to 
corporate liberalism.  The individual is reconceptualized as the consumer, whose wants 
and needs could best be met by a stable, efficient, technologically advanced industry.  
The role of the state becomes to facilitate and enable the creation of these conditions.  In 
this schema, the interests of the public not only are not odds with the interests of industry, 
but can be accommodated by the workings of a corporate capitalist structure; as such, the 
role of the government is to find a path that harmonizes the needs of the public with those 
of industry.22  For Streeter, corporate liberalism is not a totalizing ideology, but a way in 
to foreground how meaning and discourse have shaped the development of American 
broadcasting.   
Television reformers often have accepted the premises of corporate liberalism.  
Though their campaigns have tried to alter particular practices or policies, in the process 
they often have legitimated and naturalized the very structure of American broadcasting.  
In other words, in engaging in television reform they often have joined the interpretive 
community of policy-makers and have conceived of their reform objectives in keeping 
with the basic premises of corporate liberalism.  Thus activists have challenged official 
definitions of the public and the public interest, yet have done so within a framework that 
reifies the basic structure of American broadcasting. 
Importantly, reform groups continually and diligently have rearticulated a 
definition of the public interest in line with their social reform goals.  This point is 
                                                
22 Streeter, 31-38. 
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crucial.  When the activists have made claims that the public interest has not been served 
by broadcasters, they typically have defined the public interest as their own interest—in 
line with the goals and objectives of their reform community.  I do not suggest that their 
model of who composes the public or their definition of the public interest is more 
legitimate or representative than that of regulators or legislators.  Indeed, a premise of my 
work is that the “public interest” is a discursive construction, not something that actually 
exists or is discoverable.  To evoke the public interest has been to engage in an important 
and strategic discourse that is both legitimating and effective, but also to articulate one’s 
own interests and vision of what the public’s interest should be. 
From a legal perspective, television stations are guardians of the public interest; 
from a broader cultural perspective, television also has functioned as a public sphere. In 
his The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Jurgen Habermas argues for the 
existence of a public sphere--a realm of rational-critical debate amongst members of the 
public set apart from the political institutions (the state) or economic relations (the 
market) where democratic deliberation takes place.23  Habermas links the rise of print 
culture and the transformation of the economy that developed concurrently with it to the 
ascent of the public sphere in Europe.  Pamphlets, books, coffee shops, debates—these 
were the foundations of Habermas’s ideal public sphere. The Habermasian public sphere 
is not a place or site, but rather a process: it is the act of participating in conversation with 
other members of the public.24   According to Habermas, its structural transformation 
                                                
23 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, translated by Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 1998 [1962]), 27-57. 
24 There is a tremendous body of scholarship critiquing Habermasian public sphere theory on multiple 
fronts.  For some, for example, Habermas’s definition neglects to take into consideration the gendering of 
public and private spaces and, in turn, conceives of the public sphere in fundamentally masculinist terms; 
for others, Habermas’s emphasis on rational-critical discourse neglects the role of affect and emotion in the 
processes and conversations amongst publics; still others object to his historical comparisons, especially as 
they romanticize the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and unduly vilify the twentieth.  See especially 
Craig Calhoun, editor, Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). 
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takes place with the rise of the mass media, as the lines that divide the public and the 
private, state and society, begin to blur and the means of communication are absorbed 
within large-scale corporate structures.   
Numerous scholars have salvaged twentieth century mainstream media as an 
operable public sphere.  Though media like television are deeply implicated in both the 
state (regulation) and the market (commercialism), they operate culturally and politically 
much as the pamphlets and coffee shops of Habermas’s ideal public sphere: they provide 
the basis for the conversation between citizens that Habermas identified as crucial to the 
operation of the public sphere.  For example, Peter Dahlgren writes, “If publics emerge in 
the discursive interaction of citizens, then audiences (that is to say, the position of being 
an audience member) should be realistically seen as a moment, a step in the process of 
being a member of the public.”25  He clarifies, “The ‘publicness’ can be said to emerge in 
the social practices which emanate beyond that interface.”26  Thus it is the social role of 
television, not just the content of its texts, which for Dahlgren positions it as a site of 
public activity.  Television programming becomes the launching pad for the 
conversations, discussions, and debates amongst citizens that form the basis of the 
contemporary public sphere.   
Each of the television reform campaigns has begun with the premise that the 
activists and their interests have been omitted from the public sphere.  To borrow from 
Engin Isin’s model of citizenship in Being Political, television reform campaigns have 
been moments when activists have become publics.  For Isin, the definition of 
citizenship, of who belongs within a national community, always has had an 
accompanying construction of the excluded.  The process of being political begins when 
                                                
25 Peter Dahlgren, “Introduction,” in Communication and Citizenship: Journalism in the Public Sphere in 
the New Media Age, ed. Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks (London: Routledge, 1991), 17. 
26 Ibid., 17. 
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people who exist outside the category of the citizen make public claims for citizenship, 
and in the process expand and redefine conceptions of citizenship.  To be political is at 
once to claim civic membership while acknowledging one’s own outsider status.27  To 
extend Isin’s framework, to be a public is to claim one’s status as an important voice in 
the public sphere while simultaneously illustrating one’s silence within it.  Television 
reform continually has been a performance, as well as an interrogation, of what it means 
to be a public and implicitly has exposed the limitations of television’s role as arbiter of 
public culture.   
 
DEFINING TELEVISION AND ITS AUDIENCE 
For activists, television has played and continues to play an integral role in 
American social and political life.  They have viewed television as a site of where 
identities have been constructed, the parameters of political debate have been determined, 
the creative and imaginative lives of audiences have been fired or dimmed.  In this 
regard, they have joined in a cultural discussion over the role of television in American 
society that has existed concurrently with television itself.  This conversation has focused 
both on how we should define what television is and on how to understand its impact on 
audiences and American institutions.  Importantly, the way that activists have answered 
these questions both has drawn on and has countered existing discourses about television.  
In addition to the legal discourse on television—as mapped through policy, law, and 
court decisions--activists have engaged with two dominant ways of thinking about 
television: television as mass culture and television as “boob tube.”  
                                                
27 Engin F. Isin, Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2002). 
 24 
Though television made its debut in 1939 at the World’s Fair in New York, it was 
not successfully launched as a mass medium until after World War II.  By the early 
1950s, nearly one-quarter of all American households had television sets; by the end of 
that decade, well over ninety percent.  However, television’s social role was already the 
topic of numerous tracts and articles in the late 1940s, a time before it had come to 
dominate American popular culture.  Predictions of critics ranged from the immensely 
utopian to the starkly pessimistic and anticipated the parameters of how television’s 
social role would be defined.  For some, television would strengthen communities, 
expose people to things they had never seen before, and ultimately bring about world 
peace.28  For others, it would intensify the trend begun by radio to commercialize and 
commodify forms of cultural expression.29  Critics cast television’s impact in grandiose 
terms; though the nature of its influence was the subject of debate, its potential to alter 
radically the social and political life of the country seemed certain to many individuals.30  
Critics have enlisted television in part of a wider critique of mass culture, one 
which crystallized after World War II but continued to resonate for decades to follow.  
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School perhaps best articulate 
this viewpoint in their essay on the culture industries in The Dialectic of Enlightement. 
                                                
28 Perhaps the most ambitious and excited prediction about television is Thomas Hutchinson’s Here is 
Television, Your Window to the World.  Hutchinson, who was an engineer for the DuMont network, in his 
preface suggests that television will not only bind communities together, but will ultimately bring about 
world peace.  In Make Room for TV, Lynn Spigel illustrates how early television advertisements similarly, 
though less ambitiously, positioned television as an instrument that will bring family and friends together.  
See Thomas Hutchinson, Here is Television, Your Window to the World (New York: Hastings House, 
1946), ix-xi; Lynn Spigel, Make Room for TV: Television and the Family Ideal in Postwar America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 36-72. 
29 For example, Jack Gould, the radio and television critic for the New York Times for many years, was 
deeply suspicious of television.  See Jack Gould, “Television Boon or Bane?” The Public Opinion 
Quarterly 10.3 (1946): 314-320. 
30 This optimism and pessimism is in line with how other forms of mass media had been received in 
American culture.  Daniel Czitrom’s analysis of the telegraphy, motion pictures, and radio illustrates how 
new media technologies continually have inspired utopic fantasies and dystopic anxieties.  See Daniel 
Czitrom, Media and the American Mind From Morse to McLuhan (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Caroline Press, 1982). 
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Adorno and Horkheimer situate the culture industries within the Fordist shift to mass 
production; the culture industries, in other words, bring culture into the same destructive 
process of industrialization.  According to Adorno and Horkheimer, the products of the 
culture industries resemble life closely enough, but structure our understanding of the 
world in keeping with ideas that support the power structure in society.  They create 
wants and desires consonant with capitalist values, and inculcate these values within their 
audiences.  Mass culture, in this framework, creates a mass audience that is unable and 
unwilling to resist the unequal and oppressive system of power that undergirds capitalist 
society.31 Critics Dwight MacDonald and Clement Greenberg, in their works of mass 
culture and kitsch, have drawn on this criticism.  For them, the danger of mass culture is 
that displaces or waters down high culture, a phenomenon that carries with it not just 
artistic but political consequences: it enables totalitarianism and shuts down the openings 
for radical thought previously engendered by the avant-garde.32 
A variation on this mass culture critique appears sociologist C. Wright Mills’s 
best-selling The Power Elite.  In his chapter on the “mass society,” Mills links the ascent 
of the “power elite”—the political, military, and industrial leaders who make crucial 
decisions without the consent of the people—to the rise of a mass society enabled by 
mass culture.  Mills charts the transition from a community of publics, in which 
individuals are invested and active in political debate, to a mass society in which 
individuals are rendered politically impotent and complacent.33 If for Adorno and 
Horkheimer the culture industries stamp out the possibility of revolution, for Mills they 
                                                
31 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” in 
The Cultural Studies Reader, 2nd ed., ed. Simon During (London: Routledge, 1993), 32-41. 
32 Dwight MacDonald, “A Theory of Mass Culture,” in Mass Culture: The Popular Arts in American, ed. 
Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White (New York: The Free Press, 1957), 59-73; Clement 
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Rosenberg and David Manning White (New York: The Free Press, 1957), 98-107. 
33 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 298-324. 
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signal the end of a vibrant public sphere and healthy political debate.  For both, they 
transform individuals into a disempowered mass, entertained into submission and 
complacency.  It is a view that later media critics like anti- television activist Jerry 
Mander would emphasize in his screed against TV, and Noam Chomsky, Edward 
Herman, and Robert McChesney would invoke in their analyses of the political economy 
of the mass media.34  It is a view that also has been reinforced in a long line of American 
movies that continually have constructed the television audience as a highly susceptible 
and slack-jawed mass, uncritically embracing what passes over its television screens.35  
Other critics have defined television as something akin to an aesthetic cesspool 
that has spoiled American culture.  In this line of thinking, television’s sin is not its 
ability to disempower, but its tendency to turn what it touches into unintelligent drivel, a 
view perhaps best epitomized by architect Frank Lloyd Wright’s characterization of 
television as “bubblegum for the eyes.”  When FCC Chairman Newton Minow famously 
referred to television as a “vast wasteland,” he invoked this view of television as 
dominated by insipid programming.  Neil Postman elaborates upon and popularizes this 
view in Amusing Ourselves to Death, which argues that television has reduced public 
affairs journalism to sleazy sensationalism, has replaced edifying culture with banal 
entertainment, and has reduced religious ritual to another form of spectacle.36  On 
television, the sacred becomes profane and the result is a nation of poorly-informed dolts 
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36 Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business (New York: 
Viking, 1985). 
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with an under-developed inner life.   This construction television as “boob tube” has been 
a recurring discursive trope, animating popular representations of television for decades.  
It has been especially powerful for individuals and groups concerned with the impact of 
television on children.37   
Significantly, this discourse often has tied the poor, formulaic qualities of 
television programming to its commercialism.  In some ways, the “boob tube” criticisms 
have overlapped with the mass culture critique.  Both have focused on the negative 
consequences of the commodification of culture, the takeover of cultural expression by 
profit-driven industries.  However, while the mass culture critics emphasize the negative 
consequences of mass culture on both the individual and on the polity, the boob tube 
critics stress the poor quality of televisual texts and the decline of artistic quality that the 
medium encourages.  The mass culture critics fundamentally oppose capitalism, 
implicating mass culture in its reification; the boob tube critics are suspicious of 
unchecked commercialism and the denigrated aesthetic standards it promotes.  
Though these critics have disagreed over how to characterize television, their 
inquiries fundamentally have spoken to television’s impact on its audience.  For some, 
television renders its viewers a mass audience, seducing them into complicity with the 
ideology that supports the power structure within society.  For others, television dumbs 
down its audience by feeding it a steady stream of insipid and unimaginative 
programming.  To be sure, activists continually have engaged with these discourses in 
their reform campaigns. Television activists often have imagined television audiences are 
uncritical consumers, passively accepting the images and ideas that pass over their 
screens.  This is a vision of the television audience that the mass culture critics would 
                                                
37 The Parents Television Council, which L. Brent Bozell III founded in 1995 and which quickly became a 
leading advocate for children and families, repeatedly has argued that increased commercialism leads to 
programming that is sleazy, unintelligent, and harmful to children.  See chapter six for more details. 
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find familiar, one that assumes a monolithic audience whose values and views of the 
world are shaped by the texts that they consume.  Indeed, it is this construction of the 
audience that has lent urgency to the reformers’ campaigns: television is a crucial 
battleground because of its tremendous power over its audiences.  Some, in contrast, have 
emphasized how the poor quality of commercial television negatively affects its viewers 
and have agitated for stations that would operate without a reliance on sponsor dollars or 
for policies that would temper the power of commercial stations.  What is consistent is 
their view of a passive television audience, either easily swayed ideologically or 
entertained into becoming an ignorant mass.  
Ironically, activist campaigns at once have attested to the power of television 
publics while they simultaneously have been sites where this construction of passive 
audiences has been rearticulated and reinforced.  This tension between the empowered 
public and the disempowered audience runs throughout the case studies.  It speaks to the 
activists’ contention that they belong outside of the category of “audience,” yet 
simultaneously to their belief that their reform campaigns work on behalf of this very 
audience and contribute to the public good.   To be sure, the audience assumed by the 
reformers is, in Ien Ang’s phrase, an “imaginary entity”38--one that does not reflect actual 
behaviors, but rather reformers’ projections of how audiences behave.   
                                                
38 Ien Ang, Desperately Seeking the Audience (London: Routledge, 1991), 32. As Ang argues in 
Desperately Seeking the Audience, both commercial television systems and public service television 
systems understand the television audience as “an objectified category of others to be controlled.”38  In 
Ang’s language, commercial broadcasters use an audience-as-market model, public service broadcasters an 
audience-as-public.  For the former, audiences are consumers; for the latter, citizens.  While Ang 
acknowledges fundamental differences between the two approaches, she also argues that both institutions 
“foster an instrumental view of the audience as object to be conquered.”  In other words, both forms of 
television share a paternalistic view of their audience.  While one seeks to capture and sell it to sponsors 
and the other to edify and uplift it, they both impose their own vision of who their audience is and develop 
tools of measurement and study that foster this view.  Labeling this perspective the “institutional point of 
view,” Ang’s work seeks to expose how our knowledge of audiences has been constructed and directed so 
that we can move past it to study how actual people behave and engage with television texts.  The audience, 





This dissertation is organized around five case studies.  Chapter one focuses on 
the activism of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP).  The NAACP was one of the earliest activist groups to put pressure on 
broadcasting networks to alter their programming.  In particular, this chapter focuses on 
the NAACP’s boycott of the Amos ‘n’ Andy television program (CBS, 1951-3).  Building 
a coalition of its local chapters, labor unions, and other civil rights organizations, the 
NAACP tried to pressure local stations, the CBS network, and the show’s sponsor (Blatz 
Beer) to remove the program from the airwaves.   
The second chapter examines the rise of non-commercial broadcasting, 
culminating in the passage of the Public Broadcasting Act (1967).  This chapter 
specifically traces the transformation of educational television to public television. 
Though the terms “educational” “non-commercial” and “public” broadcasting are often 
used synonymously, they signify different understandings of the "problem" of television, 
as well as distinct constructions of television's public and the medium's public interest 
requirements.  The shift from a focus on educational to public broadcasting, I argue, is 
also rooted in the larger cultural shift from the World War II/immediate post-war period 
to the 1960s.   
 Chapter three investigates the television reform activism of the National 
Organization for Women (NOW) in the early 1970s. Like other social justice groups of 
the period, NOW drew on a recent court case, United Church of Christ v. Federal 
Communications Commission (1966), which expanded the rights of the broadcasting 
public to include participation in the license renewal process; often, such participation 
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centered on the filing of a petition-to-deny license renewal of an offending station.  NOW 
used its petitions to pressure broadcasters to improve televisual representations of 
women, to employ more women, and to recognize that women are part of the public 
which broadcasters are required to serve. Through its media activism, NOW’s members 
learned to navigate and articulate their twin roles as citizens and consumers and often to 
collaborate with other women’s rights groups, forming important alliances with local 
feminist organizations and with civil rights organizations 
The fourth case study focuses on the Media Research Center (MRC), a 
conservative watchdog group formed by Brent Bozell III in 1987.  Since its founding, the 
MRC has monitored the mainstream media for “liberal bias” and has disseminated its 
findings to subscribers, members of both houses of Congress, the major mainstream news 
organizations, and conservative talk show hosts, pundits, think tanks, and publications.  
The MRC, thus, wages its reform fight on the battleground of discourse and its purpose is 
to direct the public to see the media through the lens of contemporary conservatism.  
Media reform functions as a tool in the political battle waged by conservatives and serves 
to cohere a disparate conservative movement.   
In the final chapter I explore the coalition that formed to fight new media 
ownership rules proposed by the FCC in 2003.  These groups, who held widely different 
political views, feared that increased media consolidation would threaten democracy, 
increase indecency and commercialism, and denigrate the quality of programming.  At 
stake in the campaign were not just concerns over media ownership, but over the logic of 
deregulation that had defined American broadcasting policy for twenty years.   
Though each of the chapters functions as a snapshot of a distinct campaign, 
together they tell a story of social reform in an age of television.  As activists have tried 
to advance racial and gender equality, spread access of educational opportunities crossed 
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class and regional boundaries, promote conservative values and viewpoints, and rescue 
democracy from the threats that the escalation of corporate power posed to it, they have 
turned to television reform.  Each of the reform campaigns has tried to change television 
so that it better reflects the political and moral commitments of the reformers themselves.  
In addition, staging these reform campaigns has involved not only an engagement with 
broadcasting law and policy, but also a deliberation over the meaning of political 
citizenship and publicity in a mass-mediated society.  In pursuing television reform, 
activists furthermore have participated in a conversation over the definition of 
television—its social role, its relationship to its audience, and its limitations and 
possibilities as the locus of a national public culture.  
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Chapter 2:  The NAACP and the Struggle Over Prime Time 
When CBS launched the Amos ‘n’ Andy television show, sponsored by Blatz 
Beer, it seemed like it had a bankable hit.  The radio program, performed by creators 
Freeman Gosden and Charles Correll, was one of the most successful shows on the air, 
by 1931 drawing forty million listeners nightly.39  CBS had lured Gosden and Correll 
away from NBC in its infamous 1948 talent raid that resulted in CBS’s acquisition of 
twelve of the top fifteen radio programs, including Amos ‘n’ Andy.40  Using its new 
advantage in radio programming, and the $6.6 million dollars in revenues that this 
advantage afforded the network, CBS was able to finance its television network.41  
Unlike its major rival in broadcasting NBC, CBS focused on promoting sitcoms on 
television, a format that had succeeded on radio.  Premiering in the summer of 1951, 
Amos ‘n’ Andy was one such program that after its phenomenal radio success would bring 
in viewers to this burgeoning entertainment medium.  While Gosden and Correll, two 
white men, continued to perform in audio blackface on the radio show, the television 
version had an all African American cast acting out the characters made famous on radio.  
On network television, Amos ‘n’ Andy lasted two seasons.  Though much of television 
programming in this period was broadcast live, the Amos ’n’ Andy show was filmed at the 
Hal Roach studios in Hollywood; after CBS took it off its schedule, the network 
                                                
39 Bart Andrews and Ahrgus Juilliard, Holy Mackerel!: The Amos ‘n’ Andy Story (New York: E.P. Dutton, 
1986), 25. 
40 In 1948-49, CBS offered top NBC talent assistance to set themselves (the performers) up as individual 
corporations that would then be licensed to CBS.  This arrangement allowed for their income to be taxed at 
a much lower capital gains rate.  William Boddy, “Building the World’s Largest Advertising Medium: CBS 
and Television, 1940-1960,” in Hollywood in the Age of Television, ed. Tino Balio (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 
Inc., 1990), 71. 
41 Ibid., 71. 
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syndicated it to local stations, where it stayed on the air until 1966.  The radio show had 
gone off the air in 1960, after thirty-two years of continuous broadcast.   
Beloved by many, Amos ‘n’ Andy also drew the ire of African American listeners 
and viewers.  The Pittsburgh Courier launched a campaign against the radio program in 
1931.  Robert Vann, the editor of the newspaper, tried to get one million signatures on a 
petition, to be delivered to the Federal Radio Commission (the precursor to the Federal 
Communications Commission), to demand that the FRC ban the program from the 
airwaves.  Though Vann’s efforts garnered support from a number of African American 
groups, it failed to reach its goal and the radio show stayed on the air.  Additionally, 
many African American listeners disagreed with Vann’s assessment that the show was 
demeaning.  They viewed him as a crusader who not only sought to define African 
American identity in keeping with a middle class ideology of uplift, one that did not 
resonate with all African Americans’ experiences.42 
This pattern would reemerge twenty years later when the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) protested the television version of Amos 
‘n’ Andy.  The NAACP objected to the show on the grounds that it presented African 
Americans in the tradition of minstrel shows, as grotesque and degrading caricatures. The 
association had not joined the Courier radio protests in the 1930s, but saw in the 
television show a much greater harm.  “Visually,” the national office wrote to local 
branches, “those shows do more damage in perpetuating stereotypes than did the radio 
presentations.” 43 For the association, the visual quality of the television broadcast made 
this new broadcast medium of much more significance than radio. Though many 
                                                
42 Melvin Patrick Ely, The Adventures of Amos ‘n’ Andy: A Social History of an American Phenomenon 
(New York: The Free Press, 1991), 172-183. 
43 NAACP National Office to Local Chapters, August 15, 1951, NAACP Protest Files, University of Texas 
at Austin Microfilm Collection.  
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organizations would join the NAACP protests, which primarily took the form of letter-
writing campaigns and boycotts of the sponsor, many viewers strenuously disagreed with 
the NAACP’s assessment of the show and its contention that it contained derogatory 
depictions of African Americans.  Like the Courier protests of the 1930s, the NAACP 
protests of the 1950s exposed fissures over what constitutes acceptable representations of 
African Americans and elicited debate over who is to define the contours of African 
American identity. 
The protests over Amos ‘n’ Andy have become an iconic moment in the struggle 
over civil rights in the early 1950s.  The NAACP itself positioned the show as a key 
obstacle in the advance of racial parity, identifying the demeaning representations as 
contributors to race-based violence and cultural misunderstandings.  It is in this line of 
analysis that scholars subsequently have approached the NAACP protests.  Placed in the 
context of the burgeoning civil rights movement of the postwar period, the protests have 
become a way to illustrate the divisions within African American opinion on both the 
struggles that face them and the means to attain advancement within American society.44  
As this chapter will argue, the NAACP protests also constituted a crucial moment in the 
development of public participation in television.  
Significantly, when the NAACP turned its attention to television in 1949, less 
than ten percent of Americans had TV sets in their homes.  Though this number would 
increase dramatically over the course of the 1950s, at the time of the Amos ‘n’ Andy 
                                                
44 Almost all discussions of the Amos ‘n’Andy protests take this tact. See, for example, Thomas Cripps, 
“Amos ‘n’ Andy and the Debate over American Racial Integration,” in American History/American 
Television: Interpreting the Video Past, ed. John E. O’Connor (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 
1983), 33-54; Ely,, 223-237; and Leonard C. Archer, Black Images in the American Theatre: NAACP 
Protest Campaigns—Stage, Screen, Radio & Television (Brooklyn: Pageant-Poseidon, LTD., 1973), 233-
259. 
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protests less than one-quarter of American households had television sets.45  An east 
coast (where most programming originated) to mid-west chain connection of broadcast 
stations did not develop until 1949; coast-to-coast broadcasts were not feasible until 
1951.  Additionally, this was the period of the FCC freeze (1948-1952), when the 
commission refused to grant any new station licenses until it had devised an allocation 
scheme, settled on which part of the bandwidth would be available for broadcast 
television, and determined how many stations—if any—would be set aside for 
educational noncommercial broadcasting.  At this time, furthermore, the FCC was 
debating which system of color broadcasting would become the standard for the industry. 
The NAACP decided to participate in the shaping of television when its pervasiveness 
was more of a promise than an actuality and when its impact across the culture was 
symbolic rather than real.  The NAACP’s hope, as evidenced in these early protests, in 
fact laid in its intention to influence the development of TV programming at this nascent 
moment in order to secure television’s fidelity to responsible representations of African 
Americans. 
As this chapter will show, the NAACP inserted its Amos ‘n’ Andy protests into 
existing debates over the development of American television. The appeals of the 
NAACP spoke directly to the concerns of the industry and its federal regulators: what the 
proper contours of television programming content could be and how to secure the 
success of television as a commercial medium.  Furthermore, the NAACP campaign drew 
on cold war preoccupations with the mass media as a significant weapon in the global 
battle between the United States and the Soviet Union.  The association thus devised a 
strategy to persuade that its interests were in line with, rather than in opposition to, those 
                                                
45 James L. Baughman, The Republic of Mass Culture: Journalism, Filmmaking and Broadcasting in 
American Since 1941 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 41-42. 
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of the broadcast industry.   In the process, the NAACP conceptualized its interest as the 
public interest; the removal of Amos ‘n’ Andy, in the rhetoric of the NAACP, would serve 
not only African Americans, but the American people more broadly.   
This early instance of public activism met the television industry on its own 
terms.  In its reform strategy—largely composed of economic boycotts and letter-writing 
campaigns—the NAACP positioned the television public as programming consumers, its 
interest and stake in television centering on what it would watch and the pressure it could 
exert on stations and sponsors. In helping shape the early discourse on television, the 
NAACP reinforced the institutional status quo and taught viewers how to watch 
television and to understand their agency as members of television’s public. Furthermore, 
though much of the activism took place at the local level, the rhetoric of the NAACP 
made appeals to a sense of national purpose, ascribing not only widespread implications 
to television programming content but reinforcing the promise of a national cultural 
medium before the material conditions were in place to realize it. 
This chapter begins with a quick summary of the history of the NAACP and of 
the production history of Amos ‘n’ Andy.  The chapter then situates the NAACP 
campaign within the context of concurrent conversations over television in the early 
1950s and highlights how its protests were strategically in dialogue with these concerns.   
For one, it situates the economic emphasis of the NAACP protests against the backdrop 
of an emerging recognition of the purchasing power of African Americans; in this, the 
campaign dually reinforced the potential of African American consumers specifically and 
the construction of the television viewer as a consumer of sponsored goods more 
generally.  Furthermore, in its campaign, the NAACP engaged in the debates over what 
constitutes acceptable programming.  Drawing on the language of “decency” that 
animated these conversations, the NAACP attempted to expand the parameters of what 
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composes proper and socially responsible television programming.   Finally, the Amos ‘n’ 
Andy boycotts drew on cold war preoccupations with programming.  In its rhetoric, the 
NAACP exploited the concerns over the role that broadcasting played in the battle over 
“hearts and minds” by asserting that Amos ‘n’ Andy reinforced Soviet propagandistic 
claims. 
 
THE NAACP, POPULAR CULTURE, AND AMOS ‘N’ ANDY 
For decades prior to the debut of Amos ‘n’ Andy, the NAACP had implicated 
American popular culture it its fight for civil rights.  Founded in 1909 as an interracial 
organization, the NAACP’s primary commitment was to secure basic rights for African 
Americans.  The association, which adopted the platform of W.E.B. DuBois’s Niagara 
Movement, rejected the strategies and approach to black civil rights promoted by Booker 
T. Washington, arguably the most prominent African American leader at the time.  As 
opposed to Washington, who advocated for gradual progress and sanctioned segregation, 
the association used litigation to demand the full application of the fourteenth and 
fifteenth amendments.  In addition to securing civil rights for African Americans, the 
NAACP strenuously fought to stop the wave of lynchings common in the Jim Crow 
south.46 
In 1915, the NAACP participated in a boycott against D.W. Griffith’s Birth of a 
Nation, a film about Reconstruction that painted African Americans as incompetent 
buffoons or savages.  As Thomas Cripps has illustrated, whites within the organization 
did not understand why African Americans were angry about the film nor were they 
supportive of the association’s attempt to censor cinematic content.  The NAACP, along 
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with other African American groups, committed resources to create an alternative African 
American filmmaking community to counter the depictions—and the perspective—
contained within the dominant film industry emerging at this time.47  In this early 
engagement with popular culture, the NAACP foreshadowed how it would deal with 
forms of cultural expression: as images and sentiments to be policed and as forum in 
which African Americans should contribute their own voices and images. 
It was this latter concern that animated many of the transitions that the association 
went through in the 1920s.  Though continuing its work for civil rights and anti-lynching 
legislation, the NAACP also embraced the importance of symbolic interventions into 
American culture and the role that artists and art could play in realizing the goals of the 
organization.  Its publication The Crisis published many of the Harlem Renaissance 
writers and encouraged the cultural production of African Americans at the heart of this 
movement.48  Prominent writers like James Weldon Johnson and Jessie Fauset gained 
prominence in the association, signaling its commitment to support African American 
artists. 
The NAACP also continued to protest derogatory depictions of African 
Americans. For example, in the mid-1940s the NAACP launched a campaign to remove 
“Niggerhead Oysters” and “Niggerhead Shrimp” from supermarket shelves; the 
association found not only the name of the product offensive, but also the illustration on 
the cans which featured a grinning and big-lipped head of an African American boy.  The 
national office wrote letters of complaint both to the manufacturer and to Safeway, whose 
grocery stores carried the product.  In this effort, the NAACP received support from the 
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Urban League and from the National Maritime Union.49  The NAACP would use these 
tactics of letter-writing campaigns, coupled with the formation of a coalition of 
sympathetic organizations, in the following decade in its television protests over Amos 
‘n’ Andy. 
As early as 1949, the NAACP complained about the use of caricatures of African 
Americans on television.  Henry Lee Moon, the NAACP’s director of public relations, 
contacted the DuMont network in June 1949 to complain of the stereotypical presentation 
of two African American crapshooters on the network’s The Morey Amsterdam Show.  
“Television,” wrote Moon, “is a new and growing art and industry.  It seems to me a 
shame that it should retain the old, outmoded stereotypes.  Television, it seems to me, 
should recognize the Negro as an American and cast him in roles of equal dignity with 
those of white actors.”50  The NAACP leveled similar protests over the use of blackface 
on early television shows and the continued characterization of African Americans as 
clown, buffoon, or criminal. It additionally objected to the presentation of African 
Americans in stereotyped contexts like watermelon eating contests, and protested the use 
of derogatory epithets to refer to African Americans.51  For example, in December 1950, 
after receiving complaints from the NAACP over its decision to broadcast an operatic 
interpretation of Eugene O’Neill’s Emperor Jones, NBC decided not to air it in order to 
secure improved relations with its African American audience.  In particular, the NAACP 
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had objected to the repeated use of the word “nigger” in the production.52  Ironically, 
NBC executives had consulted with NAACP executive Walter White before production 
began on Emperor Jones, who reassured the network that the mood of fantasy and quality 
of art of the play elevated it above concerns over racial conflict.53  In other efforts, 
however, the NAACP received tepid assurances from networks and sponsors that they 
would try not to demean African Americans in their programming and pledges that they 
would take special care in the future. 
In these early protests, the NAACP corresponded with networks and sponsors 
about their concerns over the content of television programs.  In articulating its 
complaints, the organization continually emphasized that the stereotypes of African 
Americans in entertainment—which had characterized depictions on stage, in film, and 
on radio—was out of sync with the progress that African Americans had made in the 
United States.  Furthermore, these protests revealed that the NAACP attributed 
tremendous power to the television medium and its ability to shape the perceptions of its 
audience.  In addition, in the early 1950s, networks like NBC indicated to civil rights 
organizations their interest in appealing to the African American audience and to securing 
responsible representations of African Americans on television.  NBC employed Joseph 
Baker’s public relations firm for the expressed purpose of ameliorating the network’s 
relationship to African American viewers.  In addition to encouraging NBC to form 
relationships with African American newspapers, Baker arranged for members of the 
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network to meet with prominent civil rights leaders, including representatives of the 
NAACP and the Urban League.  In addition, with Baker’s help, NBC programming 
became more sensitive to programming that could offend African American viewers.  As 
he notes in a report to the network in 1951, “The word ‘darky’ is not now defended as ‘an 
endearment.’”54 
When the NAACP turned its attention to the television version of Amos ‘n’ Andy, 
it therefore built on decades of activism to revise the image of African Americans in 
American popular culture.  In this instance, the association targeted a text that had 
achieved iconic status through its radio broadcasts and that seemed poised to reach 
similar heights on television.  The characters of Amos and Andy originally appeared on 
Chicago radio stations as Sam and Henry.  Gosden and Correll began broadcasting on 
WGN in 1926 a show about two black men from Alabama, Sam and Henry, who move 
north to the big city.  The show, which was broadcast for ten minutes/six days a week, 
was a situation comedy with a continuing story whose humor relied on two premises.  It 
was a fish-out-of-water story that traced the experiences of rural southerners as they 
encountered the strange world of the urban north.  Secondly, Sam and Henry contrasted 
the behavior of hard working Sam with lazy and pretentious Henry.55 
Gosden and Correll had aspirations to expand the listening audience of Sam and 
Henry, primarily by recording episodes and leasing the recordings to stations across the 
nation.  WGN refused, and when Gosden and Correll’s contract lapsed in 1928 they left 
WGN for another Chicago station, WMAQ.  At WMAQ, they changed the name of their 
characters—and of the show—to Amos and Andy and tinkered with the details of its back 
story (the characters were now from Georgia, not Alabama).  Additionally, at WMAQ, 
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Gosden and Correll recorded their live broadcasts and formed an informal chain of 
affiliated stations who would broadcast the shows.56  Amos ‘n’ Andy garnered a national 
radio reputation and attracted the attention of the Lord & Thomas advertising agency and 
the NBC network.  In August, 1929, Amos ‘n’ Andy debuted on NBC’s blue network.57 
By 1931, Amos ‘n’ Andy had become a national sensation as more than forty 
million people tuned in nightly to listen.58  Its success led to a number of media tie-ins, 
including dialogue records sold by Victor Talking Machine Company, a comic strip, a 
film Check and Double Check (1930), animated cartoons, and books.59 As early as 1945, 
with the mass introduction of television to the public in sight, Gosden and Correll began 
talking with NBC about adapting their show for TV.  While the radio series initially 
focused on the trials of the two men trying to negotiate life in the big city, the plots of the 
shows revolved increasingly around a third character, George “Kingfish” Stevens.  The 
Kingfish was a prototypical con man who hatched elaborate plans each show that always 
failed.  The television series adopted this plot structure and prominently featured the 
Kingfish character.  Many of the television shows centered on the antics of Kingfish 
trying to con Andy out of money.  Amos, the most honest and intelligent of the show’s 
characters, was much more peripheral to the plot.   
The world inhabited by Kingfish, Amos and Andy on television was a world 
almost entirely inhabited by African Americans.  The central characters spoke in a 
stereotyped southern black dialect dotted with malapropisms and used exaggerated facial 
gestures.  In contrast, the people of their community—the policemen, waitresses, judges, 
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salesgirls—adopted a more conservative demeanor and communicated in “proper 
English.”  However, the NAACP’s ire was incurred from the show’s presentation of the 
central characters that, in the view of the association, drew on offensive minstrel-like 
caricatures of African Americans.  In large part ignoring the show’s presentation of 
multiple African American character types, the NAACP took aim at Amos ‘n’ Andy as a 
program that derided African Americans and that relied on a caricature of African 
Americans that had been a staple of America’s popular culture for way too long. 
The Amos ‘n’ Andy campaign far exceeded the efforts previously put forth by the 
NAACP television protests.  The association elicited the help of a number of groups, 
ranging from labor unions to churches to students organizations.  The NAACP carried off 
a sustained effort to get the show off the air: it passed an official resolution at its Atlanta 
convention in 1951 which took place the week the show premiered on CBS; it pressured 
the network and boycotted the sponsor to cease broadcasting the show; and it enlisted 
local chapters to write to local stations to remove the program and to attract the help of 
churches, unions, bars and taverns, and civil rights groups to join in the campaign.  Even 
after CBS and Blatz took Amos ‘n’ Andy off of network television, the NAACP continued 
its protests when the BBC purchased the show in 1954.60   
Amos ‘n’ Andy received such attention for a variety of reasons.  The NAACP’s 
previous television protests focused on sole appearances or skits on programs or, in the 
case of Emperor Jones, a one-time offering.  Amos ‘n’ Andy, like its predecessor on 
radio, was to be a recurring series, scheduled every Thursday evening on CBS.  The 
offense to the respect and dignity of African Americans, in the view of the NAACP, 
would continue with each broadcast of the series.  Furthermore, given the tremendous 
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popularity of the radio show, Amos ‘n’ Andy promised to be an attention and ratings 
winner on television.  The show also was filmed rather than broadcast live, as was more 
typical in this period.  The telefilms opened the door to future syndication of the show, 
expanding the lifeline of media representations that the NAACP deemed unacceptable 
and lending more urgency to the protest. 
Furthermore, to members of the NAACP, there was not much good in the Amos 
‘n’ Andy show.  In a July 6, 1951 press release, drafted by Executive Secretary Walter 
White, the show depicted African Americans as “amoral, semi-literate, stupid, scheming 
and dishonest,” a caricature that “perpetuates and extends a harmful stereotype which 
went out with the old time minstrel show.”61  The resolution adopted at the Atlanta 
convention later that week reiterated this characterization and pledged that all branches 
and state conferences of the NAACP were to protest the sponsors and promoters of the 
show and, if necessary, to boycott the products to discourage sponsorship.62 
Ostensibly, the NAACP simultaneously was protesting Beulah, a television 
program based on a radio show that had debuted on TV in 1950.  The Atlanta resolution 
listed Beulah alongside Amos ‘n’ Andy as a disgraceful program that maligned African 
Americans.  However, though the show received mention, the efforts of this campaign 
were overwhelmingly and near-exclusively focused on Amos ‘n’ Andy.  Arguably, Amos 
‘n’ Andy especially appalled the NAACP because it presented African American 
professionals (lawyers, judges, doctors) as clowns and buffoons—that, in other words, 
the association was enraged at the maligning of the black middle-class— and was borne 
out by the its lackluster campaign against Beulah.  The title character of the show was a 
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classic “mammy” figure, a large African American maid who doted and fretted over the 
white family for whom she worked.  Because the show limited its caricatures to 
domestics and handymen—Beulah’s handyman boyfriend Bill was depicted as shiftless 
and lazy—and in no way maligned upwardly mobile African Americans, as did Amos ‘n’ 
Andy, the NAACP potentially viewed it as less of a threat to African American 
advancement.   
The national office sent telegrams of protest to CBS, Blatz, and Schenley 
Industries, the company to which Blatz was a subsidiary.  At this time, television 
programs had single sponsors.  It would not be until the end of the decade that the 
magazine format of advertising, in which programs would have multiple sponsors, would 
emerge.  Asserting that the network had invested too much money in the show to cancel 
it outright, CBS vice president Sig Mickelson met with members of the NAACP to devise 
ways to revise the show so that it was more acceptable to the NAACP and the 
constituency that it represented.  This meeting did not yield a useful compromise.  Most 
of the NAACP representatives had concluded after viewing episodes that it was 
inconceivable that the program could be made in an acceptable manner.63  In August, 
1951, Edwin Lukas, the president of the American Jewish Council who sympathized with 
the NAACP efforts, made multiple suggestions to Mickelson to tone down the offensive 
parts of the show.  CBS did not implement his suggestions.64 
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Members of the NAACP also held a series of meetings with representatives of the 
Television Authority (TVA), a newly formed union representing performers on 
television, and with officials from the four major networks. These meetings resulted in a 
public statement issued by the Television Authority that pledged to “secure 
representation of Negroes on television programs, matching their role in everyday life 
and providing opportunities for employment of the many qualified Negro artists among 
the membership of the Television Authority.”65  Indeed, one of the central concerns over 
Amos ‘n’ Andy was that it was one of the only representations of African Americans on 
television.  The NAACP intimated that if there were a more diverse range of depictions, 
the show would by far less dangerous.  The support of the TVA ideally would help secure 
future shows that counteracted these damaging televisual representations of African 
Americans.  In this vein, responding to concerns that the protests would make it difficult 
for African Americans to receive work in the television industry, the NAACP solicited 
assurances from all of the networks that their policies toward hiring African Americans 
had not wavered as a result of the NAACP’s protests.66 
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The association recruited the cooperation of labor unions, churches, student 
organizations, and teacher federations in its boycott of the show.  White wrote the heads 
of approximately 100 organizations to ask for their support.  Among the organizations 
pledging to act: the United Auto Workers-CIO; the Transport Workers Union of 
America; Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders’ International Union; National 
Beauty Culturists League; United Hatters, Caps, and Millinery Workers International 
Union; Students for Democratic Action; American Jewish committee; as well as 
numerous churches across the country.67  The national office also enlisted the local 
branches, conferences, and youth councils of the NAACP.  Gloster Current, director of 
local branches, equipped NAACP members with a list of reasons why Amos ‘n’ Andy was 
unacceptable.  This list reiterated that all of the characters on the show, including the 
lawyers and doctors, were depicted as morons and buffoons; it asserted that the show 
bolstered prejudiced views about African Americans; it maintained that there were 
insufficient alternative representations of African Americans, either on television or in 
other mass media, to combat the derogatory imagery.68 
The national office encouraged local branches to contact the local CBS affiliates 
in their communities to urge them to take the show off the air.  Additionally, it asked 
them to get in touch with local taverns and bars to ask for their participation in the 
boycott of Blatz and other Schenley products.  The national office also asked for local 
help in bringing other organizations and churches into the action against Amos ‘n’ Andy.   
Indeed, the local branches were instrumental in this national campaign.  As a result of the 
actions of the Milwaukee branch, WTMJ-TV announced it would discontinue Amos ‘n’ 
                                                
67 “New Protests Mark 4th Week of ‘Amos ‘n’ Andy’ Battle,” NAACP Press Releasae, July 26, 1951, 
NAACP Protest Files, University of Texas at Austin Microfilm Collection, 15B:10. 
68 Letter to NAACP Branches and State Conferences,  July 16, 1951, NAACP Protest Files, University of 
Texas at Austin Microfilm Collection, 15B:10.; Letter from Gloster Current to Local Chapters, August 
1951, NAACP Protest Files, 15B:9. 
 48 
Andy after it had exhausted its thirteen week contract; this decision was a poignant 
victory, since Blatz’s home was located in Milwaukee.    
In its first season Amos ‘n’ Andy received good ratings: it was the thirteenth top 
rated show.  In its second season its success declined, though the show received an 
Emmy nomination. In this second season, CBS alternated it with another program, the 
Four Star Playhouse, which could account for its decline in the ratings.  Blatz withdrew 
its sponsorship after the second season, and CBS made a few more episodes of the show 
so that it had an ample number to syndicate to local stations.  It is possible that the 
NAACP boycotts contributed to Blatz’s decision, though the brewery made no official 
statement to that effect. In contrast, historian Thomas Cripps asserts that Blatz withdrew 
in order to sponsor the Four Star Playhouse, a more prestigious show that would lend a 
more sophisticated patina to its product.69  Furthermore, as historian Melvin Patrick Ely 
has pointed out, the NAACP campaign, though spirited, did not lead to any changes in 
the content of the program, received little attention in the white press, and even barely 
merited attention in The Crisis—the official organ of the NAACP.70 After Amos ‘n’ Andy 
left network television, African Americans would not receive lead roles in a network 
dramatic series until over ten years later, when Bill Cosby starred in I Spy in 1965. 
 
CONSTRUCTING THE TELEVISION PUBLIC: THE ECONOMIC FOCUS OF THE NAACP 
PROTESTS 
The NAACP protest rhetoric postulated competing definitions of the television 
audience and of the responsibilities that sponsors and stations had to their viewers.  First 
and foremost, the NAACP construed television viewers as consumers and defined their 
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strength in economic terms.  Additionally, as the next two sections will illustrate, the 
NAACP conceived of the audience as citizens and argued that programmers and sponsors 
owed them responsible shows that would foster a healthy democracy; in the context of 
the cold war, furthermore, the NAACP argued that what appears on American television 
affects Americans in relation to their position in the global conflict. This construction of 
the consumer-citizen viewer, applied to the NAACP’s members and its allies in the 
campaign against the NAACP.  However, the NAACP also asserted that television 
viewers more broadly were unwitting recipients of propaganda, incapable of recognizing 
the mistruths presented to them.  This position ascribed tremendous power to the 
television medium and near-powerlessness to its viewers, assuming their inability to suss 
out the misinformation broadcast to them.  The NAACP singled out children as viewers 
fitting this description, but also asserted that uninformed adult viewers had no more 
agency than children in recognizing the propagandistic qualities of programming.  Their 
protests became based on this dueling definition of the empowered citizen-consumer and 
the disempowered dupe. 
The economic power of African Americans played a central role in the NAACP 
protests.  The broadcast and advertising industries in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
discovered that African Americans composed a lucrative demographic.  Broadcasting, 
the trade publication of the radio and television industries, published an article in 
November 1949 informing its readership of the enormous profitability of the African 
American audience.  The counseling firm Kyle, Carter & Eubanks had conducted a study 
that showed that there was no other group “more responsive to specialized advertising 
than the Negro.”  The study urged the inclusion of African Americans in the overall 
market plan and suggested that in urban centers, programming designed for an African 
American audience could bring in profits for stations and sponsors.  Furthermore, the 
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article summarized that African Americans spend $10 million annually and illustrated 
that they were a demographic worth courting.71 
TIDE, a publication for the advertising industry, published a cover story in 1951 
on “Selling the Negro Market.”  Upping the figure of the previous study, TIDE 
maintained that the nation’s fifteen million African American had an aggregate income of 
$12-15 million annually, and thus “compose a market that is, for advertisers, rich, ripe 
and ready.”72  The article included case studies of how certain products successfully 
attracted African American consumers and focused on the use of African Americans in 
ad campaigns.  It stressed that this market “is one of the greatest, single market 
opportunities in the U.S. today for increased sales for advertisers.”73 
Ironically, when Blatz decided to sponsor Amos ‘n’ Andy, one of its goals may 
have been to attract African American consumers by sponsoring a show featuring an all 
African American cast.  The brewery spent $250,000 promoting the show, including a 
sky tour of the nation by executives to popularize it.  Blatz additionally placed ads in Life, 
TV Guide, Ebony, Color, Our World, Tan Confessions, as well as leading trade 
publications and daily newspapers across the country.  The inclusion of African 
American periodicals in Blatz’s media blitz suggests that the brewer hoped that it could 
tap into the African American market through its sponsorship of Amos ‘n’ Andy.74 
The NAACP reiterated the power of African American consumers most obviously 
through its boycott of Blatz and through the campaign’s rhetoric.  Its press releases and 
correspondence continually emphasized that the nation’s fifteen million African 
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Americans spend in excess of $12 billion annually. The NAACP brought up this statistic 
in its initial press release of the campaign; in a July 12 press release; in an August 2 press 
release; in an article by White in Printer’s Ink, and in other public sources. The NAACP 
defined much of the power of African Americans as consumer power.  As Lizabeth 
Cohen illustrates, African Americans had used consumer boycotts since the 1920s to 
protest segregation and discriminatory employment practices.  For decades before the 
advent of television, African Americans had honed the practice of the economic boycott 
to address racial discrimination and inequality.75  When the NAACP turned to this 
practice, it followed in the steps of previous campaigns that had illustrated the economic 
power of African Americans could be used to fight racism. 
In its public rhetoric, the NAACP expanded its conception of consumer agency to 
the television audience beyond African Americans.  In its initial telegram to Blatz, 
disseminated to newspapers, White wrote “No one of the fifteen million American 
Negroes who spend annually today in excess of twelve billion dollars which includes 
Blatz Beer and other Schenley products can fail to resent such libel nor can fair-minded 
white citizens similarly fail to do so by purchasing products of other manufacturers who 
do not gratuitously insult their customers [...].”76  The NAACP explicitly constructed a 
relationship of mutually-understood economic exchange between viewers and sponsors.  
Viewers would purchase the products of sponsors affiliated with responsible 
programming and would avoid those connected to offending shows.  In this instance, the 
NAACP reinforced the economic logic behind advertising and attested to its success in 
aligning products with positive programs.  In other words, the NAACP underlined the 
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notion that products do indeed become associated with the show that they sponsor, that 
audiences in fact make connections between their response to programs and their 
impression of the sponsor that financed them.  Thus, in its efforts to deter sponsorship—
and thus the commercial viability—of Amos ‘n’ Andy, the NAACP implicitly sanctioned 
the commercial sponsorship of television. 
The economic boycott of Blatz reinforced the fact that the relationship between 
television viewers and television producers was one of commercial exchange.  In 
defining its strategy as economic, the NAACP reminded viewers of the intentions of 
television programming to lure potential consumers to buy products as the prime goal.  
The association did not challenge the commercial underpinnings of broadcasting, but 
rather tried to manipulate them to change programming.  In other words, the NAACP 
embraced the commercial cast of broadcasting by empowering viewers as consumers to 
exercise control over television content by putting pressure on sponsors.  It was in this 
role as viewer/consumer that the NAACP assigned power to the television public in their 
efforts to cajole program producers. 
 
BLUE-NOSES AND HIGH-BROWS: DEBATES OVER TELEVISION CONTENT 
The NAACP also defined television not merely as medium of commerce, but as 
an instrument of citizenship and democracy.  It posited that television actively 
participated in strengthening the democracy of the United States and functioned as a 
representative of American culture to foreign countries.  As citizens, then, the NAACP 
and its cohort claimed a stake in the shaping of television programming as it alternately 
could enhance or impinge on their rights and security.  In a letter from the national office 
to local branches, the NAACP stated that one of the central reasons to get Amos ‘n’ Andy 
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off the air was that it hampered the ability for African Americans to attain full citizenship 
rights77.   
This concern was best expressed when the NAACP linked the derogatory imagery 
of Amos ‘n’ Andy to the race-based violence that erupted in Cicero, IL in July 1951.  
After an African American family tried to move into an apartment building in Cicero, a 
predominantly white suburb of Chicago, a three-day riot broke out that required Illinois 
governor Adlai Stevenson to bring in the National Guard.78  Franklin Williams, the 
NAACP’s west coast regional director, pointed out that “there is a dangerous and tragic 
relationship between Cicero, Illinois” and the Amos ‘n’ Andy show.79  Indeed, letters to 
White and members of the NAACP reiterated the connection between the violence and 
the television show, implying that the security of African Americans—and of American 
neighborhoods generally—could be compromised by misleading caricatures on 
television.  Gustav Faber, the head of the Transport Workers Union of America who had 
joined with the NAACP protest, stated “the recent riots in Cicero, Illinois should be 
ample proof of the harm that programs such as [Amos ‘n’ Andy], which depict the Negro 
in a stereotype and derogatory manner can do.”  In a letter to Blatz, the head of the New 
York Arts Council stated: “As the Negro people face a new tide of lynchings and terror—
as evidenced by the recent Cicero riots and other hoodlum attacks—your show spreads 
bigotry in its most shocking form as it invades our homes, poisons the minds of 
children.”80 
                                                
77 Letter to Local Branches. 
78 “Clashes in Illinois Bring Out Troops,” New York Times, July 13, 1951, 38; “Barbed Wire Bars Rioters 
in Chicago” New York Times, July 14, 1951, 28. 
79 Franklin H. Williams, “Negro Columnists Hit ‘Amos ‘n’ Andy,’” August 16, 1951, NAACP Protest 
Files, University of Texas at Austin Microfilm Collection, 15B:10. 
80 Letter to Blatz. NAACP Protest Files.  Series 15, Part B, Reel 9. 
 54 
One of the central arguments made by the NAACP, echoed in the above 
quotation, was that white audiences would take the representations of African Americans 
on screen as accurate.  The association often singled out families, and especially children, 
as misinformed viewers.   In a press release, White asserted that television provided for 
“the perpetuation of harmful stereotypes of the Negro among many white families and for 
many white children whose only contact with colored people is through the televised 
version of such shows as ‘Amos ‘n’ Andy and ‘Beulah.’”81  In its list of twelve reasons 
why the Amos ‘n’ Andy show should be taken off the air, one-quarter focused on the fact 
that white viewers, including children, learned about African Americans from the show 
and would not be able to discern its exaggerations and mistruths.  This tack also indicated 
a conception of the viewing public, the millions of whites who were not engaged with the 
boycott, as passive dupes uncritically believing what they saw on television.  
Furthermore, the emphasis on children reiterated television’s role as a domestic medium, 
located in the intimacies of the home of American viewers. 
The NAACP was not the only organization concerned about the content of 
television programs.  As the broadcasting industry and its federal regulators tried to work 
out the kinks in the technical aspects of television broadcasts, they simultaneously turned 
their attention to appropriate programming and to the responsibilities of broadcasters to 
their public.  In response to public complaints over the vulgarities and “poor taste” of 
programming, the FCC threatened the broadcast industry with stricter regulations.  
Reacting to concerns over whether television would fulfill its potential to be an 
educational--as well as an entertainment--medium, the FCC and Congress considered 
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whether to allocate a fixed number of television channels to non-commercial applicants 
for educational purposes.   
The Radio Act of 1927, and the subsequent Federal Communications Act of 1934, 
both prevented federal censorship of broadcasting while it also placed basic restrictions 
on broadcast content.  Section 29 of the Radio Act states:  
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the licensing 
authority the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals 
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be 
promulgated or fixed by the licensing authority which shall interfere with the right 
of free speech by means of radio communication.  No person within the 
jurisdiction of the United States shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane 
language by means of radio communication.82 
Broadcast speech is protected First Amendment speech, and thus federal regulators could 
not censor it.  The one exception would be in cases of “obscene, indecent, or profane 
language,” which the act clearly prohibits.  This section of broadcasting legislation 
historically has run up against the basis of federal regulation: to ensure that broadcast 
licensees meet the “public interest, convenience, and necessity.”  Though unable to 
censor speech, the FCC has had the power to assign, renew and revoke broadcast licenses 
based on who it deems meets the above criteria.  Though not a mandate to censor, the 
FCC could use this power in effect to dictate what type of programming it considers in 
the “public interest.”  Thus, though broadcasters did not have to worry about official 
censorship, the specter of losing their licenses should they renege on their public interest 
has obligations loomed over them. 
In 1946, the FCC issued a book entitled Public Service Responsibilities of 
Broadcast Licensees.  Known as the “Blue Book” (its cover was blue), this document was 
the result of a five-year study that contrasted the promises of broadcast applicants with 
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their records.  The Blue Book defined for broadcasters how the FCC would ascertain 
whether license renewal applicants had fulfilled their public interest obligations.  
Specifically, it encouraged sustaining programs (non-sponsored shows), live and local 
programs, programming dedicated to the discussion of public issues, and the avoidance of 
advertising excesses.83 In issuing the Blue Book, the FCC did not warn of explicit 
censorship, though clearly it threatened the denial of broadcast licenses should licensees 
ignore the public interest mandate in favor of appealing to commercial interests.  In 
September 1949, the FCC began planning to extend the Blue Book to television 
broadcasters as well.84   
To intensify pressures, in 1950 FCC Chairman Wayne Coy warned broadcasters 
that unless they cleaned up their programming, a more drastic government remedy would 
be imposed on them.  “Poor taste,” stated Coy, “is not in the public interest.”  Coy 
asserted that the FCC had been receiving increased numbers of letters complaining of 
degrading antics, vulgarities, indecency, and so on.  Acknowledging the FCC’s inability 
to censor, Coy reminded broadcasters of the FCC’s responsibilities to see that stations 
operate in the public interest, and hence to act to secure it.85 Later that year, 
Commissioner Frieda Hennock warned television stations in particular that, if they wish 
for their licenses to be renewed, they must consider their public interest obligations.  
Hennock stated: “the public is the actual owner of television.”86 
While the menace of the Blue Book and of the FCC commissioners’ allegations 
intimidated broadcasters, a threat from Congress also hovered over them.  In 1951, Sen. 
Benton advocated for the establishment of a National Citizens Advisory Board, an eleven 
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person citizen committee to oversee acceptable broadcasting practices; this committee, 
appointed by the president, would supplement rather than displace, the FCC.  The board 
would be, according to Benton, “a catalyst of listener and viewer opinion,” that would 
produce an annual Blue Book of strictures for broadcast programming.  Benton and his 
supporters reasoned that commercial radio had done an inadequate job of educational and 
public service broadcasting, that television had not done much better, and that it seemed 
unlikely that commercial broadcasting will improve.  This Advisory Board was one 
avenue to improve the quality of broadcasting.87   
A final threat to commercial broadcasters in this period came from educators and 
education advocates.  In 1950, the Joint Committee on Educational Television (JCET)—
an organization that represented the American Council on Education, Association for 
Education by Radio, Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities, the National 
Association of Educational Broadcasters, and other groups—petitioned for television 
stations for noncommercial, educational purposes.  Specifically, it asked the FCC to 
reserve one VHF station in major metropolitan areas and twenty percent of all UHF 
channels for television.88  In addition to the twenty-one witnesses that JCET presented to 
the FCC to make its case for educational television, FCC Commissioner Hennock and 
Sen. John Bricker (R.-Ohio) were strenuous advocates of reserving stations for this 
purpose.89  Furthermore, the Ford Foundation provided a $90,000 grant to JCET to make 
the case to educational institutions for the need to pressure the FCC for educational 
television.90  This push for noncommercial, educational stations concerned broadcasters 
                                                
87 Dave Berlyn “Annual Blue Book? Advocated by Sen. Benton for Radio-TV,” Broadcasting, Telecasting, 
June 4, 1951, 25. 
88 “VHF-UHF Channels: Educators Ask in Petition,” Broadcasting, Telecasting, November 27, 1950, 77. 
89 “Educators Take Up Torch for TV Channels,” Broadcasting, Telecasting, December 4, 1950, 55, 96. 
90 Edwin H. James, “Educational Dilemma: How to Use and Finance TV?,”  Broadcasting, Telecasting,  
July 16, 1951, 58. 
 58 
tremendously.  Thad Brown, the television director of the NARTB, stated that the 
reservation of channels for educational purposes, in certain communities, would mean 
that twenty-five to fifty percent of available channels in specific places would go to 
educators.91 
Broadcasters, afraid of the Blue Book and intensified federal oversight over 
programming and of the threat that potential commercial stations would be usurped by 
noncommercial educational stations, began planning for a television code of standards 
and practices.  Like the motion picture industry, the broadcasting industry had adopted a 
self-regulating code to stave off federal censorship of programming.  The National 
Association of Broadcasters in 1929 adopted its first code of standards and practices.  
This early version of the code prohibited the broadcast of false, misleading or deceptive 
programs or advertisements; required adherence to the Radio Act of 1927’s mandate of 
clear identification of all sponsored and paid-for broadcasts; and addressed standards of 
business practices for stations.92  The National Association of Radio and Television 
Broadcasters (NARTB) began crafting a revised code in the early 1950s to address 
television. 
By the end of 1951, the NARTB had written and adopted a television code.  This 
code did the following: it set up a review board to enforces its provisions; it empowered 
the use of an official seal for participating broadcasters (though permits non-members to 
use the seal); it suggested “shoulds” and “not recommended” for advertising and program 
practices;  it proposed time limits on advertising similar to those used for radio; it 
opposed sale of television time to churches and religious parties; and it gave power to the 
NARTB to check unfair and unscrupulous competition within the industry.  The code 
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also addressed themes of good taste and decency in programming in direct response to 
Benton’s concerns.  It advocated community responsibility, decency and decorum, 
responsible programming for children, treatment of news and public events, discussion of 
public issues, as well as other issues related to responsible programming.93  Though the 
four major networks were not members of the NARTB, they each already had or were 
devising their own codes of standards and practices at this time.94 
The concerns of Congress and the FCC regarding programming content, which 
the industry was responding to, circled around anxieties over indecent and vulgar 
programming, over the lack of public interest and news programming, over the 
insufficient job that broadcasters had done in using the airwaves for educational 
purposes, over the overwhelming presence of advertising on the air, and over the neglect 
of local programming and performers.  Broadcasters took steps to alleviate these 
anxieties by adopting codes of standards and practices and by scheduling programs on 
television that met governmental ideas of what constituted appropriate programming.  
The fear of censorship, strict oversight, and loss of commercial stations motivated 
broadcasters to readjust their programming habits. 
The NAACP, in labeling Amos ‘n’ Andy as a show that perpetuates “harmful 
stereotypes” and as an example of lack of “taste and judgment” potentially was trying to 
engage in this conversation over acceptable television content.  It tried to appropriate and 
expand the definition of “vulgar” programming to include not only double-entendres and 
suggestive situations, but also gross caricatures that malign a social group.  In this climate 
of fear over escalating regulation, the NAACP perhaps hoped to alert broadcasters—in 
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their incessant letters to CBS and its affiliates—that Amos ‘n’ Andy could be construed as 
an example of the kind of programming that federal regulators were rallying against.  
The failure to convince broadcasters of this characterization, or for regulators or 
politicians to take up this cause, illuminates the limitations of the debate over 
programming standards.  While much of the activity on this issue centered on what 
broadcasters were not doing—effective news coverage, discussion of current events, 
educational programming, local shows—the discussion over what they should do focused 
on issues of “decency.”  In this context, “decency” referred to the avoidance of sexuality 
or sexual scenarios over the air, as well as the absence of content relating to excretory 
functions.  “Decency” did not cover appropriate representations of people of color, 
immigrant groups, or women.  To be sure, broadcasters and advertisers did not want to 
alienate potential viewers/consumers.  But, unlike the motion picture code that forbade 
the use of derogatory racial or ethnic epithets, the television codes did not address the 
issue of sensitivity to ethnic or racial groups.   Nor did federal regulators and legislators.  
For all of the concern over acceptable programming standards, neither members of the 
FCC nor member of Congress defined the “public interest” obligations of broadcasters in 
line with programming that is respectful of racial or ethnic minorities, however that could 
be defined.   
 
COMMUNISM, TELEVISION, AND AMOS ‘N’ ANDY 
In its protests, the NAACP positioned Amos ‘n’ Andy--and by extension American 
television--as an emissary of American attitudes and cultures to foreign countries.  
Tapping into the cold war anxieties of the period, the NAACP cast Amos ‘n’ Andy as 
propaganda that undermined American claims to freedom by contributing to an 
international perception that the United States preached freedom abroad while practicing 
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racial discrimination at home. The NAACP Philadelphia Youth Council, in a letter to 
WCAU-TV (a CBS affiliate), wrote: “One of the major portions of Soviet propaganda is 
the status of minority groups in our country.  Programs such as Amos ‘n’ Andy are 
subversive to the foreign and domestic programs of the United States which are based on 
recognizations [sic] of the individual worth, for they tend to label an entire segment of the 
population as undesirable.”95 
Indeed, the characterization of Amos ‘n’ Andy as “vicious propaganda” was 
reiterated in a letter to local branches encouraging them to participate in the television 
boycotts.96  The New York branch of the NAACP, in a letter to Lewis Rosenstiel (the 
head of Schenley Industries, owner of Blatz), insisted that, “In this age when the world is 
endeavouring to develop a spirit of unity among all the nations of the world, we believe 
that such a program serves to negate such an objective.”97  The show not only harmed a 
functioning democracy at home, but put American citizens at risk by aiding unwittingly 
the Soviet cause to contradict American claims to freedom.  In this vein, the NAACP 
tapped a central concern over television in the early 1950s: its role in the fight against the 
Soviet Union. 
The broadcasting industry’s entanglements with cold war tensions took two 
primary forms: the rooting out of alleged subversives from the industry and the use of the 
media as a weapon in the fight against the Soviet Union.  For example, almost exactly a 
year before the NAACP launched its Amos ‘n’ Andy campaign, another citizens’ group 
successfully intervened in television programming practices.  Like the NAACP protests, 
participants in this campaign contacted the sponsor and the network of the offending 
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show to register its complaint.  But unlike the NAACP protests, in which thousands of 
people participated, this campaign involved twenty telegrams and two to three phone 
calls.  And unlike the NAACP protests, it worked immediately in removing the program 
from the airwaves.  The telegram-senders and phone-callers had contacted General Foods 
and NBC to protest their television premiere of The Aldrich Family.  Actress Jean Muir 
was to play the maternal head of the family in the television program.  The protesters 
objected to her presence on the cast ostensibly because she had alleged Communist 
sympathies, though no formal accusations in this vein were made.98  General Foods, 
before giving Muir a chance to respond to the charges, cancelled the show’s premier and 
removed Muir from the cast.  A company press release justified this move by stating that 
Muir was a “controversial personality” and might “provoke unfavorable criticism and 
even antagonism among sizable groups of consumers.”99  Two days after General Foods 
fired Muir, the Joint Committee Against Communism (a citizens’ group), and its 
subcommittee on broadcasting, took credit as the prime mover in the protest.100 
The Muir case elicited a tremendous response from the press, much of it in 
condemnation of General Foods’ decision.  In an editorial, The New York Times labeled 
the Muir incident as a “character assassination”; a Business Week article referred to Muir 
as a “victim” and suggested that she had grounds for a lawsuit.101  Much of the press of 
the case focused on Red Channels: The Report of Communist Influence in Radio and 
Television, a list of 151 performers, writers, musicians, directors, and producers who 
allegedly had ties to the Communist Party or to Communist front organizations, which 
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included Muir.102  Muir’s firing, for onlookers, seemed to be evidence that Red Channels 
was to operate as an unofficial blacklist in the broadcasting industry.  As its first public 
victim, Muir symbolized the nefarious potential that Red Channels portended and 
incurred the concern of those outside of the industry that it would hamper innocent 
people’s ability to work.   
The publication of Red Channels on June 22, 1950, extended the investigation and 
subsequent blacklisting common in the film industry at this time to workers in the 
broadcasting industry.  The cover of the publication, which featured a hanging 
microphone in the clutches of a bright red hand, ably communicated not only the purpose 
of the document, but the aura of fear and menace it intended to procure.  In this 
campaign, the American Business Consultants, composed of three former FBI agents 
committed to exposing subversives in multiple arenas of American life, joined 
organizations like the American Legion who similarly targeted the entertainment 
industries as cesspools of Communist activity.103  The American Business Consultants 
sent the pamphlet free-of-charge to its near 4000 subscribers to Counterattack and sold it 
in newsstands and in bookstores. 104  Three days after Red Channels’ publication, the 
Korean War began, intensifying the impact of the pamphlet.  Executives in the 
broadcasting industry, from both a security and a public relations standpoint, felt that 
they could not ignore Red Channels or the Communist threat in American broadcasting 
that it pointed to.105  According to Merle Miller, who penned an account of Red 
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Channels, “None of the information in Red Channels was checked with the persons 
involved.”106 
In early 1950, concerns over the use of American broadcasting for explicit 
Communist propaganda rose to the fore in Congress.  The House Un-American Activities 
Committee charged that WLOA radio station in Braddock, Pennsylvania had broadcast 
radio programs organized by the Communist Party.107  The FCC denied knowledge of 
this program, though the accusation spurred Congress to take action against Communist 
use of American airwaves.  At the end of March 1950, Congress proposed a bill to 
require an organization listed as subversive to identify itself as a “Communist 
organization” when sponsoring a radio or television broadcast.108  The Senate version of 
the bill would have banned broadcasts on behalf of the Communist Party or other 
political organizations unless the sources and sponsors of the program were labeled as 
such.109  A bill proposed in August that year demanded that radio and television facilities 
be denied to U.S. Communists altogether.110  In October, a bill passed both houses, and 
overrode a presidential veto, to require Communist and Communist Front organizations 
to identify themselves in broadcasts.  A part of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 
violation of this law would result in a five year prison term or $10,000 fine.111 The 
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unstated but implied purpose of the law was to undermine Communists’ and Communist 
sympathizers’ credible access to the airwaves. 
Though these bills resulted from the tremendous fear of Communist infiltration in 
this period, they also stemmed from a concurrent redefinition of broadcasting as a vital 
weapon in the cold war.  Politicians in this period conceived of broadcasting as a crucial 
form of “psychological warfare” that they employed around the world to win the “hearts 
and minds” of people both outside of and behind the Iron Curtain.  The State 
Department’s Voice of America and the privately organized Radio Free Europe used the 
airwaves as propaganda for the American “way of life.”  Politicians understood the 
airwaves to be an essential battleground in the cold war, which meant that they had to be 
guarded at home as well as cunningly deployed abroad.  The fear of Communist invasion 
of broadcasting fit this war paradigm employed by President Truman and legislators alike 
in the early 1950s. 
The Voice of America, radio broadcasts paid for and run by the State Department, 
intended to counter Soviet propaganda against the United States.  Characterized as part of 
a “truth offensive” and the nation’s “Marshall Plan of ideas,” 112 the Voice of America 
presented to listeners an image of the United States as the freest country in the world, as 
resourceful and technically advanced, and as committed to scientific progress.  It 
additionally featured political talks by expatriate citizens of Communist countries who 
were natives of the countries behind the Iron Curtain whom the Voice tried to reach that 
articulated the failings of Communism.113  In July 1950, President Truman requested that 
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Congress expand the Voice’s budget, casting it as a crucial part of America’s Cold war 
strategy.  He argued: “Communist leaders have repeatedly demonstrated that they fear the 
truth more than any other weapon at our command.  We must throw additional resources 
into a campaign of truth which will match in vigor and determination the measure we 
have adopted in meeting postwar economic and military problems.”114  Truman thus 
characterized this truth campaign to be enacted by the use of radio airwaves as a crucial 
component to win the cold war. 
At the same time that Congress expanded Voice of America, Radio Free Europe 
also used broadcasting as a means to fight the Cold war.  Run and funded by a privately 
endowed American corporation, Radio Free Europe broadcast to Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia.  It broadcasted plays, music, and 
satires forbidden by Communist leaders to its listeners; it also aired voices of men in 
exile from Communist countries who testified against the direction their homelands had 
taken.115  Like Voice of America and government-funded initiatives, Radio Free Europe’s 
broadcasts were characterized as part of the “psychological war” that had become such an 
integral offensive in the Cold war.116 
The NAACP tried to position its campaign in this larger discourse over 
Communism and Soviet propaganda, but this tactic did not inspire the necessary fears to 
sway the sponsor, the network, or the government to take up its cause.  To be sure, the 
NAACP did not foreground this rhetorical maneuver.  Perhaps if it had more strenuously 
placed its concerns over Amos ‘n’ Andy within the context of the fight against 
Communism, the NAACP may have been more effective.  Instead, it emphasized the 
domestic consequences of the show—its continuation of racial caricatures, its 
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contribution to mistaken ideas about African-Africans that lead (in the case of the Cicero 
riots) to racial violence, its denial (because of these characterizations) of full citizenship 
rights to African Americans who were maligned by the show.  Indeed, the NAACP 
stressed how the show ruptured the alleged American creed of equality and fairness.  In 
this context, when the polarity between the American-dominated free world and the 
Soviet-dominated Communist world was stark, appealing to the insufficiencies of the 
American system potentially undermined the NAACP’s ability to garner support. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite its large coalition of unions and other interest groups, the NAACP did not 
receive widespread support from African Americans. Broadcasting reported at the end of 
July 1951 that, according to Blatz’s advertising agency, by a ratio of ten to one, the letters 
they received on Amos ‘n’ Andy were favorable.117  Additionally, in response to the 
NAACP protests, African American actors formed the Coordinating Council of Negro 
Performers, which endorsed Amos ‘n’ Andy as a program that provided employment to 
African American performers.  The council received congratulations and support from 
the show’s cast.118   In its specific appeals on behalf of African Americans, the NAACP 
was speaking for a community that it did not fully represent. 
Indeed, the legacy of the Amos ‘n’ Andy boycotts has centered on this question of 
who the NAACP spoke for and how we should view its critique of the show.  Two 
documentaries, Amos ‘n Andy: Anatomy of a Controversy (1986) and Color Adjustment 
(1991), presented the NAACP’s case and then provided alternate readings of the show by 
African American viewers who liked the series.  For many African Americans, a 
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television program featuring an all-black cast in the early 1950s in-and-of-itself was 
something worth preserving.  Others enjoyed the humor of the program and did not read 
the characters as white projections of what black individuals would be like, but as part of 
a tradition of African American comedic performances.  Thus the NAACP campaign was 
a window into the complicated and fractured approach to civil rights in the 1950s, a part 
of a larger narrative that acknowledges the wide range of concerns and goals of activists 
in this period. 
Furthermore, the actual efficacy of the campaign on the program is not clear.  
Thomas Cripps has argued that CBS removed Amos ‘n’ Andy from its prime time line-up 
because of declining ratings, not because of pressure from the civil rights activists.  In 
addition, as Doug Battema has shown, the program stayed in syndication for well over a 
decade after CBS cancelled it, at times scoring high ratings in local markets and 
appealing in particular of female and young audiences.  Even though it left the CBS 
prime time line-up Amos ‘n’ Andy continued, as Battema argues, to be a cultural 
touchstone and to present what the NAACP had seen as a myopic view of African 
Americans to audiences until 1966.119 
As this chapter has illustrated, the NAACP Amos ‘n’ Andy boycotts were also a 
central and seminal event in the history of television reform efforts.  One of the first 
public interest groups to identify television as a medium of tremendous influence on 
American audiences, the NAACP devised a campaign that exploited the concerns of the 
television industry and its regulators at a moment when television’s future was still being 
molded.  By suggesting that the show reinforced racist stereotypes and thus underlined 
Soviet propaganda against the United States, the NAACP argued that Amos ‘n’ Andy was 
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hurting the “psychological war” fought over domestic and international airwaves.  By 
characterizing the show as vulgar and in poor taste, and by insisting that it robbed African 
American citizens of their full citizenship rights, the NAACP posited that the show was 
not serving the public interest.  By boycotting the sponsor, and by enlisting over 100 
organizations to join its boycott, the NAACP further tried to exert economic pressure and 
to flex the financial muscle of the African American community.  And by launching its 
campaign at a moment when the nascent television industry was still in flux, the NAACP 
tried to take advantage of this time of relative uncertainty to influence the future of 
television programming. 
In the process, the NAACP contributed to the discursive construction of television 
and its audience.  Despite the NAACP’s inaugural role in citizen activism to reform 
television, this early campaign was essentially conservative in its aims and strategies.  In 
its protests, the NAACP reinforced the commercial structures of the television industry 
and the relegation of the public as consumers whose agency came from its ability to buy 
sponsored products. It did not, in other words, assert a need for diversity in ownership of 
broadcast stations or active public participation in the production of programming; rather, 
the protests served to naturalize the economic the relationships of the broadcast industry 
by basing central campaign strategies upon them. 
Significantly, the NAACP’s use of an economic boycott to influence television 
programming inaugurated what would become a persistent television reform strategy and, 
consequently, a pervasive lens through which activists would define the power of the 
public to affect broadcasting policy decisions.  For example, twenty years after the Amos 
‘n’ Andy protests, when the character Maude decided to have an abortion on the 
eponymous television series, advocates on both sides of the abortion issue put pressure on 
the show’s sponsor alternately to support or abandon the series.  In 2004, conservative 
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groups threatened sponsors of the CBS miniseries The Reagans, effectively pushing the 
network to air the show on Showtime, the pay cable network owned by parent company 
Viacom.  Indeed, the “voting with your feet” approach to television reform, enfolded into 
the discourse of consumerism, saw its earliest widespread use by the NAACP, but 
became a central activist strategy for decades to come. 
The NAACP, in its campaign against Amos ‘n’ Andy, also tried to show the 
public, the industry, and its regulators how to expand the construction of who constitutes 
television’s audience and the responsibilities of broadcasters and sponsors to that 
audience.  Viewers were not only construed as empowered consumers, but also as 
individuals incapable of discerning depictions from reality, or racist images from the 
people that they caricature.  Thus, if the responsibility of broadcasters was to serve the 
public interest, and the task of the FCC to ensure it, then the NAACP illustrated the need 
to expand upon the definitions of offending programming to take into consideration 
shows based on hurtful caricatures or stereotypes.   
Television programs held tremendous import in the shaping of cultural 
perceptions and, by extension, could influence the nation’s progress toward racial 
equality.  Wrapped up in the reformist aspirations of the NAACP were the content of 
television programs; a key part of its broader reform strategy was its campaign against 
offending media representations.  Thus, the NAACP’s efforts brought television into the 
fold of American reform movements.  By tying Amos ‘n’ Andy to race riots and Soviet 
propaganda, the NAACP envisioned television as an important arbiter in American 
political and social life and suggested that television would be an important battleground 
in the fight for social justice and the health of the American democracy.
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Chapter 3: From Educational to Public Television: Creating an 
Alternative to Commercial Broadcasting 
For people of widely different political persuasions, public broadcasting in the 
United States long has been a disappointment.  Dating back to the early 1970s, 
conservatives have viewed public broadcasting as the mouthpiece of the political left and 
continually have called its legitimacy into question, most directly by threatening its 
funding.120  Dubbing the Public Broadcasting System (PBS) an elitist enterprise, they 
have questioned the wisdom of using taxpayer dollars to fund a system that serves a small 
and privileged audience.  Progressives increasingly have become disenchanted with 
public broadcasting as well.  Pointing to, in their view, the escalation of conservative 
voices on public affairs shows, and especially the expanding role corporations in 
financing programming, activists on the left have questioned what makes public 
broadcasting “public” and whether the system is worth saving from the perennial 
conservative attacks.121  At stake in these debates is whether there is a need for a 
noncommercial broadcasting alternative and, if so, if PBS comes close to fulfilling this 
mission. 
The basis for public broadcasting, which Congress created with the Public 
Broadcasting Act of 1967, was that television’s potential could not be realized by 
commercial stations alone.  Freed from the constraints of commercialism, public 
broadcasting could provide a space for creative experimentation, diversity of voices and 
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viewpoints, and locally-produced programming.  The new service was to be—at its 
best—culturally and politically revolutionary.  It was to yield a more informed citizenry 
and expose a wide audience to the best works of art and culture the nation had to offer.  It 
was to transform the television medium itself, expanding the desires and wants of the 
viewing public and encouraging a rise in the quality of all programming.  Public 
broadcasting could accomplish these high ambitions because it would exist outside the 
confines of commercial television. 
Public broadcasting has its origins in educational broadcasting, which. is just 
about as old as broadcasting itself in the United States. The expansion of commercial 
broadcasting, along with the regulatory system that bolstered it, threatened educational 
broadcasters who continually fought to retain a place within the broadcast spectrum. 
Educational broadcasters folded radio and television within the broader edifice of mass 
education and imagined that it could help mitigate against the social inequalities resulting 
from diverging educational opportunities afforded to people based on class and region.  
Their goal was to maintain broadcasting stations controlled by educators; they imagined 
broadcasting’s purpose to edify and educate, not solely entertain, audiences.  It was the 
issues of control and content, not funding, which initially defined educational 
broadcasting as distinct from commercial stations. 
This chapter examines the work of educational broadcasters and private 
philanthropic foundations, including the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation, 
in their fight for educational, and later public, broadcasting stations.  One of the goals of 
the chapter is to tease out the distinctions between “educational” and “public” 
broadcasting.  I argue that with the shift from educational to public broadcasting came an 
attending redefinition of the purpose of the stations.  If educational broadcasting was 
defined by who controlled the stations and the function of its programming, public 
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broadcasting largely became characterized by its funding.  Whereas educational 
broadcasters drew on the discourse of equality to legitimate their existence—their 
stations could provide equality of educational opportunities, equality of access to culture 
and political debate--public broadcasting advocates appealed to notions of freedom, in 
particular the freedom from the constraints of commercialism.  In this way, public 
broadcasting became synonymous with noncommercial broadcasting, its objective to 
provide the “diverse” and “excellent” programming that commercial broadcasters, 
because of their reliance on advertising dollars, could not schedule.122 
In addition, this chapter brings educational and public broadcasting within the 
broader discussion of media reform activism.  For educational broadcasters and the 
foundations that supported much of their work, radio and television were a means to 
ameliorate social inequalities by democratizing access to education and culture.  Though 
rooted in entrenched and unexamined ideas about quality and cultural hierarchy, the work 
of educational broadcasters to secure an alternative to commercial stations intended to 
transform the body politic by making mass education available through broadcasting.  In 
the process, they repurposed the use of the broadcasting media and hoped that their work 
would procure transformations in the programming of commercial stations and the 
viewing practices of audiences themselves. 
Specifically, I focus here on how educational broadcasters initially sought 
television licenses and reserved broadcasting frequencies; once secured, they set their 
sights on federal funding for the stations, first with the Educational Television Facilities 
Act (1962) and ultimately with the Public Broadcasting Act.  To make the case for 
broadcasting licenses, educational broadcasters underscored their own expertise and 
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public service intentions as educators, and contrasted their programming priorities with 
that of commercial stations.  In their campaign for federal monies to support the stations, 
educational broadcasters and their supporters tied their cause to issues of national 
importance.  In particular, they linked the success of educational broadcasting to Cold 
war anxieties and the fight against communism, public broadcasting to Great Society 
ambitions and the eradication of the divisions within the nation exposed by 1960s social 
movements. 
Finally, this chapter illustrates how commercial broadcasters became important 
allies to these activists.  Initially, commercial broadcasters worked to undermine 
educational broadcasters in their claims for broadcasting licenses.  Once secure in their 
own dominance in broadcasting, commercial broadcasters acted as tremendous supporters 
to the educational, and later public, broadcasting cause: not only did they lend technical 
support and expertise to the broadcasters, but testified on their behalf at hearings for the 
Educational Television Facilities Act and the Public Broadcasting Act.  Indeed, 
acknowledging how a healthy noncommercial broadcasting sector could temper their own 
public service obligations, commercial broadcasters saw how their own interests could be 
served by supporting an alternative to commercial broadcasting.  Thus the case of 
educational broadcasters marks a moment within the history of television reform in which 
commercial broadcasters were allies of reformers and not the target of the reform 
objectives themselves.  Perhaps unsurprisingly then, in advocating for an alternative to 
commercial broadcasting, educational broadcasters simultaneously naturalized and 
legitimated the dominance of commercial stations and the programming priorities of a 
financing structure predicated on ad revenue: hampered by the constraints of a profit-
driven system, commercial broadcasters could only do so much toward their public 
 75 
service goals.  This discourse served to bolster the claims of educational broadcasters and 
to insulate commercial broadcasters from criticisms of their public service performance.   
Not only does the ultimate cooperation of the commercial broadcasting industry 
differentiate this case study of television reform from the others in this dissertation, but 
so too does the position of the reformers themselves.  Unlike the other media activists 
discussed here, the educational broadcasters were both insiders and outsiders: 
broadcasting practitioners, yet ones who existed outside of the dominant structures of the 
broadcasting industry.  Indeed, it was their tenuous position that provided the impetus for 
their activism and for the formation of supporting institutions to organize their efforts.  
However, as this chapter will illustrate, what binds the educational broadcasters and the 
philanthropic foundations that supported them to the narrative of television reform is how 
they enfolded television within a wider social movement, in this case educational reform. 
  
PRELUDE: HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL RADIO 
The struggle of educators to retain a voice in the ether dates back to the early days 
of radio.  As the contours of broadcasting policy took shape, educational broadcasters—
who had been among the earliest innovators and experimenters with the radio medium—
increasingly found themselves sidelined or silenced within the emerging American 
broadcasting industry.  As this section will show, educational broadcasters’ battles over 
radio foreshadowed many of their struggles over television: access to licenses, funding 
problems, technical difficulties, and the initial hostility of a burgeoning commercial 
industry.  Furthermore, though educational broadcasting had advocates in Congress, both 
legislation and FCC policies in this early period tended to dismiss the claims of 
educational broadcasters, seeing commercial stations as more than competent to fulfill the 
public service mission that educators promised would be at the center of their own 
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broadcasting practices.  In turn, educational broadcasters built the central organizations 
that would support their movement for decades to come and they formed important 
alliances during this era with other constituencies who saw in broadcasting greater 
potential than what national commercial networks had to offer. 
Educational broadcasting is nearly as old as broadcasting itself.  Universities, 
especially physics and engineering departments, operated some of the earliest radio 
stations in the United States.  Land-grant colleges in particular used their radio stations to 
extend their educational mission to the wider communities amongst whom they lived.123  
In 1916, fifteen educational institutions received radio licenses from the commerce 
department.124   Indeed, up until World War I, radio amateurs and universities were some 
of the most active users and experimenters with this new technology.  During the war, 
acting on a provision of the Radio Act of 1912, the navy took control of all radio 
transmitters and domestic radio experimentation stopped temporarily.  But in its early 
years, as Susan Douglas and Thomas Streeter have illustrated, multiple communities—
including educators—experimented with radio and imagined widely different social uses 
for the new technology. 
Radio in the United States changed dramatically after WWI, most notably during 
the 1920s, a period often referred to as the “broadcast boom.”  At this time, the system of 
radio that is now familiar to us took shape.  Early in the decade, many different 
communities owned radio stations and received broadcasting licenses: colleges and 
universities (by 1923, over seventy educational institutions had radio stations)125, 
churches, department stores, newspapers, theaters, banks, municipalities, and members of 
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the Radio Trust.126  In the early part of the 1920s, AT&T experimented with “toll-
broadcasting,” a system by which the company would lease broadcasting time to anyone 
who wanted to transmit a message over the airwaves and laid the foundation for 
commercial sponsorship.   Initially, however, most broadcasters and sponsors alike were 
wary of radio advertising. They feared that because of radio’s location in the home, 
which fostered an intimacy with its listeners, listeners would greet advertisements with 
either resentment or anger.  Broadcasters worried that listeners would cease to listen; 
advertisers were nervous that they would turn against the emerging--yet still nascent--
advertising industry.  Stations experimented with indirect advertising, which consisted of 
programs whose titles or central characters included the name of the product that was 
paying for the show, but which contained no explicit advertisements.   As listeners 
expressed preference for sponsored shows, broadcasters and advertisers became bolder in 
their promotion of products and radio broadcasting became increasingly 
commercialized.127 
As radio grew in popularity, and as stations proliferated, Secretary of Commerce 
Herbert Hoover held four national radio conferences to determine a better way to regulate 
this medium.  Under the Radio Act of 1912, the secretary of commerce had the authority 
to issue radio licenses to qualified applicants; however, the secretary did not have the 
authority to deny a license to a qualified applicant nor to regulate the use of the airwaves 
to reduce interference.  The explosion of broadcasting stations in the 1920s seemed to 
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necessitate a different regulatory structure, and the radio conferences intended to map 
one.  In 1925, at the fourth radio conference, educational broadcasters banded together 
and formed the Association of College and University Broadcasting Stations (ACUBS) to 
advocate for the interests and needs of educational broadcasters at a moment when the 
contours of the nation’s broadcasting system were taking shape. Asserting that radio is 
“one of the most important factors in our national and international welfare,” ACUBS’s 
constitution defined its purpose to promote educational broadcasting in order to foster 
“the dissemination of knowledge to the end that both the technical and educational 
features of broadcasting may be extended to all.”128  This vision of broadcasting would 
re-emerge in the battles over educational television, both in its breadth and in the 
democratic principles that undergirded its purpose.   
The Radio Act of 1927, the result of Hoover’s radio conferences, created the 
Federal Radio Commission (FRC), a temporary regulatory agency that was to allocate 
radio frequencies to applicants best able to serve the “public interest, convenience, or 
necessity.”  The FRC was to set a fixed number of how many licenses to be allocated and 
to prioritize who would receive one based on the “public interest” criterion.  ACUBS 
lobbied for channel reservations for land-grant colleges which the FRC denied to avoid 
the precedent of granting “special interest groups” licenses.  As the FRC would articulate 
in 1929, the stations in its view best capable of fulfilling the “public interest” mandate of 
the Radio Act were “general interest” stations, typically seen at this time as commercial 
broadcasters.  The FRC expressed a strong hesitance to “balkanize the dial” by granting 
“special interest” broadcasters--educators, labor unions, churches--broadcasting licenses.  
In this regard, the FRC set the terms that would continue to define broadcasting.  By 
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constructing a binary in which commercial broadcasters were addressing the general 
population, other communities “special interests,” the FRC naturalized a broadcasting 
system predicated on national commercial networks and cast suspicion on other uses of 
radio.129 
As such, the regulation schema enacted by the Radio Act of 1927 had hazardous 
consequences for educational broadcasters.  In 1927, ninety-four educational institutions 
had broadcasting licenses.  This number dwindled to forty-nine by 1931.130  The FRC 
reassigned educational broadcasters to less desirable frequencies, reserving the more 
powerful ones for commercial broadcasters.  In addition, educational broadcasters often 
were required to share time on a new frequency with a commercial station; the latter 
would be allowed to broadcast during the prime-time evening hours, devastating the adult 
education programs that were a staple of educational broadcasters.  Furthermore, the 
costs of expensive equipment requirements and of litigation to preserve frequencies 
pushed many educational broadcasters to give up their licenses.  When Congress renewed 
the Radio Act in 1928, it omitted the Davis Amendment, which would have ended 
regulatory discrimination against non-profit and local broadcasters.  Indeed, the message 
from on-high to educational broadcasters was that their days were numbered. 
In 1930, educational broadcasters organized to fight for access to the radio 
spectrum.  Congress was considering revising the 1927 act, and educational broadcasters 
hoped that the new legislation could be more favorable to their interests.  In October, the 
US Commissioner of Education held a conference in Chicago to discuss radio and 
education.  The conference resulted in two resolutions: the establishment of a committee 
to make recommendations to protect and promote broadcasting by educational 
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institutions; and a recommendation to Congress to reserve, permanently and exclusively, 
fifteen percent of all radio frequencies for educational institutions and governmental 
educational agencies.  The following January, the National Committee on Education by 
Radio (NCER) formed, funded by the Payne Foundation.  NCER, the representative of 
nine educational organizations, acted as the primary advocate for favorable legislation for 
educational broadcasters.  It additionally supported educational broadcasters through a 
service bureau and a weekly bulletin to encourage public support of educational 
broadcasting.131   During the period between the passage of the Radio Act of 1927 and 
the Federal Communications Act of 1934, educational broadcasters also joined in with a 
broadcast reform movement composed not only of educators, but intellectuals, churches, 
civil libertarians, intellectuals, private foundations, labor unions, and agricultural 
interests.  The movement worked to dismantle a broadcasting system dominated by 
national networks, supported by advertising.132 
If a tremendous problem for educational broadcasters during this period was their 
frequency allocations, another was a lack of money; these twin problems--technological 
and financial--would recur throughout the history of educational broadcasting in the 
United States.  Some educational broadcasters sold airtime in order to finance their 
stations, and others leased their facilities to commercial interests.  In other words, though 
these stations were not for-profit, as were commercial broadcasters, selling airtime was a 
way to sustain the costs of operating a broadcasting station.  During this period, therefore, 
educational broadcasting was not, by definition, noncommercial broadcasting.  Though 
many educational broadcasters looked negatively on selling time, the practice was not 
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antithetical to the mission and purpose of educational broadcasting.  What distinguished 
educational broadcasters from commercial broadcasters was their programming goals, 
their affiliation with educational institutions, and their vision of radio as a technology that 
could expand, improve, and revolutionize American education.  Though these stations 
were non-profit, not all were noncommercial.  Some educational broadcasters at the time 
believed that they could achieve their mission within a financing structure that allowed 
for the selling of airtime.133   
Educational broadcasters suffered two major setbacks in the early 1930s: the 
failure of the Wagner-Hatfield Bill and the passage of the Federal Communications Act 
of 1934.  The Wagner-Hatfield Bill proposed to void all existing broadcasting licenses 
and to implement an allocation system that would reserve twenty-five percent of the most 
desirable frequencies for educational, religious, or nonprofit groups.  The commercial 
broadcasting industry launched an effective public relations campaign to squash the 
bill.134    Perhaps ironically, its efforts were bolstered by the National Advisory Council 
on Radio in Education (NACRE). Financially supported by the Carnegie Corporation and 
the Rockefeller Foundation, NACRE promoted educational programming for commercial 
stations.  Unlike NCER, which advocated the reservation of stations for educational 
institutions, NACRE thought commercial broadcasters were best able to provide 
educational shows to a listening public.  In the early 1930s, the emerging commercial 
radio networks cooperated with NACRE and aired programs provided by its service.135  
In providing educational programming to commercial stations, NACRE helped these 
broadcasters prove that commercial stations could be effective conduits for public service 
programming. 
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The passage of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 was a near word-for-
word repetition of the Radio Act of 1927.   It established the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), a permanent regulatory agency that would have jurisdiction over all 
telecommunications, not just radio.  As it offered no serious revision to the current 
regulatory structure of broadcasting, the act sanctioned the system of broadcasting that 
had been developing since the 1920s, one dominated by commercial national networks 
and that sidelined nonprofit broadcasters.  Though section 307 (c) of the act required the 
FCC to study whether there was a need to allocate a fixed percentage of licenses to non-
profits, it was perhaps no surprise that the following year the FCC found no such need.136 
In 1934, ACUBS changed its name to the National Association of Educational 
Broadcasters (NAEB).  The new name symbolized a wider mission and greater 
inclusiveness for the organization.  Any educational broadcaster, whether airing programs 
over a university-owned station or a commercial station, could be part of this new 
organization.  NAEB was to be a central organization not only in continuing to advocate 
for educational radio, but also for educational television.  Fashioning itself an advocate 
for the professional interests of educational broadcasters, the NAEB did not, as earlier 
educational groups had, fight to restructure and rethink the structures of American 
broadcasting.137  And though networks had collaborated with educators in the 1930s, 
primarily through NACRE, by the end of the decade they were creating sustaining 
programs in-house.138 NACRE ceased operation in 1941.139 
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Though educational, and later public, broadcasters would continue to agitate for a 
place in the broadcast spectrum, their efforts and their rhetoric increasingly accepted the 
dominance of commercial network broadcasting.  As Ralph Engelman writes, “[b]y the 
1940s, challenges to the network and advertising-dominated broadcasting system were 
outside the pale of legitimate discourse.”140  Throughout these early battles over 
broadcast regulation, the networks positioned advertising-supported broadcasting as 
classically American.  Rooted in an alleged free market system, they argued that 
commercial broadcasting existed outside of governmental control and influence.  
Advocates suggested that advertising dollars, unlike other forms of financing, would best 
serve the public because of it was predicated on the desire to reach the widest possible 
audience; noncommercial stations, without the need to produce ears for sponsor 
messages, could easily become propaganda stations.  In this period, therefore, the 
networks won not only the battle over radio’s regulatory structures, but also the fight over 
popular conceptions of the purpose of this emerging medium.  Sensing the threat being 
posed to them by educational broadcasters, the networks positioned non-network, non-
profit radio as adversarial to the interests not only of commercial broadcasters, but to the 
listening public at-large.  In this, they drew on a discourse that conflated consumer choice 
with democracy and on burgeoning fears of the link between the mass media and 
propaganda circulating in the 1930s.141    
In 1938, when the FCC reserved channels for educational broadcasters in the new 
experimental FM band, it designated these licenses as “noncommercial,” a class of 
license that later would apply to educational television stations.142  This designation 
would prove to be a catch-22 for educational broadcasters.  On the one hand, the FCC 
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was reserving a portion of the broadcast spectrum for educational purposes; on the other, 
by licensing them as noncommercial stations, the FCC cut off what had been a financing 
stream for earlier educational stations and contributed to the economic crises that 
continually would plague educational broadcasters.  The noncommercial designation was 
to guarantee the “purity of motive and the earnestness of intention” of the broadcasters 
and to free them from having to compete with commercial broadcasters.143  
Simultaneously, and from a regulatory perspective, it defined educational broadcasting in 
terms of its funding structure. In contrast, while educational broadcasters would work 
within the limitations of a noncommercial license, they insisted that what made 
educational broadcasting essential was its position within the broader edifice of education 
and its commitment to edifying and educational programming.  
As the next sections will illustrate, the two persistent problems facing educational 
broadcasters, technical and fiscal, were tied to the regulatory paradigm under which they 
operated.  As they secured frequencies in television broadcasting, educational 
broadcasters turned their reform efforts to remedying their financial and technical 
burdens.  In addition, as commercial broadcasters became more secure in their dominance 
within broadcasting, they embraced and encouraged educational, noncommercial 
broadcasters.  Rather than seeing this other use of broadcasting as adversarial, they soon 
understood that educational broadcasting posed no financial threat and could ease their 
own public service burdens.  What resulted was a movement, often supported by 
commercial broadcasters, that looked to federal financing for educational broadcasters.  
As the next sections will discuss, this movement required a re-definition of television’s 
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social and cultural role, one that exploited cold war anxieties and Great Society 
ambitions. 
 
EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION I: DEFINITIONS, DIFFICULTIES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 
It should come as no surprise that Marshall McLuhan was an advocate of 
educational television.  When he addressed broadcasters at a 1958 convention sponsored 
by the NAEB and the U.S. Office of Education, his talk anticipated the insights and 
theories of media that would make him famous six years later with the publication of 
Understanding Media.  McLuhan emphasized that the stresses facing contemporary 
educators resulted from the use of outmoded educational strategies, ones that were rooted 
in the linear thinking promoted by an age dominated by print.  In an age saturated by 
electronic media, McLuhan argued, new learning strategies were needed, ones that 
integrated and accounted for the impact of these media on the way that students 
experience the world.144  Though some of the teachers in attendance feared McLuhan’s 
theories would render them obsolete, and though his theory did not dominate the 
discourse of the convention, his insight that television would transform education was 
one shared by many in attendance.   
And though McLuhan would continue to participate in NAEB events in years to 
come, the NAEB and other advocates of educational television took a different tack in 
advocating for educational broadcasting.  As this section will illustrate, in the early 
1950s, educational broadcasters made appeals to the FCC based on the limitations of the 
programming offered by commercial broadcasters.  Asserting that the potential of 
television, defined in educational and cultural terms, could not be realized by commercial 
broadcasters, educational television advocates tried to secure television station licenses 
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by defining themselves in opposition to commercial television.  In addition, this 
reasoning aligned educational broadcasters with the spirit of public service broadcasting 
and proffered a definition of the public interest that identified the needs of the public as 
edification and enlightenment.  Later in the decade, educational broadcasters tempered 
the comparison with commercial television in favor of a discourse that linked the 
importance of educational television to the cold war and to the project of spreading 
democracy at home.  At this time, advocates of educational television stations stressed 
their role in improving the nation’s educational system and stemming the “crisis” in 
education.   
Educational broadcasters were a bit slow to recognize the potential of television.  
In 1948, when forty commercial television stations were in operation, only five 
educational institutions had their sights set on TV.145  When the FCC declared a freeze of 
television station licensing in 1948, educational broadcasters recognized that they needed 
to organize and agitate if they were to have a place in the FCC’s new regulatory 
framework for television.  In 1950, the NAEB and members of the US Office of 
Education met to discuss lobbying for the interests of educational broadcasting.  The 
result was the formation of another organization, the Joint Committee (later Council) on 
Educational Television (JCET).  
In anticipation of FCC hearings the following month, JCET’s first goal was to 
raise money to secure educators to testify.  In November, JCET and NAEB circulated a 
letter articulating the crisis looming not just for educators, but for the nation at large if 
television were to be regulated as had AM radio. The letter stated, “If we do not act now, 
television will go the way of radio and this magnificent educational and cultural medium 
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will be lost to the people irrevocably.”146  This sentiment would reoccur consistently in 
the rhetoric of educational and public broadcasting advocates.  Positioning their approach 
to broadcasting as fulfilling the more noble and important function of the medium, these 
activists simultaneously constructed the viewing public as a population due 
enlightenment and culture.  Furthermore, this vision of television suggested that the 
medium itself brimmed with promise, that it inherently was a “magnificent educational 
and cultural medium,” if only the FCC would allow this potential to be tapped. Implicit in 
these remarks was a chastisement of the performance of commercial broadcasters, whose 
use of the airwaves ignored its possibilities.  In the JCET memorandum presented to the 
FCC at the hearings, the Committee continued in this vein: “We merely insist that 
universities and public service agencies devoted to the physical, mental and moral well-
being of the population have a right to operate their own television facilities.”147  In this, 
the educators suggested that the commercial broadcasters, who had “despoiled” radio, did 
not have a similar consideration for the well-being of the public.   
At these hearings, more than seventy witnesses testified on behalf of educational 
television, led by the US Commissioner of Education.  In addition to university 
presidents, professors, and school superintendents, senators, congressmen, labor and 
parent association leaders made the case for educational broadcasting. JCET’s witnesses 
advocated for both Very High Frequency (VHF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) 
stations to be reserved for educational broadcasters.148 One of the more persuasive 
presentations was of a monitoring study of twelve hours of programming on seven New 
York stations.  The study indicated that of all the programming, only thirty minutes had 
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been sponsored by a school of any sort, and less than one percent of the shows were 
designed for children.149  This evidence supported one of the major contentions of the 
witnesses: commercial stations could not, and would not, provide educational 
programming, which necessitated the licensing of educational broadcasters.   
FCC Commissioner Frida Hennock, an early advocate for educational television, 
pushed for allocations for educational television stations.  Emphasizing that the “public is 
the actual owner of television,” Hennock recommended that twenty-five percent of the 
new stations be reserved for educators.  She stated in a 1951 address, “Television has 
enormous potential for improvement and good—for spreading knowledge, enlightenment 
and culture to every adult and child throughout the entire United States.”  She continued,  
No one ever denies the crucial importance of free public education in our 
democracy.  Everyone is in agreement on the limitless teaching potential of 
television.  Similarly, the inability of educators to compete with commercial 
interests for available frequencies is recognized.  Yet there are those who balk at 
giving education any substantial access to television on the ground that this 
valuable medium will be badly used and wasted by educators.  I, for one, am not 
so hesitant.  I would entrust television to educators just as I trust them with the 
development and training of the minds of our children.150   
Much like educational broadcasters, Hennock enfolded educational television within the 
institution of education and asserted that educators were particularly capable of realizing 
the potential of the new medium.   
In contrast, the Ford Foundation, which would become one of the biggest 
supporters of educational and public broadcasting, initially imagined that commercial 
stations could be a strong vehicle for educational shows.  In a move similar to that of the 
NACRE, the Ford Foundation in 1951 brought commercial broadcasters together in 
Washington to discuss how they could provide adequate educational programs on their 
                                                
149 Alford, 11. 
150 “See ’51 Advances: Yearend Roundup,” Broadcasting, Telecasting, January 1, 1951, 36. 
 89 
stations.  Understanding that the significant impact of television on the country would be 
through commercial broadcasters, the foundation at this point determined to work with 
commercial television to advance educational goals. The foundation proposed a radio and 
television workshop that would work with commercial broadcasters to provide 
educational programming to air over network television.   At this time of transition for 
television, when commercial broadcasters feared that educational groups would receive a 
substantial number of the available broadcast frequencies, they welcomed the overtures 
of the Ford Foundation as did Broadcasting, the industry’s trade journal. It editorialized, 
“The union between commercial broadcasting and the giant philanthropy that is the 
inheritance of a great businessman is, at its outset, of obvious compatibility.  It should 
produce an admirable heritage.”151  Senator Lyndon Johnson (D-Tex.) also supported this 
enterprise, predicting that the best way that television could be put to educational 
purposes was through a collaboration of educational institutions and commercial 
broadcasters.152  Station owners themselves encouraged educators to abandon their quest 
for stations and to work with commercial television stations to broadcast educational 
programming.153   
In August 1951, the Ford Foundation created its Television–Radio Workshop.  
The Workshop was the brainchild of James Webb Young, formerly of the J. Walter 
Thompson Advertising Agency, who operated it under the auspices of the foundation’s 
Fund for Adult Education (FAE).  Financed by a $1.2 million grant, the workshop was to 
create shows that combine “cultural, public service, and entertainment qualities” for 
broadcast over commercial stations.  To sustain the workshop, its programs would be 
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sold to advertisers; the grant was for initial set-up costs, the hope of the foundation that 
the workshop ultimately would be self-supporting.154  Perhaps the workshop’s most 
visible program was Omnibus, a 90 minute program hosted by Alistair Cooke, a variety 
show that blended highbrow and popular culture performances. 
The workshop, along with the FAE that housed it, resulted from a redefinition of 
the purpose and scope of the Ford Foundation.  The foundation, which began in 1936, 
initially had much smaller aims--both in terms of its philanthropic mission and the scope 
of its giving.  From 1936-50, the foundation gave $19 million, primarily to local causes in 
Detroit such as symphonies and hospitals.  Edsel Ford died in 1943, Henry Ford in 1947.  
The two had owned almost all of the stock of the Ford Motor Company, at the time the 
largest corporation in the United States.  In order to prevent the Ford heirs from paying 
huge inheritance taxes, ten percent of the stock went to the heirs, ninety percent to the 
foundation; all of the voting stock was in the ten percent given to the heirs.  Quickly, 
under pressure from Congress and competitors, the Ford Foundation sold some of its 
Ford Motor Company stock.  Congress did not look well on the use of private 
foundations as a way to retain control of a corporation; competitors, who had publicly-
held stocks and were responsive to the demands of shareholders, resented that all of the 
Ford stock was held in-family.  The foundation, however, had needed to map how it 
would spend the revenue it would receive from the sale of stock.  It commissioned H. 
Rowan Gaither in 1948 to study how it should allocate its money.  Gaither’s 1949 report 
became the “Magna Carta of the new and great Ford Foundation,” and outlined the 
priorities for the foundation.155  Premised on the belief that the most critical problems of 
the age were fundamentally social, the report identified five program areas for the 
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foundation: establishment of peace (through international programs that swayed nations 
to be friendly with the United States), strengthening of democracy (encourage civil 
liberties, political action), promoting of education in a democratic society, improving the 
economy, and understanding individual behavior and human relations (promote the social 
sciences).156  The foundation’s investment in educational broadcasting, at this time 
through the workshop, was part of its larger project of promoting education.   
Despite the support for endeavors like the Television-Radio Workshop, the FCC 
set aside stations for educational purposes.  In March 1951, the FCC issued a notice of 
rule-making, in which it proposed that it would set aside 209 channels for educational 
television and requested statements and responses to this proposal.  The JCET provided 
the FCC with 838 petitions in support of educational television reservations.157 In its 
1952 Sixth Order and Report, the FCC reserved 242 channels for noncommercial 
educational television; 80 channels were in the VHF bandwidth, 162 in UHF.  FCC 
Commissioner Paul Walker insisted that the educators must “use or lose” the stations 
reserved for them, putting pressure on educators to realize quickly the potential they had 
ascribed to the medium, as well as the demand they had insisted existed in educational 
institutions for access to the airwaves. 
The period 1952-1958 was one of mixed results for educational broadcasters.  
They faced two perennial problems: lack of money to support stations and UHF 
allocations.  Licensed as noncommercial stations, educational broadcasters constantly 
searched for supporters for their mission.  Typically, they received funding from states, 
municipalities, foundations, and individuals.  However, they operated under the constant 
anxiety over how to keep their stations in operation and how to pay for programming.  In 
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1953, the NAEB in collaboration with the Ford Foundation’s FAE, started the 
Educational Television and Radio Center (later the National Educational Television and 
Radio Center, or NETRC), a program exchange service housed in Ann Arbor.158  The 
NETRC distributed programs to member stations, primarily by sending tapes of 
programming through the mail.159  Cognizant that some viewers perceived educational 
programming as boring, the NETRC demanded that shows they distributed embody the 
principles of good showmanship, be informative and mentally stimulating, and hold 
appeal to a general adult audience.160 In addition the NAEB, beginning in 1954, held 
workshops for educational television stations to learn about the latest broadcasting 
equipment, supported by grants from the FAE.  The goal of these workshops was to help 
noncommercial stations develop the professional “polish and depth” of commercial 
stations.  Commercial broadcasters, including DuMont, CBS, and NBC participated in 
these workshops, providing speakers and equipment.   
The second persistent problem faced by educational broadcasters was technical.  
The majority of the channels reserved for educators were in the UHF bandwidth.  Before 
the freeze, the FCC had only licensed stations in the VHF bandwidth; many of the 
stations licensed at this time were owned or affiliated with NBC or CBS.  After the 
freeze, the FCC licensed stations in both VHF and UHF, and communities often would 
have stations in both parts of the spectrum available to them.  However, many of the 
television sets in operation only could receive a VHF signal.  Broadcasters in UHF, 
therefore, not only had an inferior allocation but sometimes were broadcasting to a 
population who could not receive their signal.   
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The launch of Sputnik in 1957 radically changed the prospects for educational 
broadcasters and provided them with a rhetorical frame that linked their mission and 
importance to the cold war.  As Barbara Barksdale Clowse illustrates, Sputnik intensified 
an already existing perception that the quality of American education was intimately tied 
to the nation’s success in the cold war.161  The need to produce scientists and engineers, 
as well as a universally literate population, seemed an essential component of the fight 
against the Soviet Union. In addition, the increase in school children (resulting from the 
baby boom) coupled with a lack of qualified teachers and facilities (the Depression had 
halted construction) fomented a sense of American education in crisis, one that had 
horrifying national security consequences.  Sputnik accelerated these fears, as it seemed 
to provide evidence that the Soviet Union was surpassing the United States in its 
technological capabilities.  While Presidents Truman and Eisenhower had supported 
federal aid to education since the end of World War II, it was not until this “crisis” that 
detractors in Congress conceded to allocate money for education.   
In 1958, Congress passed the National Defense Education Act, a landmark bill 
that granted money to myriad areas in education including educational loans for higher 
education; promotion of science, math, and foreign language instruction; and funding for 
college preparation courses and counseling.   Title VII of the bill provided funding to 
encourage the use of media in education.  The National Defense Education Act thus 
legitimated the use of audiovisual media as a key part of educational reform, forcefully 
tied the quality of the nation’s educational systems to its national security, and thus 
provided educational broadcasters with a powerful frame to justify continued federal 
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support of educational television,162 one that educational broadcasters would draw on in 
their push for the Educational Television Facilities Act. 
Reputedly, the Educational Television Facilities Act grew out of a conversation at 
a party in 1956 between Senator Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.), chairman of the Senate 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, and a lawyer for the NAEB.  Magnuson 
had been aware of the struggles of educational broadcasters for some time.  Earlier that 
year, the JCET had sent him a letter outlining the problems of educational TV stations in 
the UHF band and making a series of recommendations to ameliorate the problem.  At 
this party, the NAEB lawyer apparently told Magnuson, “what we need to do is just give 
every state a million dollars.”163 The states, in turn, would use this allocation as seed 
money to develop educational television stations.  The Educational Television Facilities 
Act, which passed the Senate three times before the House of Representatives finally 
adopted it in 1962, indeed provided for grants not to exceed $1million to states for the 
purchase of equipment and facilities for educational television stations. 
From the outset, advocates of the act foregrounded its importance to the 
educational system in the U.S.  Magnuson introduced the hearings on S. 12, the second 
iteration of the bill, in January 1959, by stating:  
This bill is intended to launch our country generally on the path of bringing into 
our educational system the tremendous advantage and opportunity afforded by the 
television medium.  Its cost in actual dollars is modest.  Its rewards are virtually 
unlimited when compared to the problems existing in the educational field 
today.164  
Magnuson, in this opening address, forecasted what would be a central theme of the 
hearings: the ability of educational television to help solve the educational crisis haunting 
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the nation at this time.  The hearings, in some sense, inverted the way that advocates and 
detractors alike had discussed educational television.  Previously, for example in the 1950 
FCC hearings, the conversation had centered on why the nation’s television system 
should include educational broadcasters; here, the focus was on why the nation’s 
educational system needs television. 
One consistent theme of the hearings was the role that educational television 
could play in the cold war. Ralph Steele, the executive directory of JCET, almost 
immediately evoked national security concerns in his testimony.  Steele had visited the 
Soviet Union in 1958, where he had met with workers in the radio and television 
industries. “I found that there was a deep conviction of the importance and significance 
of television,” he stated, “but the total concern was to use it for carrying on the same kind 
of internal propaganda that one finds in every newsstand, in every airplane, in every 
hotel.  So I must say that if we are looking for areas of leadership over and above our 
opponent, the use of television for serious educational purposes is one of them.”  He 
continued that while the Soviets negatively evaluated much of the American educational 
system, they admired educational television a great deal.  “I wondered then how long this 
leadership of the United States in the wise use of this dramatic new medium will continue 
unless we ourselves are not content with where we are but take it out to its legitimate and 
logical development.”165 
The statement of NAEB president William Harley, submitted along side his 
testimony, echoed this sentiment.  In it he wrote, “Let us hope that Russia does not have 
to launch the equivalent of a sputnik in the use of television for educational purposes in 
order to bring the breakthrough which American education so desperately needs if it is 
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again to seize a position of world leadership in education  […].”166 In conclusion, he 
summarized: “Events of the first half of the 20th century, marked by two world wars, 
discovery of ‘the bomb,’ and culminating in space conquest, have shocked traditional 
education into an awareness that its problems do not and cannot end with halls of ivy and 
yesterday’s print-based curriculums. The classroom has become the community, the 
Nation, the world.”167  Harley, like Steele, situated the urgency to develop educational 
television within a world crisis in which the United States, on the education front, seemed 
poised to lose.  New conditions demanded new approaches to pedagogy and, according to 
advocates of educational broadcasting, television could help remedy the crisis in 
education. 
A second prong of the educational crisis, as presented in the hearings, was the 
lack of qualified teachers and facilities to meet the tremendous rise of students to be 
educated.  John Ivey, executive vice president of New York University and chairman of 
the Committee of Educational Television of the American Council on Education, testified 
to the role that television could play in alleviating this burden.  Ivey anticipated that by 
1970, the college population would increase by 100 percent.  Television, according to 
Ivey, could provide high quality educational opportunities to many students, in essence 
allowing the wisdom and competence of a professor to be telecast to students far outside 
his or her own classroom.  He stated, “When you put television into the formula you can 
project the personalities and performances of these top quality teachers throughout the 
land and do it in such a way that the intellectual resources of this country are not the 
particular monopoly of any small group of institutions which might ordinarily limit the 
enrollment to the number of students that they think meet the standards compatible with 
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their purposes and goals.”168  Defining “our best scholars” as a “national resource,” Ivey 
encouraged the use of television to disseminate this resource to as many people as 
possible.  Ivey positioned television as an answer to a forecasted demographic crisis 
facing higher education and as an antidote to the fundamentally un-democratic nature of 
higher education in which only a small select group have access to quality education.   
Raymond D. Hurlbert, general manager of the Alabama Educational Television 
Commission, echoed many of Ivey’s points.  Defining education as the “greatest natural 
resource,” Hurlbert attested to television’s ability in Alabama to democratize the 
availability of education, to equalize across class and geography students’ access to 
educational resources.169  The potential for educational television, for Hulbert, included 
expanding the impact of gifted teachers, educating homebound and disabled children, 
providing continuing education opportunities for adults, disseminating materials to 
students otherwise unavailable to them, and allowing parents and the public to be more 
involved in the educational process.170  He also promoted educational television to help 
alleviate the problem of teacher shortages, especially in anticipation of the increased need 
for qualified teachers in years to come.  Hurlbert argued that television, its “reality, 
immediacy, and versatility” was especially well-suited to be an innovative and powerful 
educational tool.  He suggested, “The only insurance for the perpetuation of a democratic 
society is an informed electorate.  With educational television, we have the means for 
fulfilling the responsibility for the education of the people of our country, young and old.  
It seems providential that we have at our command in these crucial times this great 
medium for mass communication in education.”171  
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Significantly, commercial broadcasters had linked commercial radio, rooted in the 
free market, as emblematic of the American way of life.  Hurlbert here refocused this 
relationship and highlighted how equality of access, rather than the liberty inherent in 
consumer choice, defined the “American” potential of broadcasting. This sentiment 
reoccurred in Harley’s testimony, when he stated: “This is the greatest opportunity this 
Nation has ever had to make equality of educational opportunity available to 
everyone.”172  Harley reiterated,  
As a nation, we are committed to equal educational opportunity for all.  Yet today 
in hundreds of rural areas there are no teachers qualified to teach physics, modern 
languages, art, music, and many other urgently needed disciplines.  Many 
paraplegics and many who are aged or infirm, or even simply ashamed to go back 
to school, perhaps with their children or grandchildren, are left unserved.  The 
millions of illiterates we have, and refugees who need to learn our language and 
traditions, are unrealized resources of our Nation.  The need is here.  A tool is 
here, a powerful tool, to help solve those problems.173  
Harley defined the development of educational television as a tool of democracy and, like 
Hurlbert, pointed to the nation’s population as its great untapped resource.  Casting the 
need to utilize television for educational purposes in ethical terms, Harley suggested that 
to allow television’s potential to go un-used was to abandon the principle of equality that 
allegedly undergirded the nation’s principles. 
When Harley addressed the Senate in 1961 in support of S. 205--essentially the 
same bill as S. 12, which had failed to pass the House of Representatives--he presented 
letters by presidential candidates John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon, both of whom 
supported the bill.  The language of their letters reiterated the connections educators had 
been making about television’s ability to serve the nation, both to secure its national 
security and to realize its goal of equal opportunity.  Kennedy’s letter stated, “The issue 
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of education is clearly bound up with our national stature: one cannot and has not through 
American history been achieved without the other.”  It continued,  
American progress and even our national survival is directly dependent on what 
we as a Nation do now about the shameful weakness and deficiencies of our 
educational system. […] Television, a device which has the potential to teach 
more things to more people in less time than anything yet devised, seems a 
providential instrument to come to education’s aid. 174   
Nixon’s letter used similar language: “This Nation must improve and make the fullest use 
of all educational means at its disposal in order to adjust the institutions and methods of 
democracy to the demands of a speeding world.  In this regard, the leaders in educational 
broadcasting have a great opportunity as well as an obligation.”175 
Commercial broadcasters also testified in support of the bill.  Donald McGannon, 
the president of Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, confirmed that though the 
primary--though not exclusive--function of commercial broadcasting is to entertain, it is 
in the national interest that educational television stations receive support and flourish.  
Westinghouse, as McGannon testified, had supported educational television through 
contributions of programming, technology, and monetary grants. He argued that the high 
costs and competitive nature of commercial broadcasting made it necessary for 
commercial broadcasters to “call on every showmanly and creative device we can 
contrive to hold the audience and prevent the viewers from straying to the competitive 
stations.”176  The need, in other words, for truly educational programming could not be 
met according to McGannon by commercial stations because of the financial pressures 
they faced.  He then stated, “if our people are to keep pace with our fast-changing times, 
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education must not, cannot, stop with the diploma, or be restricted to the classroom.  It 
must and can be carried out by television and radio and any other media we can 
devise.”177  He continued that “the broadcasting industry needs this additional element, 
and failing to get it will always be a poor second in the most crucial area: the need to 
enlighten men.”178 McGannon reiterated that broadcast media could expand and improve 
education and that it would be a travesty not to use powerful communications tool in this 
regard, while he simultaneously excused commercial broadcasters from a responsibility 
to meet this requirement themselves.   
In the 1961 hearings, CBS president James Aubrey lent his support to the bill.  
Aubrey, infamous for his memo that defined the goals of CBS programming as “broads, 
bosoms, and fun,” characterized the potential of educational television as to “help 
broaden the intellectual and cultural horizons of all Americans, young and old.”179  Like 
Westinghouse, CBS had supported the development of educational television, both in 
financial contributions and in programming offers.  Aubrey suggested that federal 
investment in educational television would accelerate its growth, allowing communities 
who currently had no access to it to see its benefits and, in turn, invest in it themselves.  
However, he emphasized that his support for the bill was for funding for facilities and 
construction; Aubrey warned against the use of federal funds for programming, a use that 
the bill explicitly forbade anyway. 
John L. Burns, the president of RCA, also testified in support of the act, his 
statement echoing many of the justifications of other advocates.  Burns focused on the 
“educational gap” in the nation, positioning television as a way to breach it.  
Furthermore, he looked to the technology of television to function as a teaching tool, one 
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that could expand the pedagogical possibilities of teachers and cater to the pace of 
intellectual development of individual students.180  Burns, in the questioning period after 
his testimony, reiterated his confidence in the potential of educational television, while 
stressing that it should remain outside the reach of commercial pressures.  Justifying this 
position by attesting to the tremendous importance of education, and the need to ensure 
that it not “be diluted by anything else,” Burns stated that the appropriations of the bill 
would be adequate to spur educational television.181   
What emerges from these hearings is a consensus over the potential of television 
to address the perceived “crisis” in education and to bolster the strength of the American 
citizenry, a task perceived of tremendous urgency during this cold war moment. Though 
the vision of television embodied in these hearings was not controversial, the use of 
federal funds to realize it was.  Senator Frank Lausche (R-Ohio) in particular viewed the 
act through the lens of federalism.  He questioned not the usefulness of a vibrant 
educational television system, but whether the states themselves--rather than the federal 
government--should bear the financial brunt of its development.  He pointed to the fears 
over budget deficits and suggested that the potential costs of the program would 
exacerbate an already over-committed federal spending program.  At one point, Senator 
John Pastore (D-R.I.) responded by stating: “If we educate our people and make them 
more worthwhile citizens and make them more instructive, more illuminated of mind, 
spirit, body, and soul, I think we have enhanced the wealth of the United States of 
America.  I would even go for a $4 billion imbalance in payment, if we could beat the 
Russians in better education.”182 
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In the end, this rhetoric carried the day and the Educational Television Facilities 
Act became law in 1962.  That same year, Congress passed the All Channel Receiver 
Act, which required television set manufacturers to produce television sets that could 
receive both UHF and VHF signals.  Both acts were a tremendous boon to educational 
television.  The former provided seed money to build up the infrastructure of educational 
television, the latter the conditions for all viewers to have access to it.  Aside from the 
expansion of the financial and technical support, these acts also were symbolic victories 
for educational broadcasters.  In previous legislative battles, both Congress and 
commercial broadcasters worked against the development of a broadcasting system 
seemingly at odds with the goals and structure of commercial network broadcasting.  
Here, advocates of educational television successfully situated its import within cold war 
anxieties and drew on concerns of  the period--in particular the “crisis” in education--to 
make the case for federal support.  The limited ambitions of the bill and the support it lent 
likely assuaged anxieties of commercial broadcasters over the growth of educational 
broadcasting.  Furthermore, they saw that educational television, if expanded, could 
mitigate the public service responsibilities of the commercial broadcasters themselves. 
 
EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION II: CAPABILITIES AND THE “QUALITY” AUDIENCE 
As educational broadcasters looked to the federal government to ease both their 
financial burdens and their technical handicaps, they also critically examined their own 
practices and goals.  In addition to meeting frequently to discuss the future of educational 
television, organizations like the Ford Foundation solicited studies to understand better 
the performance of educational television stations and the composition of its audience. 
They also held conventions to define further the purpose of educational broadcasting.  In 
the process, the contours of educational television’s importance, mission, and challenges 
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took greater shape.  What emerges is a vision of educational television that reinforced its 
place within the broader system of American education.  Furthermore, educational 
broadcasters, in contrasting the audience and programming of educational television, 
engaged in a discourse about commercial television that identified it with a debased, low 
form of mass culture and with a passive audience that uncritically consumes it. 
As Laurie Ouellette has argued about public television in Viewers Like You, PBS 
emerged at a time of a mass culture critique of television that conflated the popular with 
the bad and mindless and that characterized commercial television programming as a 
“vast wasteland.”183  To persuade for the need for public television, according to 
Ouellette, its advocates reinforced view and positioned public broadcasting as an agent 
that could irrigate the “wasteland.”  For Ouellette, then, a seminal problem with public 
television, one she has traced to the period in which it began, centers on the inherent 
elitism of this cultural discourse and the unexamined aesthetic hierarchies on which it is 
predicated.184   As this section will illustrate, this construction of commercial television 
operated as a foil for educational broadcasters as well, as educational broadcasters went 
about defining the purpose, scope, and significance of their programming. 
For example, in September 1959 educators, government officials, station owners, 
and representatives from private foundations met in Washington, DC to discuss the 
possibilities of networking educational broadcasting stations.  Buoyed by Title VII of the 
National Defense Education Act, the National Association of Educational Broadcasters 
(NAEB) sponsored the conference at the invitation of the Office of Education, a part of 
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW).  Though the ostensible 
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purpose of the conference was to discuss the feasibility of networking educational 
stations, at stake in the conversations were definitions of educational broadcasting itself, 
of who was to control it, and of what purpose it was to serve. What is noteworthy about 
these discussions is not just the vision of educational broadcasting that emerged, but the 
imagined use of the television medium and its audience that undergirded these 
conversations.  Educational broadcasters not only wanted access to the airwaves, but also 
advocated a purpose and use for television outside of the contemporary television system.  
In short, educational broadcasters did not just desire an alternative to commercial 
television, but hoped to realize a different social function for the medium itself. 
HEW Secretary Arthur S. Fleming opened the first session of the conference.  
“There isn’t any doubt in the minds of anyone today certainly that television does provide 
us with the opportunity of strengthening our total educational system,” he stated. “The 
question is whether or not as a nation we will take full advantage of the opportunity and 
whether or not we will pursue the opportunities that it presents with a sense of 
urgency.”185  Fleming’s framework is one that would be repeated throughout the three 
day conference: television, in this context, was viewed primarily as an educational tool.  
The task at hand was to figure out how to use it most effectively and to persuade 
educators of its utility. 
Repeatedly over the course of the conference, participants stressed that 
educational broadcasting was to be the purview of educators--teachers, administrators, 
schools, and so on.  As NAEB President William Harley commented, “educators have 
always been in control of educational broadcasting; they are now and they will be in the 
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future.”186  In his opening remarks, US Commissioner of Education Lawrence Derthick 
agreed that the educators were the most significant community for educational 
broadcasting and stressed that a future priority was to train teachers to implement 
television effectively into their classrooms.187  Ralph Steele, the executive director of 
JCET, also insisted that the primary people to be involved in the expansion of educational 
television were teachers and administrators.188 
It is this issue of origination (schools) and control (educators) that in large part 
defined educational television for many of the participants.  As Kenneth Yourd, vice 
president of NETRC outlined, the term “educational television” applied to the open 
circuit transmissions of noncommercial stations to a broad viewing public, the 
educational programming on the schedules of commercial stations, and the closed-circuit 
uses of television within educational institutions (often for credit).  However, Yourd 
stated, that when “the commercial broadcasters saw that ‘education’ was acceptable 
television fare, they then began to designate many of their so-called public service 
programs as ‘educational television’ programs.”189  From his statement, it is clear that the 
shows of commercial stations fall outside of Yourd’s definition of what constitutes the 
real “educational television.”  As Edgar Fuller, executive secretary of the Council of 
Chief State School Officers, insisted, “To the extent that ETV helps improve total 
learning it is justified; to the extent that it does not do this, it is not justified.”190  Fuller’s 
comment pointed to the shared sense of educational television as something outside of 
commercial television, its primary function to educate its viewers. 
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A central concern that received repeated attention during the conference, as it 
would in studies of educational television, was the composition of the educational 
television audience and the impact of educational television upon it.  E.W. Ziebarth, a 
dean at the University of Minnesota and news analyst for radio and television stations, 
suggested one of the goals of educational television should be to mitigate the 
“narcotizing” effect of television and to avoid contributing to, in the language of 
Lazarsfeld and Merton, the “narcotizing dysfunction” of the mass media.191  He 
elaborated that educational broadcasting could have two unintended negative 
consequences on viewers and on the social transformations it hoped to engender.  The 
more time audience members watch television, he asserted, the less time they will have 
for acting—especially for participating in organized action for social change.  In addition, 
Ziebarth expressed concern that “educational television may contribute to the confusion 
between knowing about a problem and doing something about—the substitution of a kind 
of intellectually active but socially passive pattern of response which may be 
undesirable.”192  In this, Ziebarth folded educational television into the mass culture 
concerns of the postwar period and suggested that, though it stood outside of the 
commercial system, ETV could have a similarly devastating impact on audiences and 
civic engagement. 
Harley addressed this issue from a different perspective in the closing session of 
the conference. He asserted, “In seeking to reintensify our efforts in a bipolarized world 
to preserve individual liberty and democratic processes, the use of radio and TV must be 
safeguarded so that all voices have a reasonable assurance of access to these 
instruments.”193  While Ziebarth focused on members of the public as ETV audiences, 
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Harley redefined them as potential contributors to ETV—as the voices that should have 
access to the airwaves.  Harley, in other words, advocated collapsing the distinction 
between producer and consumer.  To be sure, despite his appeals to democracy in his 
statement, Harley’s vision of whose voices would have a place in educational 
broadcasting was restricted to “educational and public service agencies and those citizens 
whose contributions to the public interest and welfare can be effectively extended by 
broadcasting.”194  In other words, this expansion of participation had its own parameters, 
ones governed by the emphasis on authority and expertise that had informed the 
conceptions of educational television since its inception. 
Much like the conference, the Ford Foundation’s NETRC commissioned a series 
of reports to document the progress of educational broadcasting and specifically to 
determine the scope of its impact on communities across the nation.  The reports 
consistently celebrated educational television over commercial television and drew upon 
a discourse of quality that aligned ETV with high-culture and denigrated commercial 
television as mass culture.  The report  The Impact of Educational Television (1960) 
characterized commercial television as a system that “encourages chiefly passivity and 
minimum effort rather than activity, a minimum of social interaction, a concern with 
fantasy rather than real life, and living in the present rather than concerning oneself either 
with self-improvement or the problems of tomorrow.”195  In contrast, according to the 
report, educational television encouraged of a viewer to “be active, striving, achieving, 
trying to better himself, participating in social interaction and public affairs.”196   
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The People Look at Educational Television (1963), another Ford Foundation 
sponsored report, defined educational broadcasters as idealists, explaining that, “Only 
idealists would dare to offer the American people, who have been busy proving by the 
millions that they want to relax and be entertained in front of the television set, a 
television alternative of lofty ideas, fine art and pressing problems.  This is something 
like inviting school children to give up their summer vacation from school.”197 Both 
reports situated educational television within the realm of high culture, distancing it from 
the mass culture implications of the medium upon which it broadcasted.  Furthermore, 
these characterizations drew upon a language of uplift and enlightenment consistent with 
progressive ideals of engendering good citizenship. 
Moreover, as Ouellette has argued, the denigration of commercial television 
during this period, perhaps best exemplified by Newton Minow’s address to the National 
Association for Broadcasters where he labeled television a “vast wasteland,” hinged upon 
a construction of television as feminized and formulaic, mass produced, and reliant on 
emotion and spectacle.198  The characterization of educational television in the reports 
strenuously defined it in opposition to these values and simultaneously reinforced the 
critique of commercial television circulating at this time.  In addition, the school children 
analogy in the second report echoed a comparison Minow made in his address.  In 
excoriating the ratings justification for sub-par programming, Minow likened 
broadcasters who programmed according to ratings to parents who designed their 
children’s diets based on their tastes.199  Both analogies implicitly infantilizes the 
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audiences of commercial television and suggested that their desires, much like that of 
children, flew in the face of what was good for them. 
This characterization stood in stark contrast to how the reports constructed the 
ETV audience, which touted its quality by highlighting the educational and class 
background of its audience members and by emphasizing their active engagement with 
—rather than passive acceptance of—the texts that they consumed.  For example, the 
report The Impact of Educational Television revealed that viewers of educational 
television were also readers of books and high-quality magazines, listeners of good 
music, owners of classical records, and consumers of news and public affairs programs; 
they were members of high status groups and were likely to take part in public affairs.200  
In The People Look at Educational Television, this characterization of the ETV audience 
was amplified:  
This is a remarkable audience, strongly representing the best educated people in 
the community, the people with professional and managerial jobs, the people who 
are most active in the civic and cultural affairs, the people who are the serious and 
purposeful users of the mass media.  It is an audience that any television 
broadcaster should be happy to have, and that any community organization, 
educational institutions, or state commission should be proud to serve.201 
Both reports stressed that the ETV audience was a quality audience, composed of 
accomplished people of taste who also were strong community members.  They were 
people, in other words, who had the restraint to fend off the seductions of mass culture 
and the good sense to prioritize self-improvement and uplift.  In addition, both reports 
indicated that the audience of educational television behaved differently from that of 
commercial television.  Whereas viewers of commercial television stumbled upon 
                                                
200 The Impact of Educational Television, 27-29. 
201 The People Look at Educational Television: A Report of Nine Representative Stations (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 1963), 90. 
 110 
programs, according the reports, educational television audiences purposely sought them 
out and engaged with them as they would a lecture or class.202 
The reports, while celebrating the audience educational television had attracted, 
simultaneously were self-critical about ETV’s limitations. The Impact of Educational 
Television report concluded, for example, that there “is little evidence that educational 
television meets any special needs of racial minorities, as was once thought possible.”203  
Though The People Look at Educational Television report characterized the ETV 
audience as a minority, though a “minority of choice rather than a minority by 
determination,”204it acknowledged that this audience “does not represent equally all 
levels of society.”205  The report conceded that educational television “is serving the 
better educated members of society, the members who are already more socially and 
culturally active and who have learned to use the mass media as a source of high culture 
and serious thoughtful information.”206 The reports admitted that to have a “quality” 
audience was also to have a smaller audience, and one that was fairly homogenous along 
race and class lines. 
At this time, educational broadcasters faced a persistent paradox of educational 
broadcasting: the explicit desire to use television as a democratizing agent while 
simultaneously attracting a small, somewhat homogenous audience. The reports, though 
on the one hand rooted in empirical studies of educational television stations, on the other 
replicated a popular construction of commercial television rooted in entrenched cultural 
hierarchies.  Defining educational television and its audience in opposition to commercial 
television, the reports reinforced certain binaries about television at the level of 
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production (educators vs. businessmen), content (enlightenment/instruction vs. 
entertainment), audiences (adults vs. children), and viewing practices (active vs. passive).  
In this, they aligned educational television with high culture forms, and reinforced 
contemporary critiques of commercial television.  Indeed, the success of educational 
television, according to this viewpoint, rested in its difference from the practices of 
commercial broadcasters.  Paradoxically, however, educational broadcasters sought a 
broad audience for their programming and desired to create a television system that 
would provide a widespread public service to television audiences.  A fundamentally 
middlebrow enterprise in its aspirations, educational television in the 1950s and early 
1960s fell short of its goal toward mass education through mass communication.  In part, 
as the next section will illustrate, the turn toward public broadcasting in the 1960s was 
intended to bring educational television’s goals closer to fruition. 
 
THE TURN TO PBS 
In a 1963 report on its philanthropy, About the Ford Foundation, the Ford 
Foundation reported that it had spent $77 million on educational television.  It allocated 
this money to its Fund for the Advancement of Education, which supported experiments 
in television instruction in schools and colleges; to the Fund of Adult Education; to help 
the development of community and cultural programs; to the National Educational 
Television and Radio Center (NETRC), which conducted a national program service for 
educational stations; and to thirty-four educational stations directly.  The foundation also 
provided money to the “Continental Classroom,” the first national television program 
offering college courses for credit, and the Midwest Program on Airborne Television 
Instruction project.207  The report detailed this program of giving in its section on 
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“Education in the United States”; the educational television grants were sandwiched 
between report on funds allocated for school improvement and for school and college 
facilities.208   
In its 1967 report on its philanthropy, also titled About the Ford Foundation, the 
Foundation similarly documented its contributions to educational television, including its 
support of the NETRC and of individual stations.  The report also referred to the 
foundation’s proposal to the FCC, issued in 1966, which encouraged the use of domestic 
satellites to help noncommercial television stations with both financing and distribution 
of programming.  Significantly, this discussion took place in the report’s section on 
“Humanities and the Arts.”  The foundation’s contributions to educational television were 
listed after its support of artistic institutions (symphonies, operas, theaters, etc) and the 
American Council of Learned Societies (a council on library resources).209  This shift 
indicated a re-evaluation of how the Foundation understood the social role of educational, 
noncommercial broadcasting.  While earlier in the decade it rooted it squarely within 
education--akin to the buildings, teachers, and materials required to improve the quality 
of schools at all levels--later in the 1960s, the foundation situated it within its programs 
for cultural uplift, implying its fidelity with the mission of arts and humanities institutions 
that function outside of mainstream educational institutions.   
This shift was consistent with the broader re-evaluation of educational, 
noncommercial broadcasting in the 1960s that culminated with the Public Broadcasting 
Act of 1967.  In the previous decade, advocates of educational television justified it as 
part of a broader need for educational reform.  Not only would educational television 
stations democratize and improve upon school instruction, but they would offer a use for 
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television completely different than that of commercial network stations.  In the late 
1960s, inspired by the Carnegie Commission’s report Public Television: A Public Action, 
educational broadcasting became public broadcasting, and with the new label came a new 
definition of the purpose and scope of noncommercial stations.  Whereas educational 
television would address cold war anxieties over the education gap, public television--as 
imagined at this time--would remedy the social problems and inequities exposed by the 
cultural ferment of the 1960s.  In the process of redefining the purpose of noncommercial 
television, advocates expanded its scope to include not only instructional television but a 
wide diversity of programming that would mirror in style, if not in content, that of 
commercial broadcasters.   
The Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, largely the architect of 
public broadcasting, emerged out of a conference in 1963 held by the NAEB and the U.S. 
Office of Education.  At the conference, leaders in educational broadcasting decided to 
commission a report to study the financial needs of educational television.  The result 
was the Carnegie Commission, a thirteen member group composed of educators (James 
Conant, Lee DuBridge, James Killian, Franklin Peterson), artists (Ralph Ellison, Robert 
Saudek), politicians (David Henry, Terry Sanford), businesspersons (Oveta Culp Hobby, 
J.C. Kellam, Joseph McConnell, Edwin Land) and a labor leader (Leonard Woodcock). 
Killian, who had been president of MIT, chaired the commission.  Its report, published in 
1967 and addressed to the American people, became the basis of the Public Broadcasting 
Act passed later that year.  The commission based its findings on visits with ninety-two 
educational television stations and seven television systems in foreign countries; during 
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its research phase, more than 225 individuals and organizations addressed the 
commission.210 
The commission’s primary innovation was its expansive definition of educational 
television.  Under the umbrella of “educational television,” the commission mapped two 
different types of television service: instructional, which would use television as an 
educational tool for pre-set educational purposes and public, which would address itself 
to the wider American public.  However, though the commission advocated both types of 
service, the overwhelming emphasis of its report was on public television, whose 
possibilities eclipsed that of the current educational television system or of instructional 
television.  Similarly, though a key provision of the Public Broadcasting Act centered on 
a study of instructional television, the hearings on the bill focused almost exclusively on 
the promises of public television. 
The shift to public, rather than educational or instructional, broadcasting pointed 
to two transformations to the noncommercial broadcasting sector that the Carnegie 
Commission strenuously recommended.  The first involved the financing of the 
broadcasting system with public monies.  The Educational Television Facilities Act had 
promised a one-time allocation to states to establish or augment educational television 
stations.  In its report, the Carnegie Commission advocated the creation of a federally 
chartered corporation, titled the Corporation for Public Television, to receive both public 
and private funds to disburse to broadcasters.  The corporation, in the commission’s 
schema, would be a nonprofit nongovernmental entity whose primary purpose would be 
to support noncommercial television with programming, research and development, 
interconnection capabilities, and training for personnel.211  The commission 
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recommended that Congress place an excise tax on television sets; the revenue from this 
tax would be dedicated for the corporation.  The implementation of a tax would insulate 
public broadcasting from the political pressures that an annual appropriations process 
could provoke.212  Though the commission anticipated that private contributions and 
funds from state and local governments would continue to sustain noncommercial 
broadcasting, one of its central innovations was its recommendation of a steady, 
permanent federal financing stream.  The “public” of public broadcasting, in this sense, 
referred to its government support. 
Additionally, the “public” of public broadcasting indicated the Carnegie 
Commission’s expansive vision of the scope of its programming and the audiences it 
would serve.  Early in its report, the Commission defined how it understood the 
distinctions between commercial, instructional, and public television: 
Commercial television seeks to capture the large audience; it relies mainly upon 
the desire to relax and to be entertained.  Instructional television lies at the 
opposite end of the scale; it calls upon the instinct to work, build, learn, and 
improve, and asks the viewer to take on responsibilities in return for a later 
reward.  Public Television, to which the Commission has devoted its major 
attention, includes all that is of human interest and importance which is not at the 
moment appropriate or available for support by advertising, and which is not 
arranged for formal instruction.213 
In other words, public broadcasting was to serve as a hybrid of commercial and 
instructional television.  It was to hail its audience with strategies similar to commercial 
broadcasters, but was to include programming that contemporary commercial 
broadcasters would not air.  It was to provide educational and public affairs programming 
like instructional broadcasters, but would not take its cue from the classroom in its 
address to its audience.  Significantly, the commission went to great pains to dismantle 
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the rigid binary between commercial and educational broadcasting that educational 
broadcasters themselves had relied upon.  The report stated, “We do not regard 
educational and commercial television as distinct activities, each pursuing its own 
exclusive way.  We deplore any inference that educational television cannot entertain as 
it addresses itself to its many audiences, just as we deplore any inference that commercial 
television should decrease its efforts to provide excellent programs of cultural and public 
affairs for the mass audience.”214 
Furthermore, the vision of the “public” within the report is one that acknowledged 
the regional and ethnic diversity of American audiences.  “Our varying regions,” the 
commission wrote, “our varying religious and national and racial groups, our varying 
needs and intellectual interest are the fabric of the American tradition.”215  Emphasizing 
the diversity of the American public, the commission designated the primary goal of 
public television to blend diversity with excellence.  “Public Television is capable of 
becoming the clearest expression of American diversity, and of excellence within 
diversity. […] It will be, in short, a civilized voice in a civilized community.”216  
Whereas educational broadcasters understood the purpose of their programming to 
diminish distinctions—based on class inequality—and provide a means to realize social 
equality, the commission envisioned public broadcasting as a medium to celebrate the 
distinctions between audiences, rather than mitigate against them.  In this, the 
commission reflected the turn toward multiculturalism that animated political discourse 
in the 1960s. 
Another key distinction between the system of educational television in existence 
and the system of public television proposed by the commission was a shift mirrored in 
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the Ford Foundation reports: from education to art.  Educational broadcasters had viewed 
television as a tool of education, whose use and control should largely be in the hands of 
educators.  The Carnegie Commission, in contrast, situated public broadcasting within a 
large community of artists, intellectuals, and community members.  It would be a space 
for creative people to produce and air programming that would not have a home on 
commercial stations.  “The major innovation in Public Television,” the commission 
wrote, “will arise out of the environment it will provide to attract talented people and 
release their skills and creativity in a medium of great service to the American public.”217  
This system, in the end, will enable “a broad range of quality programs beyond anything 
now available.”218 
Whereas educational broadcasters, especially in their testimony for Educational 
Television Facilities Act, drew upon a discourse of equality—equality of access, 
education, and opportunity—to legitimate educational broadcasting, the Carnegie 
Commission used the language of freedom in its appeals for public broadcasting.  It 
concluded: 
If we were to sum up our proposal with all the brevity at our command, we would 
say that what we recommend is freedom.  We seek freedom from the constraints, 
however necessary in their context, of commercial television.  We seek for 
educational television freedom from the pressures of inadequate funds.  We seek 
for the artist, the technician, the journalist, the scholar, and the public servant 
freedom to create, freedom to innovate, freedom to be heard in this most far-
reaching medium.  We seek for the citizen freedom to view, to see programs that 
the present system, by its incompleteness, denies him. 
     Because this freedom is its principal burden, we submit our Report with 
confidence: to rally the American people in the name of freedom is to ask no 
more of them than have always been willing to provide.219 
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In large part, the freedom that the commission sought for television was largely freedom 
from the constraints of the commercial system that dominated broadcasting and from the 
regulatory schema for noncommercial broadcasting that had made its funding so 
precarious.   
Significantly, this passage also defined the audience of public television as 
citizens, their freedom as the “freedom to view.”  Despite the commission’s advocacy for 
an expanded noncommercial television system, it imagined a system in which the 
creators of content would be experts or members of a distinct class (artist, scholar, public 
servant, etc).  In its appeals to diversity and excellence, and its effort to dismantle the 
high art/low art binary that placed commercial television in the latter category, the 
commission still maintained a hierarchy that relegated audiences to viewers and, 
importantly, taxpayers whose money would support this system of television.   
When the commission issued its report, Congress and President Johnson had 
recently approved legislation to create the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), the 
National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), and the American Film Institute (AFI).  
The political climate was ripe, it seemed, for federal support for television at this moment 
of broad spending on the arts and humanities.  Congress passed, and President Johnson 
signed, the Public Broadcasting Act in November 1967, just months after the publication 
of the Carnegie Commission report. 
While the hearings on the Public Broadcasting Act centered on logistical issues, 
like how to appoint CPB members or how much the new service would cost taxpayers, 
the prevailing themes that ran throughout the hearings pointed to a new paradigm for 
noncommercial broadcasting, even while echoes of existing discourses on educational 
television remained.   The continual allocation of federal funds for this television 
service—as opposed to the one-time disbursal of funds under the Educational Television 
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Facilities Act—raised a number of concerns over the legitimacy of the enterprise and its 
accountability to the American public.  Wrapped up in this latter issue was a familiar 
discussion over television’s public and the audience that public television would, in 
actuality, serve.  One of the most persistent topics of the hearings, however, was the 
limitations of commercial broadcasting, limitations that necessitated the creation of a 
noncommercial alternative.  Whereas the Educational Television Facilities hearings 
focused on the crisis of national education, the Public Broadcasting hearings addressed 
the inadequacies of commercial television.  The public television system, which was 
endorsed by all three major television networks, would allow television to realize its 
potential—a potential currently hampered by the restrictions of commercial television.  
However, in the process of criticizing commercial television, the testimony of the 
hearings legitimated and naturalized the primacy of profits over service that characterized 
the commercial networks.  The strength of public television, in other words, would be to 
fulfill the public service possibilities of television that the commercial stations, licensed 
to serve the “public interest, convenience, and necessity,” were not capable of doing. 
One of the most persistent objections to public broadcasting was the fear that 
federal financing would yield federal control over content.  In his opening statement at 
the Senate hearings, Senator John Pastore indicated that the senate had received 
numerous letters objecting that public broadcasting would function as “ministry of 
propaganda” for the federal government.  Congressman Claude Pepper (D-Fla.), who had 
introduced a similar bill in the House of Representatives, had received letters suggesting 
that his bill would create a “Hitler-type propaganda ministry.”220  Fred Friendly, former 
producer of See it Now and television consultant to the Ford Foundation, identified that 
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the biggest concern regarding the proposed bill was the need for political insulation of 
public television.221    The Carnegie Commission, in making its recommendations, had 
shared this fear and had urged the adoption of an excise tax in order to remove public 
television from political pressures. 
When Killian testified, he raised this very point and addressed the concerns over 
government control.  Public broadcasting, as the Carnegie Commission imagined it, was 
to be consonant with American traditions-- “not a BBC, it is not patterned after the 
Japanese system or any other existing system.” Killian stated, “We have attempted to 
design something that corresponds to American traditions and American mores, that can 
coexist amicably with commercial television—we feel that to be of vital importance—
and that together with commercial television, can meet the highest needs of our 
society.”222  In drawing the distinction between the American public television system 
and the BBC, Killian reassured that the system under discussion would not be a 
government-run model, but one that fused the liberal spirit of commercial television with 
a funding source that did not rely on sponsor dollars.  He emphasized at the end of his 
testimony that the key to the success of the service would be its insulation from the 
appropriation process, whether through an excise tax or other means.223  The commission 
advocated government support of public television, but strenuously wanted to keep it far 
away from government control.  William Henry, the director of NAEB and former 
chairperson of the FCC, summed up this balance in his testimony: “I believe that concrete 
governmental support is not necessarily linked to governmental interference.”224 
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This vision of a public television system that would exist outside the market 
(commercialism) and the state (government control) raised the issue, in the minds of a 
few senators, of accountability.   In particular, the concern was over whether public 
television, supported by taxpayer dollars, would address itself to the broad sweep of 
American audiences, rather than the small elite group already attracted to educational 
television.  Senator Norris Cotton (R-N.H.) asked John Gardner, the secretary of HEW, 
whether the CPB would “have some function in seeing to it that education television, 
which partially at least, will be supported by public funds […] does sugarcoat the pill, so 
to speak, and attract the general run of people who haven’t the advantage of the 
classroom background.”225  The premise of Cotton’s question was that current 
educational television addressed itself to a smaller, niche audience, one with the 
“advantage of the classroom background.”  In a question that would recur throughout the 
history of public broadcasting, Cotton asserted that the use of public monies required 
broadcasters to have more egalitarian view of their audience.  The question underscored 
the paradox of educational broadcasting, which justified itself through appeals to equality 
while reaching a somewhat elite audience.226 
One of the recurring themes of the hearings was that commercial broadcasters 
were “trapped” by the economics of their trade; because this restriction would be 
alleviated by the public funding source for public television, it would be free to 
experiment and innovate in ways that commercial television could not.  For example, 
Friendly testified, “I think the problem is that commercial television—I have said this 
before, forgive me again—makes so much money doing its worst that it cannot afford to 
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do its best.”227  Edwin Land of the Carnegie Commission agreed that the “trouble with 
the commercial stations now is that they simply cannot experiment even when they want 
to.”228  James O’Connell, the director of the White House Office of Telecommunications, 
justified public television with, “commercial television is trapped in a profit syndrome 
which inhibits greater experimentation with programs which seek to satisfy many small 
but important minorities of the American public—then surely public television must have 
as its prime objective not only to satisfy these audiences but also to stimulate their growth 
in numbers.”229 
As these comments illustrate, many of the supporters of public television defined 
the problem of commercial television at its root as economic.  In their estimation, the 
poor quality of commercial television programming resulted from broadcasters’ reliance 
on advertising revenue.  Freed from this trap, public broadcasters could experiment and 
innovate in ways that commercial broadcasters could not.  This line of reasoning 
legitimated both the performance of commercial broadcasters and their elision of the 
public service responsibilities of their licenses.  Furthermore, in contrasting public 
broadcasting to commercial broadcasting, it defined public television in terms of its 
financing.  What would ensure its success in achieving a more diverse and qualitatively 
better programming schedule would be its existence outside the world of commercialism.   
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Frank Stanton (president of CBS), Julian Goodman 
(president of NBC), and Leonard Goldenson (president of ABC) testified in support of 
the bill, Stanton pledging $1 million of CBS’s money to help get the CPB off the ground.  
Pastore, in questioning Goodman, acknowledged the support of the major networks, yet 
briefly questioned the motive behind it.  Pastore stated, “There has been a very, very 
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strong and emphatic endorsement of this legislation on the part of commercial 
broadcasting.  We want to make the record clear that the motive behind this is not to 
escape any responsibility you have under the law.  Is that correct?”230  Goodman assured 
him that it was, and drew distinctions between the public service obligations of 
commercial broadcasters and the proposed public television system. All the network 
presidents underscored the compatibility between noncommercial television and 
commercial television and asserted that the former would be able to engage audiences 
that the former could not. 
When President Lyndon Johnson signed the bill into law, he remarked that the act 
“announces to the world that our Nation wants more than just material wealth; our Nation 
wants more than a ‘chicken in every pot.’ We in America have an appetite for excellence, 
too. While we work every day to produce new goods and to create new wealth, we want 
most of all to enrich man's spirit.  That is the purpose of this act.”231  Johnson’s phrasing 
captured the spirit of the hearings and reflected the binary that had emerged during them.  
Just as the nation has a dual purpose, “to create new wealth” and “to enrich man’s spirit,” 
so too would the nation’s broadcasting system. The creation of public broadcasting would 
enrich the spirit of television audiences, as commercial broadcasters focused on the 
business of creating new wealth. 
The Public Broadcasting Act did not provide a dedicated financing stream for the 
CPB.  Against the recommendations of the Carnegie Commission, and despite the fears 
of many of its supporters, the CPB has relied on the congressional appropriations process, 
a process that has opened public broadcasting up to the political pressures from which its 
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creators had hoped to insulate it.  In 1972, President Richard Nixon vetoed the 
appropriations bill for the CPB.  Though the ostensible reason for the veto was that public 
broadcasting had begun to function as a fourth network, rather than a servant to local 
communities, Nixon arguably objected to public broadcasting on political grounds.  
Perceiving PBS as too liberal, Nixon began what would be a decades-long battle between 
public broadcasting and the federal government that have taken place on the battleground 
of political bias, and which has used the weapon of federal appropriations.232   
As William Hoynes has illustrated, public broadcasting for decades has turned to 
alternate funding sources because of this threat; in the process, as he argues, public 
broadcasting increasingly has accepted corporate financing and has become more market-
oriented and enmeshed with commercial media outlets.233  He points to PBS’s recent 
online activities, complete with websites that provide advertising space.  PBS Kids, for 
example, includes links to children-oriented products like Juicy Juice and Kellogg’s 
Cereal.234  PBS also has entered into joint ventures with Warner Home Video, Warner 
Bros. Records, and AOL, and Simon & Schuster.235 Given this emphasis, Hoynes 
questions, what continues to make PBS “public”?236   
In asking the question, Hoynes reiterates one of the central conceits of the shift 
from educational to public broadcasting: the purpose of the service is to provide a 
noncommercial alternative, one that will take advantage of the freedom from the 
economic constraints of commercial broadcasting.  As this section has illustrated, this 
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definition marked a new epoch, as it redefined the educational broadcasting sector that 
had existed as long as broadcasting itself. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Educational and public broadcasting advocates continually fought to create an 
alternative to commercial broadcasting.  Both asserted that the television medium itself 
was one of tremendous potential, a potential unrealized by commercial stations.  The 
right kind of television could inspire, enlighten, and educate; it could demystify the 
various communities who co-exist in the United States and could mitigate the gaps in 
opportunity and education.  As this chapter has shown, educational broadcasters for 
decades had pointed to the limitations of commercial stations.  Early on, these appeals 
were in the context of battles over licenses.  Though educational institutions had been 
involved with broadcasting since its earliest years, its future looked uncertain under a 
broadcasting policy that favored well-financed, commercial stations.  They also rooted 
educational broadcasting within broader structures of mass education.  Educational 
broadcasters imagined a use for the airwaves outside of conventional expectations, and 
desired to use television as an educational tool, alternately broadly and narrowly defined.  
Though consistently hampered by its financing, educational broadcasting was not defined 
by how it was funded, but rather by its broader mission and purpose. 
When in the 1960s the Carnegie Commission proposed a public broadcasting 
service, its rhetoric intensified the comparisons between the promise of noncommercial 
broadcasting and the limitations of commercial broadcasting.  The goal of public 
broadcasting was to provide a form of television unrestricted by the limitations of 
commercialism.  With a guaranteed funding stream, but one that existed outside of the 
vagaries of the marketplace, public broadcasting was to realize the potential for television 
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to experiment, to reach diverse communities, and to broadcast quality shows deemed 
inappropriate for commercial stations.  However, the Public Broadcasting Act did not end 
the financial burdens of noncommercial stations, nor did it insulate public broadcasting 
from the process of politics.  Today, as Hoynes has illustrated, the noncommercial 
alternative increasingly looks like a commercial network. 
In their attempt to create an alternative, educational and public broadcasting 
activists simultaneously reinforced the status quo.  After 1934, they did not question the 
underpinnings of broadcast regulation or the dominance of commercial stations.  Indeed, 
by 1967 the rhetoric of public broadcasting advocates accepted the inevitability not only 
of the dominance of the networks, but of their programming practices.  Ironically, in 
arguing for a television system outside of commercialism, these activists naturalized and 
legitimated the commercial foundations upon which American broadcasting rested. 
Furthermore, much like the other activists in this dissertation, the public and 
educational broadcasting activists imagined a contradictory television public.  The 
audiences of its stations were actively engaged, seeking out programming that would 
engender self-improvement and edification.  Contrarily, the audiences of commercial 
stations were passive, stumbling on shows that imparted no meaningful social values and 
being happily entertained by them.  For these activists, it was the type of television itself 
that activated different types of audience responses.  Indeed, a central conceit of their 
worldview was that if television would change, so too would its audiences’ response to it.  
In their activism, these broadcasters not only repurposed television, they also redefined 
its relationship to its viewers.  This viewpoint assumed that television viewers writ large 
were a monolithic group, passively viewing whatever programming came their way.  It 
was a view enmeshed in a cultural hierarchy that conflated the commercial and the mass 
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with the low and insipid.  It was a perspective, in other words, that more reflected the 
cultural biases of these activists, than the actualities of television viewers.  
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Chapter 4:  Feminists in the Wasteland Fight Back: The National 
Organization for Women Turns and the Petition-to-Deny 
When feminists protested the 1968 Miss American Pageant, no bras were burned.  
Staged on the boardwalk in Atlantic City, the protest featured a crowning of a sheep as a 
surrogate Miss America and the disposal of symbols of women’s oppression—girdles, 
curlers, bras, women’s magazines—into a “Freedom Trash Can.”  Though the contents of 
the trash can were to be set on fire, leaders of the protest complied with city law and did 
not torch them.237   The label “bra-burner” would be applied to feminists anyway, 
attesting both to the symbolic importance of the 1968 protest and to the fascination with 
the salacious that would define popular accounts of second wave feminism, even when 
incorrect.  The 1968 Miss American Pageant protest has become an iconic moment in 
second wave feminism, alongside the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment in 
Congress, repeal of restrictive abortion laws culminating in Roe v. Wade, and the 
ubiquitous slogan announcing the “personal is political.”  
Feminists of all political stripes, from the New York Radical Women who staged 
the protest to the less radical National Organization for Women, viewed popular 
constructions and representations of women to be a profoundly important stumbling 
block in overcoming sexism.  Feminists understood that the political, economic, and 
social challenges that women faced were rooted in an anachronistic and myopic vision of 
women, one underlined and perpetuated by popular culture.  Indeed, in her seminal 
feminist tract The Feminine Mystique (1963) Betty Friedan wrote of the impact of 
popular culture on keeping women in their “comfortable concentration camps,” as 
magazines, television shows, and films taught that fulfillment was to be found in their 
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roles as wives and mothers.  The Feminine Mystique exposed that such limitations on 
women actually had robbed them of meaning in their lives, and advocated for women’s 
entrance into the professions. 238  Alice Embree, in an essay in Robin Morgan’s 
Sisterhood is Powerful  (1968), wrote that the “American woman is not only tied to the 
image created for her by the mass media and their consumption-minded commercials; but 
that image itself ties her into a routinized rather than a liberated role.”239   The 
transformation of images of women was central to the realization of a more just society 
and the liberation of women. 
Some feminists of the era rejected transforming the American mass media 
altogether, forging alternatives that better met the needs of and were controlled by 
women (Ms. magazine, for example).  Others saw consumer capitalism, and the economic 
logic that underpins the media industries, as deeply entwined with sexism; to change 
perceptions of women, according to this view, it was necessary to overhaul the 
institutions that create them.  Other feminists staged public, theatrical protests drawing 
attention to the pervasiveness of negative imagery of women which resembled the 
happenings of the Yippies and other counter-cultural groups.  Feminists also engaged 
directly with the creators of popular culture, as when feminists physically took over the 
offices of the Ladies Home Journal and staged a sit-in in protest of its largely male 
editorial board. 
This chapter focuses on an overlooked area of feminist engagement with the 
media by examining the television reform activities of the National Organization for 
Women (NOW) in the early 1970s.  Though NOW too participated in symbolic protest of 
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representations of women, it also sought to reform the media industries that created them.  
Throughout the 1970s NOW, often in collaboration with other women’s and civil rights 
groups, included television reform as part of its larger agenda. In particular NOW filed, 
or threatened to file, twelve petitions-to-deny the license renewal of television stations 
across the country.240 Like other social justice groups of the period, NOW based its media 
reform efforts on a recent court case, Office of Communication of United Church of 
Christ v. Federal Communications Commission, which expanded the rights of the 
broadcasting public to include participation in the license renewal process. This decision 
enabled citizens’ groups to have the direct ear of broadcasters and their regulators as they 
tried to bring television into the fold of the more democratic and multi-cultural society 
they were trying to establish.241  NOW actively participated in this movement, asserting 
an intertwined relationship between media reform and feminist goals. Specifically, NOW 
used its petitions to pressure broadcasters to ameliorate their depictions of women, to hire 
more women to important positions, and to recognize that women are part of the public 
which they are required to serve.   
The petitions were in keeping with NOW’s reformist position of working within 
existing legal and political channels for change. To be sure, the NOW petitions-to-deny 
were not challenges to the structure of the television industry or to its economic 
underpinnings; in fact, in filing petitions, NOW implicitly accepted the terms upon which 
broadcasting was regulated and organized in the United States.  Leaders of NOW did not 
assert, as other feminists would, that American society was so rooted in patriarchy as to 
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be beyond reform.  Rather, their activism was predicated on the assumption that 
American institutions could work if reformed to be more inclusive of women and 
women’s needs.   
Though sincere attempts to transform broadcaster practices and programming, I 
argue that NOW’s television reform efforts additionally served the organization’s larger 
project of expanding civic recognition to women. First wave feminists had assumed that 
suffrage, the ur-right of citizenship, would confer upon women full membership in civil 
society. As feminist scholars have illustrated, the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment 
provided women with the right to vote alone; it did not expand women’s civic identities 
to a stature equal to that of men, and women continued to bear the brunt of legal, 
economic, and political discrimination.242 When NOW emerged in 1966 it continued the 
work of feminists who, since 1920, had fought to assure women’s full recognition as 
public actors and citizens.   
The vagaries of broadcasting’s regulatory model allowed for NOW to continue 
this project while simultaneously challenging derogatory representations of women. 
Congress had mandated in the Radio Act of 1927 and the Federal Communications Act of 
1934 that broadcast licensees must serve the “public interest, convenience, or necessity.” 
The definition of this phrase, and the attending definition of who composes the “public,” 
have been areas of contestation and confusion since the passage of the Acts.  The Office 
of Communication of United Church of Christ vs. FCC case both expanded the rights of 
listeners and viewers, and attested to the existence of a multi-faceted public whom 
broadcasters have a legal obligation to serve. To have recognition in license renewal 
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proceedings was also to lay claim to civic belonging--to one’s inclusion as part of the 
“public.”  Thus, in its television activism, members of NOW positioned themselves as 
citizens, as members of the broadcasting public with a legitimate and legally-sanctioned 
stake in the programming and practices of television stations. 
NOW’s use of the petitions-to-deny reimagined the female television consumer as 
an active citizen. In their media reform activism, NOW’s members made appeals based 
on their public-ness, not on their consumer or economic power as viewers.  For feminist 
media scholars, television has been a feminized medium: its location in the domestic 
sphere, its place within consumer culture, and its focus on serial narratives has situated it 
culturally with the location, role, and tastes of women. The television audience thus has 
been a feminized audience, its ideal viewer the female consumer.243 As Karin Vasby 
Anderson and Jessie Stewart have illustrated, even television representations of female 
voters--an identity intrinsically linked to citizenship--reinscribes women ultimately as 
economic (consumer), rather than political (citizen), actors. This emphasis on female 
consumers extends to constructions of audiences in feminist television scholarship.244  In 
this chapter, I illustrate how female viewers defined themselves as members of 
broadcasting publics, whose claims on television derived from their political identities.   
Specifically, this chapter focuses on NOW’s use of the petition-to-deny in the 
1970s.  By analyzing its first petition leveled at WABC-TV, the ABC owned-and-
operated station in New York, I argue that NOW both sought to reform television 
practices and to legitimate women as a public. A primary strategy the organization used 
was to compare its marginalization to that of African Americans, a community 
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legitimately recognized as a neglected part of the broadcasting public.  Furthermore, as 
this chapter illustrates, NOW’s media activism functioned to mobilize women at the local 
level to become media activists and simultaneously to view the media through the lens of 
second-wave feminism.  This local activism also provided opportunities for collaboration 
with other feminist and civil rights groups. NOW further asserted that its members were 
stake-bearers in media policy, and articulated the deep connection between media reform 
and feminist goals, when individuals from the organization testified in front of Congress 
to protest transformations to the license renewal process.  In sum, this chapter argues that 
NOW’s media reform, in particular its challenges to license renewals, marked not only 
the intersection of feminist goals and media reform battles, but also a way for feminists to 
gain legitimacy as members of the wider civic body. 
 
“WOMEN IN THE WASTELAND FIGHT BACK”: NOW’S PETITIONS-TO-DENY 
In a first season (1971) episode of All in the Family, Gloria Stivic (Sally 
Struthers) discovers feminism.  She embraces the contemporary emphasis on women’s 
conversation, evidenced by the first scene in the episode when she and her mother share 
secrets while cooking breakfast.  She also insists that her husband and her father treat the 
women of the household as equals and with respect.  Her husband Mike (Rob Reiner), an 
outspoken advocate for the rights of ethnic minorities and the equality of men, refuses to 
extend his social justice commitments to women.  He insists that the subjugation of 
women is not analogous to that of African Americans or Latinos, despite the protests of 
Gloria that they indeed are.  Though Gloria leaves Mike briefly, distraught that her 
husband refuses to see her as an equal, the couple reconciles by the end of the episode, 
though no indication is given that either of the two have changed their views.   
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Gloria could have functioned as a poster girl for many of the feminists of the 
period.  Like many of her real counter-parts, Gloria’s commitment to social change began 
with her support, along with Mike, of the anti-war effort and civil rights.  Within their 
marriage, Gloria had occupied a supportive role as Mike went to college, defending him 
against the attacks of her father and standing by his side in his liberal causes.  But when 
Gloria asserts her rights as an individual and draws attention to the subordination of 
women, Mike dismisses her needs, insists on the primacy of his own, and derides claims 
for women’s liberation.  Gloria, in some sense, represents the women pushed to a 
feminist movement by the sexism of their fellow activists whose vision of injustice and 
social hierarchy could not see a place for women’s claims.245  Where the parallel breaks 
down is in the end of the story.  Gloria stays with Mike.  If she had truly served as a 
symbol of many of the women’s movement’s founders, she may have left him to build 
strong, mutually beneficial relationships with other women. 
Members of NOW, a co-ed women’s group with a different story of origins, also 
could have claimed Gloria Stivic as an able and on-message spokesperson.  NOW formed 
in 1966 as an “NAACP for women.”246  In 1961, President John Kennedy formed the 
President’s Commission on the Status of Women and appointed Esther Peterson, a former 
activist for women workers, to head it.  In 1963, the commission issued a report pointing 
to discrimination in every facet of American life.  The commission also established state 
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commissions, which provided a network for women to promote reforms at all level 
government to improve the status of women.  In June 1966, delegates of state 
commissions tried to present a resolution at the third conference of state commissions to 
demand that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission enforce the clause of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act to fight sex discrimination. Their resolution was not allowed 
on the floor of the conference.  Angered and frustrated at the EEOC’s and legislatures 
unwillingness to tackle sex discrimination in employment, women met in Betty Friedan’s 
hotel room with the idea to start a women’s organization.247 
NOW was born.  At its organizing conference in October 1966, members of this 
new women’s organization mapped six “targets for action” that would form the group’s 
main goals: achieving equal opportunity in employment, promoting educational 
opportunities for women, attaining social equality between the sexes, changing 
stereotypical images of women, addressing the problem of women in poverty, and 
gaining equal rights and responsibilities for women as citizens.  By the following year, 
NOW had fourteen local chapters; by 1972, it had over 200 chapters and had achieved 
prominence in the popular imagination as the preeminent mainstream feminist 
organization.  Unlike more radical feminist groups, like WITCH, the Redstockings, and 
the New York Radical Women, NOW sought an expansion of gender equality within 
existing frameworks, not the overhauling of social institutions and practices.  Its media 
reform activities, in particular its petitions-to-deny, reflected this commitment. 
Much as Gloria tried to show Mike that women, like Blacks and Latinos, are an 
oppressed group within American society, so too did NOW use the petitions-to-deny to 
legitimate women as a distinct and unique group—just like ethnic minorities—and to 
                                                
247 Winifred D. Wandersee, On the Move: American Women in the 1970s (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 
1988), 17-18. 
 136 
designate women as a class to be considered in the varied conception of the broadcasting 
public emerging at this time.  The petitions-to-deny represented a sincere attempt to 
change broadcast programming and to bring women into positions of importance at 
broadcasting stations, but they also were means to instruct broadcasters and regulators to 
see women as a neglected and maligned group, to raise the stature of women’s civil rights 
claims to those of African Americans, and to redefine the interests of women according 
to the values and goals upon which NOW operated. 
In its attack on television stations, NOW stood on the shoulders of previous civil 
rights activists who had gained recognition for members of the public in administrative 
hearings. Though the 1934 Federal Communications Act afforded any “party in interest” 
legal standing to file a petition-to-deny the grant or renewal of a broadcast license, the 
FCC initially had narrowly defined who constituted a “party in interest.” Prior to 1940, in 
keeping with the policy of other regulatory agencies, the FCC granted this designation 
only to individuals whose legal rights would be violated by FCC actions or to individuals 
who could show that an agency policy would actually hurt an interest that the agency was 
supposed to protect.248  In its FCC v. Sander Bros. Radio Station (1940) decision, the 
Supreme Court extended the definition of who had standing to those who would suffer 
economic injury based on an administrative agency’s policy or decision.249 With respect 
to FCC decisions to grant or renew broadcasting licenses, the only individuals or parties 
that were granted standing were those who could show potential electrical interference or 
economic injury resulting from an FCC action.250  
This narrow definition would be challenged in 1964 when the Office of 
Communication of the United Church of Christ, a church congregation, and two 
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individuals filed a petition-to-deny the license renewal of WLBT-TV in Jackson, Miss. 
The petition claimed that WLBT repeatedly had violated the Fairness Doctrine on issues 
of racial discrimination and had not conducted sufficient ascertainment of the needs of 
the African American community in Jackson. The Fairness Doctrine, which dated back to 
1949, stated that stations had an affirmative obligation to air programs on controversial 
issues and must allow time for both sides of the controversy to present their views. The 
FCC policy of ascertainment required licensees to survey community needs and to 
propose programming schedules to meet those needs. The FCC immediately dismissed 
the Jackson petition on the grounds that the petitioners did not have standing in the 
renewal process because they could not show that the granting of the renewal would 
directly or substantially harm them.251 The petitioners appealed the FCC decision, and in 
1966 the U.S. Court of Appeals sided with the petitioners.   
The Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC decision was 
a watershed moment in public interest activism. In this decision, the court asserted that 
members of the public have a compelling interest in the renewal of broadcast licenses and 
should be awarded standing by the FCC. Reminding the FCC of the legislative mandate 
that broadcasters must serve the “public interest,” the court insisted that an effective way 
for the FCC to gauge whether a station had served its public is by listening to the 
testimony of members of that public. The court encouraged public participation in license 
renewal hearings, suggesting that the FCC itself could not adequately ascertain the 
quality of the service any individual broadcaster had provided to its audience. In essence, 
the court acknowledged that the FCC in the past had acted as an insufficient guardian of 
the public interest and justified this expansion of standing as a way to correct it.252   
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With regard to the petition-to-deny of WLBT’s license renewal, the court 
mandated that the FCC afford at least one of the petitioners standing and hold a hearing 
to solicit testimony to determine whether WLBT’s license should be renewed.  
Significantly, the court did not specify which of the petitioners qualified for legal 
standing.  Rather, it provided broad guidelines to the FCC: to have standing, petitioners 
must be “representative” and “responsible.”  To be considered “representative,” an 
individual or group must have significant roots in the community, represent a wide range 
of community concerns, and concern itself with broad and public (rather than narrow and 
private) interests.  The court did not indicate how the FCC should interpret 
“responsible.”253 
NOW modeled its own petitions on a law review article that mapped how 
women’s groups could use existing legal channels to reform the media. In “Federal 
Communications Law and Women’s Rights: Women in the Wasteland Fight Back,” 
Nancy Stanley acknowledged multiple routes for television reform--campaigns against 
advertisers of offending shows, public shaming of policies and programming of 
individual stations--but advocated a direct legal attack on the broadcaster, in particular 
filing a petition to challenge a license renewal. She provided three doctrines that 
feminists could use to base their complaints: rules requiring community ascertainment, 
equal employment rules, and the Fairness Doctrine.254 The equal employment rules 
referred to the FCC’s application of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to 
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broadcasting licensees.  The FCC prohibited licensees from discriminating in 
employment based on race, color, religion, national origin, or sex; the rules also stated 
that licensees must establish a program to assure equal opportunity in all aspects of 
employment.  The inclusion of “sex” in the FCC’s EEO rules marked an early media 
reform victory for NOW.  When the FCC had announced its equal employment rules in 
1969, it did not include sex as a class protected from discrimination.  NOW petitioned the 
FCC in 1970 to reconsider, and in 1971 the commission included “sex” as part of its EEO 
rules.255 
The Fairness Doctrine typically had been applied to news and public affairs 
programs but, as Stanley indicated, the FCC and the courts had extended it to other types 
of programming. Stanley offered a two-pronged strategy for women’s groups to use the 
Fairness Doctrine in their media reform claims.  She suggested that women’s groups first 
point to women’s role in society as a controversial issue of public importance.  The 
cumulative programming on broadcasting stations, Stanley maintained, presented a 
myopic view of women. Under the Fairness Doctrine, according to this rationale, stations 
could be required to provide alternative views of women than that depicted in their 
current programming.256  
NOW’s first petition-to-deny, filed by its New York chapter against WABC-TV 
in May 1972, used Stanley’s model closely to build its case against the station.  In the 
first section of the petition, NOW asserted that at both levels of the ascertainment 
process—the interviewing of community leaders and the surveying of the general 
public—WABC had neglected an important part of their community: women and 
members of the women’s movement.  Of the forty-nine female community leaders 
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interviewed not one, according to NOW, represented women’s issues.  Though WABC 
had interviewed leaders of the League of Women Voters and Women Strike for Peace, 
NOW insisted that these groups constituted organizations composed of women but not 
groups focused on women’s issues.257 In contrast, WABC “did interview such members 
of the Black and Puerto Rican communities, and should have treated the community of 
women with equal concern and with respect.”258 According to NOW, WABC had 
committed two sins: it had mistaken organizations with female memberships as women’s 
organizations and it had failed to extend the same consideration to the women’s 
movements that it had to other civil rights movements. Indeed, in this section of the 
petition, NOW was somewhat slippery in its use of the terms “women” and “feminists,” 
often indicating that the concerns of the latter were the same of the former.  NOW argued 
that WABC had failed in its ascertainment responsibilities because it had neglected to 
consult with feminist groups, an oversight especially egregious because members of 
NOW had notified the station that they would be available for ascertainment 
interviews.259  
The petition also established that the role of women in society constituted a 
controversial issue of public importance (the first criterion of the Fairness Doctrine) and 
that the programming on WABC presented one side of the issue (the second criterion). 
Citing numerous television shows and commercials accumulated through a monitoring 
program of the station’s programming, the petitioners illustrated that women were 
presented overwhelmingly as wives, mothers, and homemakers. Furthermore, if one 
watched WABC, one would see an image of women as “flighty, frivolous, simple-
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minded persons, physically attractive but totally incapable of filling positions of 
independence and authority outside of home.”260 In conclusion, “[b]ased on what they 
see, WABC-TV viewers will believe, for example, that all women are pregnant 
housewives – although fifty percent of all adult women work outside the home. They will 
believe women work to catch a man and can be paid low wages – although two-thirds of 
women work to support their families.” Significantly, the petitioners concluded their 
discussion with this statement: “They [viewers] will believe women are emotional, 
childlike, sexy, and irresponsible--although generalizations about women as a class are 
no more valid than similar generalizations about Blacks.”261  
NOW continually drew these comparisons between women’s struggles and the 
civil rights gains of African Americans. For example, according to the petition, one of 
WABC-TV’s more disturbing broadcasts of 1972 involved the Olympics. That year, 
seven of the eight American gold medalists were female athletes. WABC’s newscast 
dedicated less than a minute to their accomplishments and did not mention the names of 
the medalists on air. That same broadcast included a two-minute, fifteen-second segment 
on a pancake-eating contest. To members of NOW’s New York chapter, this slight was 
emblematic of the way that television stations denigrated the accomplishments of women. 
To underscore the severity of this action, the petitioners wrote, “No doubt, we would 
have been shocked if, while Jesse Owens was walking away with the 1936 Olympic 
prizes, the news coverage was devoted to a watermelon eating contest for Blacks.”262  
In this vein, the petition excoriated a show called “Mantrap,” which began with a 
cartoon of three circles beating up a triangle, until it becomes flat, after which one of the 
circles drags it off. In addition to this sequence, which NOW’s members read as mocking 
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and duplicating men’s power over women, the host of the show had introduced female 
contestants with descriptions like “one of the curviest girls . . . who always looks pretty.” 
To explain why this aside is offensive, in a footnote the NOW petitioners stated, “To 
recognize how offensive and demeaning this introduction is, it is helpful to transpose the 
statement to make it applicable to a Black man. For example, we would not tolerate an 
introduction where he is described as ‘a boy with rhythm.’”263  
 The NOW petition most clearly underlined this comparison and underscored the 
consequences on women when it stated:  
WABC-TV, like other stations, has abandoned the ‘Amos ‘n’ Andy’ image.  It 
would never call Black leaders ‘boy’ or snicker about the civil rights movement.  
Nor would it portray Black men exclusively as porters, waiters, and song-and-
dance men. Women should be accorded similar unbiased treatment. 
    In sum, the stereotypes described about would be intolerable if WABC-TV 
presented them about Blacks or any other minority group. They are no less 
damaging about women.264 
NOW’s consistent comparison in the petition between women and African Americans 
had a four-fold significance.  First, it drew on a long-standing feminist strategy dating 
back to the antebellum period,265 and was a strategy that NOW had employed since its 
founding.266  A 1966 law review article by two of NOW’s founding members, Pauli 
Murray and Mary Eastwood, drew parallels between the discrimination against African 
Americans and women: “We think that sex discrimination can be better understood if 
compared with race discrimination and that recognition of the similarities of the two 
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problems can be helpful in improving and clarifying the legal status of women.”267  The 
analogy, for Murray and Eastwood, would elevate the claims of discrimination that 
feminists raised and articulate them in a language comprehensible to the American 
public. 
Furthermore, a repeated epithet NOW’s members publicly used to describe anti-
feminist women was “Aunt Tom.” In defining this term, Friedan relayed the following 
stories in a 1968 New York Times article: 
“Once I was interviewed on television and said something about getting more 
satisfaction out of having a byline than out of washing dishes.  And the hostess, a 
big, tough battle-axe who has worked ruthlessly for her success, smiled tenderly 
at the studio audience and said, ‘Oh girls . . . what does a byline mean? Don’t we 
all know that being home washing the dishes is the most satisfying work a woman 
can do?’ That’s a real Aunt Tom. 
    “A group of us met in Washington with the head of the E.E.O.C. We said one 
of our complaints was that women were employed only in the most menial jobs in 
his department. He said, ‘I’m interviewing girls right now for important jobs.’ I 
said, ‘Mr. Chairman, I would hope you’re interviewing women.’ It’s like calling a 
50-year-old Negro ‘boy.’ He got the point.”268 
Friedan’s example foreshadowed NOW’s use of the race-sex comparison in its petitions-
to-deny. An “Aunt Tom,” much like the reviled “Uncle Tom,” identified with the 
repressive ideology of her oppressors, graciously accepting her second-class status. 
Furthermore, Friedan’s application of the term underscored the class and race-based 
assumptions she makes about the women for whom she speaks.   
Second, the constant women vs. African American mistreatment documented in 
the petition highlights one of the key limitations of the NOW petition.  When NOW 
raised hypothetical examples of unthinkable treatment of African Americans on 
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television, they consistently were of Black men (Jesse Owens, porters, and so on). NOW 
implicitly failed here to acknowledge that the community of women also included Black 
women, Latina women, poor women—in other words, groups whose needs and interests 
would not be met by the recommendations and complaints of NOW in this action.  
NOW’s petition, in trying to define women as a class, erased the differences between 
women and the varying struggles that they faced.  Though the organization would correct 
this oversight later on in the decade, the petitions drew upon this limiting analogy. 
Third, as NOW made claims that insulting images of African Americans had 
disappeared from the airwaves, African American activists themselves were filing 
petitions with the FCC to expose and ameliorate discriminating practices and 
representations on television.  The same year that NOW filed its petition against WABC 
for example, the Paterson Coalition for Media Change filed a petition with the FCC 
against stations in New Jersey that ignored African American and Hispanic members of 
the community.269  In May 1972, Black Citizens for the Media signed agreements with 
WNBC and WABC, both in New York, in which the stations agreed to hire more African 
Americans and to program more black-oriented shows; the organization filed a petition-
to-deny against WCBS, with whom the activists could not reach an agreement.270  In 
1975, in a rare case where the FCC sided with petitioners and revoked broadcasting 
licenses on content-based allegations, the FCC rescinded the licenses of nine Alabama 
television stations, all part of the Alabama Educational Television Network, for refusing 
to carry programming that featured African Americans.  Indeed, petitioners had 
calculated that one-half of one percent of the stations’ programming featured African 
Americans, a level only reached because the stations carried Sesame Street.  When NOW 
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made its claims about African Americans, they reflected the perceptions of the feminists 
rather than the actualities of televisual representations of African Americans. 
Finally, in this context the comparison was a savvy strategic maneuver that 
enabled the organization to use television reform to make its own civil rights claims.  By 
the time NOW had filed its petitions, the representations of African Americans in the 
media had gained legitimacy as a compelling civil rights issue.  For example, the 1968 
Kerner Commission Report, whose purpose was to study the causes of race riots, had 
underscored media’s role in contributing to racial tensions between blacks and whites. 
Studying the role of the mass media in the coverage of race riots, the report found that 
news stories skewed what had happened.  It also asserted that the news media had 
neglected the problems of poor blacks for way too long and had failed to understand that 
members of their audiences include African Americans. To rectify this problem, the 
commission recommended that news organizations hire black journalists and editors.271  
The report urgently identified diversity in the media as crucial for the public interest, a 
call heeded by the FCC when it enforced EEO policies for all broadcasting licensees in 
1969. The report, coupled with the FCC’s EEO policy, conceded that televisual images 
and discriminatory hiring practices at broadcasting stations had a meaningful impact on 
the civil rights of African Americans.  By making the comparison between African 
Americans and women, therefore, NOW could try to show how destructive images and 
paltry female employment similarly violated the civil rights of women. 
The comparison was important at the production level (production of 
programming, employment at stations), but also at the level of reception (composition of 
the broadcasting public). In preparing for the United Church of Christ case, the 
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petitioners had conducted a detailed monitoring study of racist programming carried by 
WLBT, as well as the absence of African Americans on WLBT’s schedule.  WLBT was 
one of two television stations in Jackson, where forty-five percent of the population was 
African American. They had illustrated, for example, that the station repeatedly violated 
the Fairness Doctrine when, in news programming on civil rights, only aired the 
segregationist point of view.  If the ruling in United Church of Christ expanded the 
definition of who composes the public and what constitute its rights in general, it 
specifically afforded such power to African Americans. By making the comparison to 
African Americans, NOW tried to legitimate women was an analogously crucial part of 
the public. 
A final part of the WABC petition focused on how television news programs 
neglected to cover key events in the women’s movement. The WABC petition noted that 
the station only gave ten seconds to the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) 
in Congress listed it as the second to last news story of the day.272 I aired five editorials 
about the women’s movement, four of which were negative, one neutral.273  On March 
24, two days after the passage of the ERA, the station ran a sixty second story on the 
amendment: “Roger Grimsby reported on a small group of women who oppose the ERA 
and who insist that women’s rights leaders only speak for 3% of the population.  ‘Now,’ 
Mr. Grimsby said, ‘the male chauvinist pigs will have something to oink about; the girls 
are fighting among themselves.’”274  To NOW, this attitude was indicative of the station’s 
approach to the women’s movement as either a joke, or as a topic to be ignored. 
WABC-TV had offered to negotiate with NOW, in particular on its employment 
practices.  However, the station would not be flexible on its programming decisions.  The 
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New York chapter, the national coordinator, and NOW’s lawyers agreed that the area of 
programming was critical and rejected WABC’s offer for negotiation.  The WABC 
petition thus became the first petition-to-deny filed solely on behalf of women and the 
first to use the Fairness Doctrine to apply to entertainment programming.275  
In its response to NOW’s petition, WABC accused the group of misusing the 
petition-to-deny license renewal for purposes for which it was never intended.  The 
station characterized the petition as a “general criticism, from its parochial viewpoint, of 
the television industry and of Commission requirements for renewed applications.”276  In 
other words, WABC argued that NOW was seeking to use the petition-to-deny as an 
attack on network practices and misinterpreted FCC requirements for license renewal in 
its discussion of WABC’s failings.  The first charge was undoubtedly true.  Due to its 
limited resources, NOW initially chose to focus on stations particularly influential in 
local markets or on network-owned stations.  NOW did indeed seek to transform the 
television industry but, constrained by the doctrine of localism that undergirds broadcast 
regulation, judiciously chose stations whose reform would make the greatest impact.  The 
choice of WABC as its first target, and WRC (an NBC owned station in Washington, 
DC) as its second, was in keeping with this strategy.277  Whether this tact was a misuse of 
procedure would be up to the FCC to decide. 
Outside the area of employment, WABC’s response dismissed NOW’s claims and 
accused the organization of misleading the commission in its petition.  WABC asserted 
that NOW’s complaints regarding ascertainment essentially boiled down to a complaint 
that the “right” women were not interviewed, not that women as a group had been 
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neglected.  Furthermore, the station stated that the people interviewed and surveyed had 
different priorities than NOW, and that the women’s movement was not an issue that was 
raised substantially in their ascertainment findings.  If WABC failed to dedicate a 
substantial amount of time to it, then it was not ignoring the stated interests of its 
community.  However, the station argued that it had provided substantial coverage to the 
women’s movement and suggested that NOW’s monitoring of its programming was 
insufficient.  The WABC response further attacked NOW’s understanding of regulatory 
policy.  It stated that an evaluation of journalistic decisions is outside the purview of the 
FCC.  Furthermore, it strongly suggested that an application of the Fairness Doctrine to 
programming would not be something that the FCC should allow.  Finally, WABC 
insisted that it intended to increase the number of its female employees in the future and 
the network had created an executive position, an Equal Employment Opportunity 
Manager, to insure that stations do not participate in discriminatory hiring and promotion 
practices.278 
The FCC dragged its feet for two years in responding to the NOW petition, only 
issuing its decision after the U.S. court of appeals mandated that it act. The FCC 
ultimately rejected NOW’s petition on the grounds that it had not raised sufficient claims 
to warrant an evidentiary hearing. The commission agreed with NOW that the role of 
women in society constituted a controversial issue. It also believed that entertainment 
programming could fall under the purview of the Fairness Doctrine, though only when 
programming would “contribute to or constitute a discussion” of an issue of public 
importance.  The FCC did not agree that the portrayal of women in a particular role 
constituted a “discussion,” and thus WABC had not violated the Fairness Doctrine.  
Finally, the FCC agreed with NOW that the number of female employees was low, but 
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the revised EEO programs of the station convinced the commission that WABC was 
within the “zone of reasonableness” with regard to the employment policies.279  
So in its first battle with a network-owned station, NOW technically lost.  
However, in a broader sense, the petition against WABC was a crucial and important step 
in NOW’s efforts toward media reform. This petition brought the issue of destructive 
media images of women into the public eye. As George Gent wrote in The New York 
Times, the WABC petition “is believed to be the first attempt to force the Federal 
regulatory agency and the public to recognize the role television plays in creating and 
reinforcing sex-role stereotypes.”280 The NOW actions were opportunities to articulate 
the hazards that television programming had on women, bring women into the fold of 
considerations of fair and equitable programming, and assert that women composed part 
of the broadcasting public that stations had a legal responsibility to serve. 
Furthermore, NOW’s actions against this station communicated to broadcasters 
across the country that the organization was serious about its broadcast reform efforts. 
Frequently in this era, petitioners had used the petition-to-deny as a bargaining chip to 
gain the attention of stations, not actually to revoke a license. A petition-to-deny could 
make the renewal process lengthy and costly for a station, and always carried with it the 
potential threat of the loss of a license.  Stations often would strike an agreement with 
petitioners, typically by revising their hiring and promotion policies, agreeing to establish 
an advisory council of members of the community to consult on programming decisions, 
and conceding to dedicate a portion of the programming schedule to shows that would 
serve the needs of a neglected part of the broadcast community. After reaching an 
agreement with a station, petitioners would rescind the petition-to-deny.  
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Following its actions against WABC, NOW chapters reached agreements with 
many local broadcasters and averted the need to see through a petition-to-deny by 
striking deals that addressed many of the organization’s central concerns.  NOW chapters 
capably convinced broadcasters across the nation that women constituted a significant 
portion of their public. Broadcaster recognition of women, both as audience members and 
as workers, was one crucial victory that resulted from NOW’s media activism. Another, 
as discussed in the next section, was the educative function of NOW’s media reform 
strategies. 
 
THE WIDER IMPACT OF NOW’S PETITIONS I: LOCAL CHAPTERS 
Nicholas Johnson was an atypical FCC commissioner, in many ways trivial (he 
looked more like a hippie than a bureaucrat) and substantial (he continually battled 
against fellow commissioners, Congress, and broadcasters to enforce the “public interest” 
mandate of broadcasting law). In the midst of his tenure (1966-1973) at the FCC, Johnson 
published How To Talk Back to Your Television Set (1970), an impassioned call-to-arms 
to citizens to challenge the hegemony of broadcasters over what passes over television 
screens. Johnson wrote, “The right to petition one’s government, guaranteed in the First 
Amendment to the Constitution, has become the need to petition one’s media – usually 
television.  That is how a citizen helps to change things.  That is how he communicates 
with his fellow citizens.  As we’ve discovered, even a riot is a form of 
communication.”281 Johnson’s claims underline that of many public interest and activist 
groups of the era.  To make substantive social changes in a mass-mediated age, media 
reform must be part of the agenda. Furthermore, media activism is a form of civic 
engagement, as Johnson’s words suggested, both as a way to reimagine the civic body--
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who gets represented on television--and as a public process in which viewers transform 
themselves into citizens, articulating through their activism their vision of and their 
demands for a better society.  
In addition, as Johnson stated, “[t]he whole theoretical foundation of American 
broadcasting is the tie of a local station to its community and its local service.”282 
Television reform, by the legal structure of broadcasting, is fundamentally a local 
activity. Even though by 1934, when Congress issued its Federal Communications Act, 
national networks were set to dominate broadcast radio, legislators decided to maintain 
the doctrine of localism they had established in the Radio Act of 1927. The FCC was to 
license local stations, not national networks, which had the obligation to serve the needs 
of the particular communities in which they broadcast. Thus the “public” of the “public 
interest” requirement was the local public, whose needs and interests were to be met in 
broadcast programming and who, by the late 1960s, should be represented on the payrolls 
of their local broadcasters. 
For NOW, television reform activism took place at the level of local chapters, 
though guided by the organization’s national task forces on media. In the process of 
instructing members of local chapters how to be effective media activists, NOW’s 
leadership educated them on how to be both critical television viewers and civic actors. 
Indeed, NOW’s members became knowledgeable of administrative policies regarding 
broadcasting, of their rights and interests as members of the public, and of how to 
promote changes in programming and employment practices. Their media reform efforts 
not only resulted in new partnerships with and promises by local broadcasters, but also 
allowed local members of NOW chapters to  “communicate with their fellow citizens” on 
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the need to eradicate inequity--in particular sexism--by allowing new images and voices 
in the mediated public sphere created by television. 
With NOW’s first petition-to-deny still pending a response by the FCC, the 
organization recruited local chapters across the country to monitor, engage, and possibly 
challenge the broadcasters serving their communities. In May 1974, NOW’s Broadcast 
Media Task Force sent a newsletter to all local chapters entitled “NOW Media Project: 
An Action Plan to Create a Feminist Media.”  Significantly, the action plan described in 
the pages of the newsletter centered on reforming existing media structures and practices, 
not--as other feminists of the period would advocate--the creation of alternative feminist 
media to counter the mainstream. Indeed, the three highlighted long-term objectives of 
NOW in this arena were to get more (and more fair) coverage of feminist issues in 
broadcast programming, achieve a more balanced depiction of women in all 
programming, and improve the status of women who work in the broadcasting 
industry.283  
The strategy advocated that local chapters follow the roadmap Stanley had offered 
in her 1971 article. In the first pages of the newsletter, NOW’s membership was provided 
a description of the license renewal process, their rights as part of a broadcast public, and 
the legal foundations of the three areas listed above.  Additionally, each of the terms 
employed (ascertainment, Fairness Doctrine, equal employment) were defined as legal 
concepts (including where in statute or FCC policy they appear) and as activist strategies 
(how specifically they could apply to feminist media concerns).284  
NOW’s chapters set up local task forces focused on broadcast media reform.  
These task forces were to inspect the public files of a broadcasting station, set up a 
                                                
283 “Now Media Project: An Action Plan to Create a Feminist Media,” May 1974 in Donna Allen Papers, 
Western Missouri Historical Society. 
284 Ibid. 
 153 
monitoring project to examine the content of stations’ programming, prepare themselves 
to be ascertained effectively by local stations, arrange meetings with local broadcasters to 
discuss any concerns regarding programming or employment, and--failing to negotiate a 
settlement with a station--file a petition-to-deny license renewal with the FCC. The 
newsletter provided a detailed list of how to find information in public files regarding the 
employment and ascertainment strategies of a station. It also gave specific instructions on 
how to meet with broadcasters to maximize NOW’s ability to convince them to reform 
their policies, which included the writing of memoranda and specific proposals as 
workable documents that would be the basis of discussion and negotiation. The petition-
to-deny was presented as a last resort for NOW chapters to be used only if stations refuse 
to compromise with the organization. 
Key parts of the preparatory work in these campaigns were studies that monitored 
the content of individual broadcasting stations. When monitoring programs, participants 
would pay attention to how women and women’s issues were represented and discussed, 
and to how much time stations dedicated to women’s rights and issues. Specifically, 
monitors would record the characteristics (gender, race, approximate age, occupation) of 
television characters and figures. They would register how much time each news story 
was granted and account for stories that were under-reported or neglected.  They also 
were to pay attention to the implied gender and race of voice-over voices and figures of 
authority both in commercials and in non-narrative programming and examine the 
conclusion of narratives and determine the characteristics of the individual(s) who 
resolved the conflicts. The results would be concrete, statistical information about how 
women fared on a particular television station, information that stations could not dismiss 
as anecdotal or inconsequential.   
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Importantly, the monitoring strategy also taught NOW’s members to look at the 
cumulative effect of the broadcasting day, rather than to hone in on particularly offensive 
programs or advertisements. Much in line with Raymond Williams’s insight about 
television flow, published concurrently with NOW’s monitoring studies, NOW 
approached television not as a series of discrete texts, but as a medium whose 
programming was continuous and whose impact should be gauged accordingly.285 In his 
Television: Technology and Cultural Forum (1974), Williams emphasized that what 
defines the television experience is not discrete texts, but televisual flow—the seamless 
flow of texts and advertisements from one to the next.  NOW deployed a similar 
definition when in its monitory study of WRC-TV (Washington, DC; NBC) it drew from 
ads, game shows, variety shows, children’s programs, soap operas, prime time programs, 
and news reports.286 Thus, monitoring programs not only provided a critical lens through 
which to view television, but also implicitly recognized television’s flow as a defining 
characteristic of the medium. The entire broadcasting day, including advertisements, was 
up for scrutiny, and the combined impact of the messages communicated would provide 
the basis of the feminist critique. 
Many NOW chapters, utilizing the above strategies, successfully struck deals with 
local broadcasters. For example, NOW’s Houston chapter reached an agreement with 
KPRC-TV in June 1974 wherein the station agreed to recruit women employees and to 
establish (with the help of NOW) a Women’s Advisory Council to confer with the station 
on how best to cover issues of concern to women and to plan programming that 
addressed specific areas of interest; in addition, the station promised to increase coverage 
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of the women’s movement on the news and of women’s athletics.287 Around the same 
time, the San Diego NOW chapter reached “by far one of the best agreements to date 
concerning the image of women in television” with KCST-TV, in which the station 
promised to employ women to mirror their ratio in the labor market and to devote twelve 
shows in prime time dedicated to women’s issues over the next two years. In Denver, the 
NOW chapter, in coalition with other women’s minority groups, reached an agreement 
with KWGN that, similar to the Houston arrangement, established an advisory council 
and secured programming commitments and employment gains for women and 
minorities.288  Indeed, by mid-1974, NOW chapters had reached fifteen agreements with 
local radio and television stations that “deals with the issues of the image of women in 
the media.”289  
The local chapter media activism not only engaged NOW’s membership as 
citizens, it resulted in meaningful negotiations with local broadcasters to better serve their 
publics. In addition, NOW chapters often acted in concert with other women’s and civil 
rights groups to challenge broadcasters. The advisory councils--which were a consistent 
part of broadcaster agreements and hearkened back to the radio councils of the 1930s290-- 
typically brought together representatives from a wide array of women’s and civil rights 
groups.  For example one of the earliest councils, formed in 1972 as part of an 
arrangement with WTAE-TV in Pittsburgh, included members of Pittsburgh’s NOW 
chapter, the League of Women Voters, Black Business & Professional Women, Women 
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in the Urban Crisis, the NAACP, the Pittsburgh PTA, the YWCA, Black Women’s 
Association of Pittsburgh, Hadassah, and both the Republican and Democratic Parties.291 
Media reform activism, in the form of direct negotiation with broadcasters, 
provided a forum for NOW to collaborate with other women’s rights groups and with 
many civil rights and public interest groups who had a shared stake in reforming 
television.  To be sure, NOW had been part of widespread feminist coalitions prior to its 
media reform activism.  It had joined the Congress to Unite Women, a coalition of groups 
calling for legal reforms, along more radical groups like WITCH.292  NOW notably had 
organized the Women’s Strike for Equality on August 26 1970, which across the nation 
brought together women of all ages, political orientations, and group membership; 
publicized the women’s movement and its goals; and legitimated women’s rights as an 
important political and social issue.293   The media activism, however, was a way to 
cohere the women’s movement at the local, rather than the national, level and to bring 
women from various organizations together to improve broadcast station practices.  
Furthermore, through its media reform, NOW worked with a variety of civil rights 
groups, outside of organizations specifically dedicated to women’s rights, which united 
the organization with larger movements for social justice and equality who were active in 
the 1970s. 
In sum, NOW’s media reform campaigns transformed media consumers into 
citizens/members of publics, redefining their relationship with broadcasters from one 
predicated on the reception of media texts to one that iterated the rights of viewers as part 
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of the civic body who had a legal stake in broadcasting.  NOW’s national leadership 
continued to encourage this role a few months later when, facing deregulation of the 
license renewal process, the heads of NOW’s Media Reform Task Force encouraged 
members of local chapters to write to senators expressing opposition to the proposed 
rules.  Reminding viewers that “[t]he airwaves belong to you,” NOW asserted that 
alterations to license renewal requirements could fundamentally restrict the ability of 
citizens – “labor, consumers, minorities, the poor, farmers, or ‘middle America’” – to 
maintain that the mediated public sphere provided by broadcasters was responsive to the 
publics that it served.  In encouraging this form of civic participation, NOW allowed its 
own members and the larger broadcast public to see the ties between broadcasting policy 
reform, a responsive media, and a healthy democracy.  In addition, as the following 
section will show, the process of challenging license renewals legitimated NOW as an 
organization with a stake in media reform and provided its leaders opportunities to testify 
in front of Congress over the structure and goals of broadcasting policy and its 
relationship to the social justice aims of feminists. 
 
THE WIDER IMPACT OF NOW’S PETITIONS II: BROADCASTING POLICY AND 
FEMINISM 
Whitney Adams, the national coordinator of NOW’s FCC Task Force, testified in 
front of Congress in June 1973. The previous day, Kathy Bonk--a member of NOW and 
of two women’s advisory councils to television stations in Pittsburgh--had appeared 
before the same congressional committee. Congressman Torbert MacDonald (D-Mass.) 
had asked Bonk: “What is your definition of sexism as opposed to sex?”  Bonk’s reply 
echoed a familiar NOW refrain: “The best understanding would be to compare the 
definition of sexism and racism.  Sexism is discrimination against any person because of 
 158 
their sex.”294 Adams initially addressed her remarks the following morning to that very 
question asked of Bonk, taking a different tack: “in my opinion the difference is that sex 
is fun and sexism isn’t.”295  
Significantly, both comments were made in the context of hearings to discuss 
broadcast license renewal. Adams, Bonk, additional representatives from NOW, and 
other members of civil rights groups appeared before Congress to register their 
disapproval for the proposed deregulation of broadcasters.  Congress at this time 
contemplated expanding the length of a broadcasting license from three to five years and 
removing barriers to incumbents for license renewal.  In addition, Congress considered 
making it more difficult for an incumbent licensee to face loss of a license.  In 1969, the 
FCC had not renewed the license of WHDH-TV (Boston), and instead granted the license 
to a competing applicant.  Though the FCC later asserted that WHDH was a special case 
of a station that repeatedly over the course of its term had been a sub-par licensee, and 
that its transfer of its license to new station owners did not represent a break in FCC 
policy, the broadcasting industry and its allies in Congress were nervous that this case 
would serve as a precedent that would destabilize the industry and make broadcasters too 
vulnerable to loss of their licenses.  The new policy would require the FCC to determine, 
before looking at competing applications for a license, that a licensee had not served the 
public interest.  In other words, license renewal was to be secure for broadcasters if they 
minimally served the public interest during the previous term of their license.  Competing 
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applicants, even if promising to be far superior to current license-holders, would not 
receive consideration unless the FCC already decided not to renew the license.296 
 The testimony of members of NOW at the hearings only rehearsed many of 
NOW’s findings regarding sexism and television, but provided opportunities to articulate 
in a public forum the entrenched relationship between perceptions of women and the 
material discrimination that women faced in the United States. The work done by NOW 
in amassing evidence against broadcasters equipped its members both to participate in 
legislative hearings over broadcasting policy and to show law-makers how regulation of 
broadcasting was intrinsically tied to the eradication of social injustices, in particular 
sexism.   
Members of NOW testified both in front of the House and the Senate to protest 
these policy changes. The first to appear was Jan Crawford, a member of the NY chapter 
of NOW and an array of other women’s groups, who testified alongside Helen Blume, 
also of NOW, and Cynthia Goulder, member of NBC’s Women’s Committee for Equal 
Employment Opportunity. Crawford issued the official statement, though both she and 
Blume participated in the question-and-answer session with congressmen that followed. 
In her statement, Crawford made four central points: (1) broadcasters discriminate against 
women in their employment practices; (2) images of women on television contribute to 
their low regard and status nation-wide, and likely contribute to point (1);  (3) the only 
recourse women’s groups have had, given the hostility or silence that broadcasters often 
afford them, is the challenge to license renewal; and (4) therefore, an expansion of the 
term of a license and the deregulation of the renewal process will severely limit the 
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ability of women’s groups to reform images of women and sex discrimination in 
hiring.297  
In the questioning session after the testimony, the congressmen interrogated all 
four prongs of Crawford’s testimony.298 In the process of answering questions, Crawford 
and Blume articulated what constituted sexism, defined the goals of the women’s 
movement, illustrated how media reform and eradication of sexism were deeply 
entwined, and attested to why the license renewal process was a crucial strategy for 
women’s activists. These themes would also recur in the testimony of Bonk and Adams.  
For example, MacDonald began his questioning by asking about the relationship 
Crawford drew between employment discrimination broadly and images of women on 
television. Crawford, who had experience in media sales, was turned down for a job at 
ABC because she was told “I am not interested in a woman.”  The following exchange 
took place: 
Mr. MacDonald: No, I am not talking about your background.  I am talking about 
the background of the ABC official who said he was not interested in having a 
woman.  You say he automatically thought all women were childlike, subservient 
idiots, and incapable of assuming full responsibility [as per media 
representations].  That is possible.  But it is also possible he may have a bad 
marriage. 
Ms. Crawford: I don’t think employment standards should be based on his 
personal experience in his marriage. 
Mr. MacDonald: I am not saying that it should.  I am saying that is another 
possibility.  You jump at the conclusion that you were being put down just 
because this man did not think a woman would fit the job. 
Ms. Crawford: That is sex discrimination, I believe. 
Mr. MacDonald: Well, yes, I guess it is on his part.299  
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The testifiers received similar skepticism from Congresswoman Cardiss Collins (D-Ill.), 
who implied that the reason why women did not receive similar levels of employment in 
broadcasting is because they had not attended professional schools, in particular 
engineering and business schools, to qualify them adequately. She asked, “How can 
women be discriminated against today as far as industry is concerned if these women do 
not have the training?” Blume asserted that, in fact, many women were qualified and still 
suffered discrimination; she also pointed out that much of the training in the broadcasting 
industry happens in-house, training that women would not be eligible for if they could 
not gain entry in the first place.300  
In Crawford’s response, she again drew on personal experience to expose sex 
discrimination in the broadcasting industry and linked small strides forward to the license 
renewal process: 
Ms. Crawford: I know many women from the media area who until recently had 
no opportunity in broadcast sales until recent months.  Because of the ABC-TV 
license challenge stations are under more pressure to upgrade women.  I 
personally spoke with about six different companies about sales positions.  One of 
the answers was hysterical because it was the only negative reply that the person 
interviewing me could come up with—that they could not tell as many jokes at 
their sales meetings if women were present.  This is ‘subtle’ discrimination.  
There are women interested in sales.  I can guarantee you that.  I have spoken 
with many, and in New York they are beginning—they are beginning to interview 
these women.  Before the license challenge women were not being interviewed 
for these positions or they weren’t described as positions that women could fill.  
There are women within the network and stations who are very capable of going 
from clerical positions in sales to selling outside and who, until recently, were not 
being considered—and are still having a difficult time being considered.301 
Another congressman challenged this use of the petition-to-deny as a means to attack the 
problem of employment discrimination and asked: “What do other people in industries do 
who have the same problem?  Suppose there is discrimination in the banks?”  To which 
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Crawford replied: “Banks are not Federal licensees.”  She later clarified: “We are talking 
about the public airwaves here and broadcasters’ responsibility to the public.  Their 
responsibility is much clearer and more direct than employee at a bank having some 
difficulty.  The employee at a bank is not effecting the communications system of this 
country.”302 
A concern of MacDonald’s, raised both with Crawford and later with Adams, was 
whether one could characterize television as particularly demeaning to women, since men 
on television appeared as buffoons as well. He pointed to a particular television 
commercial about two men arguing about bleach as indicative of men’s silly 
representation, and challenged Adams’s contention that Dingbat (Edith) on All in the 
Family suffered a worse fate than Archie in her depiction. Both women, in keeping with 
NOW’s emphasis, directed the congressman’s attention away from individual shows or 
ads to discuss how women were consistently presented in demeaning or diminished roles.  
This tack was consistent with the monitoring campaigns and petitions of NOW, and 
underscored the organization’s understanding of broadcasting flow.  
Perhaps the most persistent area of concern for the congressmen was the use of 
the petition-to-deny as a strategy to attack the problems of media representation and 
employment discrimination. MacDonald, though acknowledging that sex discrimination 
was a problem, questioned whether the challenge to a license renewal was the best way to 
fight it. He likened the action to shooting a squirrel with an elephant gun.  Crawford 
conceded the point, but asserted that “the petition-to-deny is the only effective tool 
available at this time.”303 This was a point reiterated by Bonk when she testified in front 
of the committee. She too highlighted how television’s tremendous power to influence 
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people and how the image of women on television is disappointing.  However, she spent 
much of her testimony charting how the threat of a license challenge to three Pittsburgh 
television stations in 1972 was the catalyst that forced the stations to negotiate with 
NOW’s Pittsburgh chapter to address some of the complaints regarding programming and 
employment. “Prior to any talk of license renewal, prior to any knowledge that as citizens 
we did have legal rights and a framework to reach broadcasters,” Bonk stated, women 
were ignored as serious community leaders and news-makers.” However, “when 
threatened by a petition-to-deny when approaching the final date of filing, did the 
television stations respond to any of the proposals made by NOW.” 304  
Unlike in New York, when the New York chapter did file its petition, the 
Pittsburgh chapter capably negotiated with the stations but, as Bonk highlighted, these 
agreements resulted only from the pressure the station felt at the potential of a license 
challenge. As a result, the stations and women’s groups in the area had “opened the doors 
for a channel of communication.” Bonk underlined, “None of this would have happened 
if citizens had not had available to them the use of a petition-to-deny.”305  The length of 
the license term, she concluded, would disadvantage the public and their ability to have 
broadcasters listen to their concerns. Like Crawford, Bonk revealed that this action, 
though seeming extreme, had been the one way to force broadcasters to be responsive to 
members of their publics. 
The proposed revisions to the license renewal did not pass, and NOW’s leadership 
took some of the credit for its defeat.306  In addition to a fight to retain current policy, the 
testimony of NOW’s members underlined how the organization understood that feminist 
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goals and media reform were inseparable and provided a platform for NOW’s members 
both to define sexism and to illustrate how broadcast practices contributed to it.  The 
testimony further legitimated NOW as an organization with an interest in broadcasting 
policy, the realization of its larger goals contingent on a regulatory structure that 
provides, in Bonk’s words, “channels of communication” with the broadcasters whose 
programming shapes public conceptions of women.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Diana (Faye Dunaway) in Network (1976) was both a timely and prescient 
character.  In this scathing film about television, Diana is an accomplished television 
executive who infuses the news division with entertainment values, employing a psychic 
as a news personality and allowing Howard Beale (Peter Finch), a former anchor in the 
throes of a nervous breakdown, to preach on-air.  She personifies the sensationalist values 
that are the downfall of serious television.  She literally replaces Max (William Holden), 
a craggly old newsman who had worked with Edward R. Murrow and who embodies the 
Golden Age of television news, at the fictitious network.  She is at once what NOW 
worked throughout the 1970s to achieve—a woman in a position of power in television—
and perhaps the organization’s worst nightmare.  Diana’s character is a repository of the 
nastiest characterizations of feminists: she is cold, self-involved, and cares only about her 
career; she climaxes during sex when talking about her vision for the network.  Network 
can be read not only as an excoriation of television, but as a backlash against the media 
activism of groups like NOW who aggressively tried to bring women into the fold of 
television.   
Throughout the 1970s, NOW’s use of the petition-to-deny established the 
connection between televisual representations of women and the very conditions 
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feminists sought to change.  Furthermore, as this chapter has illustrated, NOW’s media 
reform campaigns transformed media consumers into citizens/members of publics, 
redefining their relationship with broadcasters from one predicated on reception of media 
texts to one that iterated the rights of viewers as part of the civic body. In encouraging 
this form of civic participation, NOW allowed its own members and the larger broadcast 
public to see the ties not only between feminism and media reform but between 
broadcasting policy reform, a responsive media, and a healthy democracy.   
And while NOW, like many activist groups, would abandon the petition-to-deny 
by the end of the decade, the organization stayed actively involved in television reform 
efforts.  The costs of filing a petition, coupled with the move to deregulation in the 1980s 
(see chapter 6), dampened the enthusiasm for challenging license renewals and public 
interest groups turned to other forms of media reform.  In the 1970s, alongside their other 
work, NOW participated in a coalition with groups like Planned Parenthood to encourage 
sponsors to support Maude, of the series Maude, for the episode where she gets an 
abortion.  NOW also joined the Advisory Committee of National Organizations (ACNO) 
for the Corporation of Public Broadcasting.  In this role, NOW tried to ensure that the 
new public broadcasting system avoid the negative stereotyping of women so common on 
commercial stations.307  Throughout the 1980s, NOW continued its media reform work, 
from filing complaints against ABC’s and CBS’s decisions not to air Public Service 
Announcements about birth control to defending women who lost their jobs in television 
because of sexual discrimination.308  More recently, NOW has been a part of a 
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widespread coalition (see chapter 6) to fight relaxed media ownership rules and in 
particular has focused on the impact new rules would have on minority and female 
ownership of broadcasting stations.  While NOW no longer challenges license renewals, 
the organization continues to fold media reform efforts within its feminist project. 
Furthermore, activists in the twenty-first century have revived the petition-to-deny 
as a media reform strategy.  Though the petition-to-deny had seemed an obvious victim 
of deregulation, the 2007 National Conference on Media Reform held a session on “How 
to Challenge a License Renewal,” in which representatives of activist organizations 
detailed how and why they had filed petitions with the FCC against television and radio 
stations across the country.  Much like petitioners in the 1970s, groups like the Youth 
Media Council, Iowans for Better Local TV, and Chicago Media Action did not expect 
their petitions necessarily to result in the revocation of licenses.  Rather, they had three 
primary purposes: to create a paper trail documenting the alleged abuses of broadcasters; 
to put pressure on broadcasters to improve or ameliorate their programming; and to 
engage citizens in the media policy and reform work as a means to revitalize a 
democratic public sphere.  Much like NOW and other activist groups in the 1970s, the 
petitioners saw in filing a petition a reclamation of their civic rights, as members of the 
broadcasting public, to a media system ostensibly predicated on public interest 
objectives. 
This later enthusiasm for the petition-to-deny had yet to take on the same 
proportions it had had in the 1970s.  Indeed, in the 1970s, social justice used policy 
reforms to gain the direct ear of broadcasters and their regulators in their attempts to 
bring television into the fold of the more democratic, multi-cultural, and just society they 
were trying to establish.  NOW actively participated in this movement, asserting an 
intertwined relationship between media reform and feminist goals. As this chapter has 
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argued, NOW’s petitions-to-deny only nominally aimed to revoke broadcasting licenses. 
They were opportunities for the organization and its members to assert the enmeshed 
relationship between media representations and women’s oppression and, importantly, to 
lay claim to women’s civic membership. The petition-to-deny process, along with its 
involvement in other forms of broadcast reform, reconstituted NOW’s members as part of 
the broadcasting public with legally-sanctioned rights to challenge the programming and 
practices of broadcasters.   
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Chapter 5:  The Media Research Center and the Battle Against the 
“Liberal News Media” 
In each monthly issue of MediaWatch, the Media Research Center (MRC) gave 
its “Janet Cooke Award.”  The award, which was received by a representative of almost 
every major mainstream news organization over the ten years (1988-1998) that the MRC 
published MediaWatch, honored the news story of the previous month that the MRC 
deemed most unconscionably biased.  Cooke, the award’s namesake, had been a reporter 
for the Washington Post and a recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for a feature she had written 
on a heroin addict.  Cooke later returned her prize and lost her job at the newspaper after 
admitting that the subject of her article was a fake--not an actual person, but a composite 
of many people she had met.  In evoking Cooke in its awards for over ten years, the MRC 
implicitly called its winners liars, biased reporters shirking their professional 
responsibilities.  Though this charge was often hyperbolic and over-stated, over the 
course of a decade MediaWatch continued to find some unlikely recipient to single out as 
especially biased and irresponsible.    
The bestowing of the Janet Cooke award typifies a tack that the MRC has taken in 
its media reform efforts.  Founded by L. Brent Bozell III in 1987, the MRC’s mission has 
been to chart liberal bias in the mainstream news, paying particular attention to television 
network newscasts. The MRC has collected data, statistics and direct quotation, to 
corroborate its claims of bias.  Using a Nexis database, the MRC has monitored the news 
stories of television networks, cable networks, magazines, and newspapers.  The use of 
direct quotations and statistics, according to the organization, proves the presence of bias 
and counters claims that such allegations are impressionistic or anecdotal.  Additionally, 
the MRC often has presented its findings in a humorous manner and has used a tone of 
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comic disbelief in the way it reports on bias in the news.  The Cooke award typifies this 
strategy, as does the MRC’s list of “Notable Quotables,” direct quotations it finds 
especially slanted and/or funny, and the its annual banquet honoring the journalists who--
in its estimation—have made silly or especially slanted remarks, for years referred to as 
“The Linda Ellerbee Awards for Distinguished Reporting.”  According to Bozell, the 
MRC had named the award after journalist Ellerbee because she “epitomizes a liberal 
blowhard who has nothing to say.”309 
The MRC has become an important contributor to public perceptions of American 
media practices.  Since its founding, it has disseminated its findings to subscribers, all 
members of both houses of Congress, the major mainstream news organizations, and 
conservative talk show hosts, pundits, think tanks, and publications.310  The MRC, thus, 
has waged its reform fight on the battleground of discourse.  Its purpose has been to 
direct the public to see the media as it sees it: as controlled by liberal eastern elites who 
are both out-of-touch with America’s mainstream and who mask their partisanship with 
false claims of objectivity. Media reform, in this case, has functioned as a tool in the 
political battle waged by contemporary conservatism.   
As this chapter will illustrate, the MRC has forged a reciprocal union between 
media reform and conservative activism.  As such, the work of the MRC has functioned 
to cohere a disparate conservative movement around the issue of the media.  As historian 
George Nash has noted, the label “conservative” has been an umbrella term for divergent 
and often conflicting movements311, such as economic libertarianism, social 
traditionalism, and neo-conservatism. The MRC has illustrated that what can bind 
                                                
309 Joe Queenan, “The Media’s Wacky Watchdogs” Time, August 5, 1991, 54. 
310 Brent Baker (vice president for research and publications, Media Research Center), in conversation with 
the author, January 2005. 
311 George Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc. Publishers, 1976). 
 170 
conservatives of all perspectives is a shared antagonism toward the media that treat the 
views of all conservatives with either disregard or hostility.  Its publications attack the 
media’s coverage of stories on fiscal policy, moral and social issues, and American 
foreign policy.  In sum, one of the primary accomplishments of the MRC has been to 
create a discursive frame through which to view the media, one that sees the mainstream 
media as overt and consistent in its antagonism to every kind of conservative.  The work 
of the MRC suggests that no matter what kind of conservative one is, one should hate the 
mainstream media. 
In addition, as this chapter will show, the MRC has positioned the public interest 
as synonymous with a conservative worldview. In the process, the MRC continually has 
argued that the liberal media inflicts harm on the polity itself and on the possibilities of a 
functioning democracy.  It encourages and reinforces the dichotomy that positions 
liberals as elites, conservatives as of the people and representative of the “common man.”   
It therefore constructs its role not only as media watchdog and guardian of conservative 
views, but simultaneously and seamlessly as the protector of the American public itself.  
Furthermore, this discursive frame has been accomplished by the way that the MRC 
constructs a narrative of victimization that positions conservatives--and the broader 
American public--as the undeserving victims of an irresponsible, yet immensely 
powerful, liberal media.   
The MRC’s reform tactics are designed specifically to accomplish these goals.  
Unlike previous media reformers--who have looked to legislative action, changes in FCC 
policy, or shifts in industrial practices--the MRC primarily has set it sights on changing 
the national discourse on the media.   Its primary aim, according to MRC Vice President 
for Research and Publications Brent Baker, is to discredit the mainstream media and to 
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encourage the American public not to trust it.312  The MRC widely disseminates its 
conservative critique which, in turn, has contributed to the parameters of a national 
conversation over the media.  In sum, it has taught Americans how to watch the news 
media and, in the process, to view it through the lens of contemporary conservatism.  Its 
focus on public discourse is a strategic maneuver to shape public perceptions of the 
media and to redefine the terms upon which national debates over the media take place.  
In the process, it simultaneously points to its evidence of a liberal media as a means to 
reassert that conservatives constitute the marginalized and victimized group within 
American society. 
The MRC conflates Republican with conservative, Democrat with liberal.  As 
such, the terms’ deployment in their publications has been more pragmatic than 
ideologically consistent.  In this chapter, my use of these terms reflects how the MRC 
employs them.   In addition, though the MRC’s overarching emphasis has been news 
telecasts, the object of its study is the mainstream media writ large: television, 
newspapers, magazines, and radio.  It makes no distinctions between or across media, and 
its work rests on the premise that all media share not only a similar bias, but occupy an 
equivalent role in audiences’ lives.  That said, despite the proliferation of media outlets 
online, the MRC continues to focus on television (though with an increased emphasis on 
cable), and print publications.  Maintaining that these are the sources that a majority of 
Americans use as their primary source of news, the MRC has kept its attention on older 
distribution platforms. 
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MRC: HISTORY AND STRATEGIES 
When Bozell founded the MRC, he followed in the footsteps of previous 
conservative activists. The MRC, much in the tradition of conservative groups like Reed 
Irvine’s Accuracy in Media (AIM), has monitored television newscasts (the major 
networks, PBS, and CNN), newspapers, and magazines to document examples of liberal 
bias.  Bozell writes a syndicated column and has appeared, along with other members of 
the MRC, on television repeatedly to weigh in on the issue of liberal media bias, perhaps 
contradictorily utilizing the very media the MRC vilifies in order to disseminate its 
critique of it. In its attacks, the MRC has foregrounded the political leanings of editors 
and journalists and has suggested that it is these individuals, not corporate owners or 
sponsors, who bear tremendous power in dictating the political content of the nation’s 
newscasts.   
While the MRC has continued the work of conservatives in its media reform 
efforts, its strategies also mark a departure from both previous and contemporary 
conservative activists including a second Bozell organization, the Parents Television 
Council.  While previous reformers have looked to some form of regulation to correct the 
alleged liberal leanings of the media, the MRC steadfastly has rejected a policy 
corrective.  Embracing the ideology of deregulation and the free market, the MRC has 
opposed any additional regulations on broadcasters, even ones that could benefit the 
interests of conservatives.  Change, for the MRC, takes place outside of the arena of 
policy and legislation; it comes to large degree through shaping public perceptions of the 
media, by teaching members of the public to view the media through a conservative lens, 
and in continuing its steady campaign of intimidation through its publications to pressure 
news organizations to foreground conservative viewpoints. 
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This strategy, reform through the circulation of intimidating materials, hearkens 
back to the publication of Red Channels in 1950.  As discussed in chapter 2, the 
American Business Consultants, author of periodical Counterattack: Facts to Combat 
Communism, published Red Channels: The Report of Communist Influence in Radio and 
Television --a list of 151 performers, writers, directors, producers, and musicians who 
allegedly had subversive affiliations-- on June 22, 1950.  Three former FBI agents 
(Kenneth Bierly, John Kennan, and Theodore Kirkpatrick) had formed the American 
Business Consultants in 1947.313  They sent the pamphlet free-of-charge to the near 4000 
subscribers to Counterattack and sold it in newsstands and in bookstores.314  Three days 
after Red Channels’ publication, the Korean War began, intensifying the impact of the 
pamphlet.  Executives in the broadcasting industry, from both a security and a public 
relations standpoint, felt that they could not ignore Red Channels or the communist threat 
in American broadcasting that it pointed to.315  What resulted was an unpublicized 
blacklist, with performers or writers not getting jobs because they “were not right for the 
part,” a veiled excuse to hide the fears of communist accusations.   In essence, Red 
Channels paved the way for the work to be done by the MRC in both its attack on media 
workers and in its strategy of using publications and the court of public opinion as its 
reform strategy.316 
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The substance of the MRC’s conservative media critique was first articulated in 
the late 1960s. At the end of 1969, Vice President Spiro Agnew delivered two speeches 
criticizing the news media, in particular the television networks.  In the first of the 
speeches given in Des Moines in 1969, Agnew’s goal was “to focus your attention on this 
little group of men who […] wield a free hand in selecting, presenting and interpreting 
the great issues in our nation.” 317  Agnew stressed that members of this group “live and 
work in the geographical and intellectual confines of Washington D.C. or New York 
City,”318 and represent a provincial eastern group who is out-of-touch with most of the 
nation.  Referring to telejournalists and producers as “a tiny, enclosed fraternity of 
privileged men elected by no one,”319 Agnew insisted that the “views of the majority of 
this fraternity do not—and I repeat, not—represent the views of America.”320  He 
suggested that “we’d never trust such power, as I’ve described, over public opinion in the 
hands of an elected government.  It’s time we questioned it in the hands of a small and 
unelected elite.”321  Agnew’s focus on the biography of the men responsible for the news 
and his contention that their shared eastern elitist background was responsible for the 
slanted presentation of current events would have a contemporary echo in the 
publications of the MRC.   
Also in 1969, Irvine started AIM in as a one-man operation.  He quickly recruited 
other members, and by the early 1970s, AIM’s budget expanded, as did its public profile.  
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AIM functioned as a precursor to the MRC, its goal to publicize its account of a liberal 
media bias.  It flooded newspapers with letters to the editor and, in cases when the papers 
refused to run a letter, bought advertisements detailing its allegations of bias. 322  AIM 
published a biweekly newsletter, The AIM Report, and enlisted subscribers to write letters 
to media corporate executives and advertisers regarding the offenses of the liberal press. 
In the mid-1970s, Irvine initiated one of his more unorthodox strategies in his campaign 
for media reform: he bought shares in media corporations so that he could attend annual 
shareholder meetings and introduce resolutions.   At these meetings, Irvine would deride 
shoddy reporting, and demand that action be taken.  In 1982, he caused a stir at a CBS 
meeting by accusing Walter Cronkite of being a shill for the Soviets. In 1984, Irvine so 
disrupted a Washington Post meeting that he was threatened with rejection;323 Benjamin 
Bradlee, the former executive editor of The Washington Post, used to refer to Irvine as a 
“miserable, carping retromingent324 vigilante.”325  Though theatrical and belligerent, 
Irvine’s actions also pointed to his determination quite literally to confront the liberal 
media establishment as he saw it.  It was a form of direct attack that the MRC would 
elide in favor of insinuation and accusation in its publications. 
Edith Efron’s 1971 book The News Twisters further codified the attack on a 
liberal media.  Efron, a staff writer for TV Guide and later assistant to Objectivist 
philosopher Ayn Rand, studied news coverage on the three major television networks for 
a two month period in 1968 (the ninety days leading up to the presidential election) by 
taping and transcribing the news shows.  She chose a set of controversial issues to focus 
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on including the presidential race, Vietnam policy, black militants, the left, conservatives, 
demonstrators, and violent radicals.  From her body of evidence, she then isolated stories 
on these issues and calculated the percentage of words “for” and “against” individuals or 
sides of issues.  After this study, Efron concluded “it is clear that network coverage tends 
to be strongly biased in favor of the Democratic-liberal-left axis of opinion, and strongly 
biased against the Republican-conservative-right axis of opinion.”326  Celebrated  by the 
National Review, who called Efron’s results “even more scandalous than might have been 
anticipated” and her conclusions “irrefutable,”327 The News Twisters strongly bolstered 
conservative claims of liberal bias and provided the template for future arguments about 
the slanted presentation of the news for groups like the MRC. 
However, Efron’s recommendation to address this issue of bias—a 
recommendation seconded by writers in the National Review—was increased federal 
monitoring and regulation of broadcasting.  Specifically, Efron suggested that the FCC 
should be more active in enforcing its Fairness Doctrine. Adopted in 1949, the Fairness 
Doctrine was two-pronged: it asserted that broadcasters have an affirmative responsibility 
to cover controversial issues and it mandated that broadcasters allow time for both sides 
of the controversy to present its position.  This policy codified a central tenet of the 
FCC’s interpretation of the “public interest” requirements of broadcasters.  Indeed, the 
FCC had been actively involved in ensuring the adequate discussion of current affairs 
since its inception as the Federal Radio Commission in the late 1920s.  Efron’s call, 
therefore, drew on a long-established precedent that the FCC considered the presentation 
of the news in a balanced way to be an essential part of broadcasters’ responsibilities. 
Irvine, too, was an advocate for greater enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine.  Asserting 
                                                
326 Edith Efron, The News Twisters (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971), 47. 
327 “The News Twisters,” The National Review, October 10, 1971, 1159. 
 177 
that the Fairness Doctrine provided conservatives with the regulatory justification to 
demand a presence in broadcasting, Irvine understood that the Fairness Doctrine could 
benefit American conservatives seeking a voice in broadcasting.  In contrast, the MRC, 
founded the same year that the Fairness Doctrine was repealed, rejected both this 
approach and the views of regulation and the state that it embodied.   
Bozell and much of the MRC’s original staff initially worked for conservative 
organizations committed to electing more conservative public officials and broadening 
the base and influence of conservatism.  The MRC specifically grew out of John “Terry” 
Dolan’s National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), formed in 1976, 
and its sister organization, the National Conservative Foundation (NCF), founded in 
1980.  Dolan had formed the NCPAC after the Supreme Court allowed, in its Buckley v. 
Valeo (1976) case, the formation of political action committees to fund political 
campaigns.  The NCPAC raised money, issued advertisements in support of conservative 
candidates, and launched campaigns against overly liberal politicians. In 1980, Dolan 
started the NCF as a non-profit organization that had similar aims, if not different 
responsibilities, than NCPAC.  As a political action committee, NCPAC could accept 
donations of at most $5000 from individuals and had to report all contributions to the 
Federal Election Committee; the NCF, as a non-profit organization, did not have funding 
limitations.  Furthermore, the NCF could take aim at other conservative concerns beyond 
the promotion or denigration of political candidates.  
By the early 1980s, Dolan and the NCF began to focus on the media. In a March 
2007 article in The Washington Times, Bozell recounted a conversation he had with 
Dolan in the parking lot at the Dallas-Fort Worth airport, in which the two brainstormed 
why in their view good, conservative candidates could not get elected. Determining that 
the fault likely lay with the “liberal media,” they decided to put media reform at the 
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center of the NCF’s agenda.328  In June 1983 the NCF sponsored a conference entitled: 
“The Conservative Movement and the Liberal Bias in the Media: A Private Conference to 
Plan the Conservative Counter-Attack.”  Participating in the $250 a person conference 
were Republican senators John East (N.C.), Don Nickles (Okla.), Charles Grassley 
(Iowa), and Roger Jepsen (Iowa).  FCC chairman Mark Fowler had been scheduled to 
give the keynote address but bowed out at the last minute because of concerns over the 
appropriateness of his appearance.329  The conference, which focused on how to confront 
the “liberal” news media, revealed a split amongst conservatives on the issue of news 
bias.  On one side were activist Richard Viguerie and Congressman Newt Gingrich (R-
Ga) who believed that conservatives should form “intelligent relationships” with the 
news media and develop contacts with members of the press.  Dolan and Irvine of AIM 
adopted a much more belligerent attitude.  Irvine in particular advocated threatening 
sponsors of offending shows; both men favored the creation of new networks and 
publications to counter the “liberal” mainstream media.330 
The NCF’s focus on the media continued to escalate in the 1980s.  In 1985, it 
began a $1 million campaign to call the media’s “liberal bias” to the public’s attention.  
“We believe that the media acts as if it were a wholly owned subsidiary of America’s 
liberal establishment,” stated Dolan.  “We are trying to have the American people know 
that this bias exists.  We want them to do nothing more than take what you in the media 
say with a grain of salt.”331  The NCF earmarked money for television, radio, and 
newspaper ads; for bumper stickers that read “I don’t believe the liberal media”; and for a 
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newsletter to be entitled NewsWatch that it would disseminate to its members, 
conservative organizations, members of Congress, and the media.  Brent Baker, who 
would later head the news division of the MRC, was hired by the NCF in 1985 to edit 
NewsWatch.332  As would be the case with the MRC, the NCF’s campaign tried to affect 
public opinion on the media, not to alter FCC policies or to gain access to television 
producers directly. 
The following year, the NCF targeted PBS as an especially biased and dangerous 
disseminator of liberal views in the media.  In the fall of 1986, PBS ran a 9-part mini-
series entitled “The Africans,” authored by Ali A. Mazrui, a Kenyan intellectual who held 
faculty positions at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor and the University of Jos in 
Nigeria.  PBS promoted the mini-series as the first program where Africa was presented 
to viewers through the eyes of an African.  However, to conservative groups including 
the NCF, the program was not just pro-African, but anti-western.  The National 
Endowment of the Humanities, under the leadership of Lynne Cheney, castigated the 
show and had its name removed from its list of sponsors.  The NCF spearheaded a 
campaign denouncing the program, running advertisements that announced: “If you hate 
America, you’ll love ‘The Africans.’”  Again, this NCF campaign against “The Africans” 
was largely a public relations project to alert the viewing public of the purported slanted 
perspective of the series.333 
After the “Africans” episode, the NCF launched a $2 million campaign called the 
“Presidential Support Project” to rally support around President Reagan in the midst of 
the Iran-Contra controversy.  Bozell saw the Iran-Contra investigation as the mean-
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spirited attack of a “leftist elite” who was “trying to get even” with Reagan.  In response, 
Bozell and the NCF pledged to “raise a national uproar against the liberal lynch mob that 
has tried President Reagan since he took office in 1980.”  The NCF’s campaign consisted 
of mass mailings and television commercials urging the public to protest the news media 
and members of Congress over the Iran-Contra investigations.  Simultaneously, the 
NCPAC announced it would monitor the behavior of members of Congress and would 
target vigilant investigators in the 1988 election.334 
Significantly, Bozell’s and the NCF’s early interest in the media developed within 
the context of how to promote conservatism more broadly.  The MRC has continued to 
use its attacks on the media as a way to embolden and unite conservatives.  It is this 
objective, not the reform of media institutions themselves, which guides its strategies and 
accounts in part for its rejection of regulatory answers to the issue of liberal bias it so 
meticulously documents.  The MRC, like the NCF before it, has circulated its readings of 
media texts and has labeled their content not only liberal, but anti-American.  In the 
process, it simultaneously popularizes a conservative worldview and creates a frame that 
views the media through the lens of conservatism. 
In September of 1987 Bozell left the NCF, taking much of the staff with him, and 
formed the MRC.335   After Dolan died in 1986, Bozell was at odds with Dolan’s sister 
over the future of the foundation and put his energy into the MRC.  Much in the tradition 
of the NCF’s NewsWatch, the MRC from the outset planned to publish a newsletter, 
MediaWatch. MediaWatch was divided into several sections that showcased the 
organization’s findings.  In addition to the monthly Janet Cooke award, MediaWatch 
                                                
334 Robin Toner, “The White House Crisis: Got No Iran Funds, Conservative Says” The New York Times, 
December 17, 1986, sec. A18. 
335 “Conservative Official Resigns,” The New York Times, September 1, 1987, sec. A12; and “Thomas B. 
Edsall, “Head of Conservative PAC Quits in Dispute with Board,” The Washington Post, September 1, 
1987, 28. 
 181 
consisted of “News Bites,” short stories that documented instances of liberal bias in the 
news; a “Revolving Door” section that charted the flow of personnel between political 
appointments and positions in the media; and a “Study” that looked in depth at one 
particular issue’s coverage in the media, including statistical data and direct quotations 
from the news sources studied.  In 1989, the MRC launched two additional publications, 
TV etc. and Notable Quotables.  The latter was a biweekly list of humorous and/or 
slanted headlines and quotations from the press.  The MRC would draw on these lists for 
the “winners” of its annual awards for bad reporting.  TV etc., a comparatively short-lived 
MRC effort, examined entertainment programming for liberal themes and outed 
performers who the MRC considered to be politically liberal. 
Though the MRC had subscribers who paid for its publications, two-thirds of its 
circulation was to groups and individuals who received the publications for free, 
including conservative foundations, magazines, think tanks, talk show hosts, public 
figures, etc.   According to Baker, a goal of the MRC has been to provide “ammunition” 
to other conservative organizations who may seek to make a compelling case for media 
bias.  At its height of popularity, MediaWatch was distributed to over 25,000 readers.   
The MRC publicized its work through advertisements in magazines like The National 
Review and through direct mail campaigns.336 
Additionally, the MRC annually enlisted the help of prominent conservatives to 
compile its awards for poor reporting.  The participants have included radio talk show 
host Rush Limbaugh, Wall Street Journal editorial writer John Fund, Chicago Tribune 
columnist Stephen Chapman, professor Marvin Olasky, former National Review 
publisher William Rusher, senior editor of The National Review Priscilla Buckley, senior 
vice-president of the Heritage Foundation Burton Yale Pines, columnist and commentator 
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Cliff Kincaid, as well as numerous other talk show hosts, syndicated columnists, and 
members of the MRC staff.337  In bringing together conservatives from various media, 
think tanks, and foundations, the MRC further has cohered its base of conservative 
support and directly has provided “ammunition” to conservatives to make the case in 
multiple arenas for liberal bias in the news. 
Beginning around 1999, the majority of the MRC’s work has taken place on the 
Internet, and has included a daily “Cyberalert” email authored by Baker, a weekly 
“Media Reality Check” email, and the “Notable Quotables” published every two weeks.  
It also has created the Cybercast News Service which functions as an alternative news 
source and a newsbusters blog which publishes updated reports on news coverage.  
Significantly, though the MRC has changed its means of communication in the age of the 
Internet, it has not altered its perception of the media landscape.  Despite the diversified 
media landscape provided by cable and digital television and by the web, the MRC has 
maintained that older news sources--the major networks, the New York Times, CNN--still 
provide the majority of public affairs information to citizens and still retain their 
hegemony over what viewers hear and see.  The MRC, in other words, rejects the 
influence of narrowcasting and niche markets.  In large part, and though the organization 
uses the tools of online technology, the MRC still operates in a three-network world.   
In its myriad publications, the MRC has used four primary strategies to persuade 
of a liberal media bias.  Its more in-depth studies typically have prioritized statistical 
information about how a sector of the media (a single network, all broadcast networks, 
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newspapers, etc.) covers a particular issue.  For example, a study would note how often 
pro and anti abortion activists received the label they prefer in news articles covering 
abortion.  Its shorter pieces have alternated between two different modes of presentation: 
a story that outlines the coverage of an issue in which the MRC provides analysis or pithy 
asides as commentary; or a story that merely quotes an offending remark or 
characterization, without much or any comment at all, with the suggestion that the 
quotation speaks for itself.  The Notable Quotables draw on this second tactic as well.  
Finally, the MRC has charted the professional affiliations and employment histories of 
media workers and has highlighted their ties to Democratic politicians. 
Throughout its twenty-year history, the MRC also has rejected a fundamental 
staple of deregulation: that our current diversity of media outlets yields a diversity of 
viewpoints.  For the MRC, the dominance of the major networks has not abated in the 
face of cable news and online news sources.  Regardless, though, the MRC remains a 
staunch advocate of deregulation.  “We are free-market oriented here,” stated Baker, and 
hence oppose further government intervention in the machinations of the media.  Baker 
instead offered two modes of action for people who are sympathetic to the MRC: donate 
money to the MRC so that it can continue its monitoring of the news and talk to 
neighbors or friends about media bias to engender a greater public skepticism of the 
“liberal” press.338  These suggestions underscore the MRC’s focus on creating a 
widespread public perception that the media is run by a liberal elite, and of forging a 
conservative critique of the media in line with a libertarian view of regulation. 
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MRC AND AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: UNITING THE MOVEMENT, LAMBASTING 
THE MEDIA 
In its 1990 Best Notable Quotables awards list, the MRC gave a “Gorbasm 
Award” for stories that in its view inappropriately gushed over Soviet Prime Minister 
Mikhail Gorbachev.339 Other awards distributed  in this list included the “Bring Back the 
Gas Lines Award,” the “Damn Those Conservatives Award,” the “Paul Erlich Ecological 
Panic Award,” the “Good Morning Morons Award,” and the “Real Reagan Legacy 
Award.”340  Each award was given to one first place winner and two runners-up to 
journalists whose name was accompanied by the quotation that earned the reporters their 
“honors.”  These awards, in addition to revealing the often humorous and glib tone 
adopted by the MRC, summarize most of the primary political concerns of the 
organization.  Its publications highlight how the media, especially the major television 
networks, adopt a foreign policy perspective sympathetic to leftist—and even 
communist—causes, preach secular over traditional moral values, and advocate big 
government solutions to domestic problems.  Additionally, the MRC continually stresses 
the political party partisanship of the news media by illustrating that Democrats receive 
                                                
339 “Gorbasm Award” The Best of Notable Quotables of 1990: The Linda Ellerbee Awards For 
Distinguished Reporting, Media Research Center website archives, 
http://www.mrc.org/notablequotables/bestof/1990/best7-9.asp#gorbasm, (accessed March 1, 2005). 
340“Bring Back the Gas Lines Award,” The Best of Notable Quotables of 1990: The Linda Ellerbee Awards 
For Distinguished Reporting, Media Research Center website archives, 
http://www.mrc.org/notablequotab,les/bestof/1990/best1-3.asp#gas (accessed March 1, 2005); “Damn 
Those Conservatives Award,” The Best of Notable Quotables of 1990: The Linda Ellerbee Awards For 
Distinguished Reporting, Media Research Center website archives, 
http://www.mrc.org/notablequotables/bestof/1990/best4-6.asp# (accessed March 1, 2005); “Paul Erlich 
Ecological Panic Award,” The Best of Notable Quotables of 1990: The Linda Ellerbee Awards For 
Distinguished Reporting, Media Research Center website archives, 
http://www.mrc.org/notablequotables/bestof/1990/best4-6.asp#erlich (accessed March 1, 2005); “Good 
Morning Morons Award,” The Best of Notable Quotables of 1990: The Linda Ellerbee Awards for 
Distinguished Reporting, Media Research Center website archives, 
http://www.mrc.org/notablequotables/bestof/1990/best4-6.asp#morons (accessed March 1, 2005); “Real 
Reagan Legacy Award,” The Best of Notable Quotables: The Linda Ellerbee Awards For Distinguished 
Reporting, Media Research Center website archives,  http://www.mrc.org/bestof/1990/best13-
15.asp#reagan  (accessed March 1, 2005). 
 185 
near-unconditional favorable consideration while Republicans are derided and criticized.  
In other words, the MRC has showcased how the media allegedly expresses disdain and 
hostility to all conservatives.  In this, the center continues the work begun in the postwar 
period to cohere an often disparate conservative movement; for the MRC, the glue that 
binds is a shared antagonism to a liberal media. 
Indeed, Bozell comes from a line of prominent conservative intellectuals.  His 
father L. Brent Bozell II and his uncle William F. Buckley Jr. were outspoken proponents 
of conservatism at a moment—the 1940s and 1950s—when liberalism seemed to be 
hegemonic and conservatives saw themselves as political and intellectual outsiders.  Both 
men were widely published, and they collaborated on a book that defending 
McCarthyism and started the publication that would cement the conservative ascent into 
American politics and culture, The National Review.  In fact, we could tell the story of 
American conservatism in the latter half of the twentieth century through the Bozell 
family.  What began as the work of intellectuals to forge a movement in response to the 
dominance, as they saw it, of liberalism has transformed into a widespread popular 
movement that often sees as its targets cultural and social institutions.  
Though American conservatives in the 1940s and 1950s disagreed on many 
fundamental issues, what bound them together was a distrust of liberalism, a strident 
commitment to anti-communism, and a perception of their marginal status politically, 
intellectually, and culturally.  In some sense, the two figures that conservatives of this era 
defined themselves against were Franklin Roosevelt and John Dewey.  The libertarian 
strand of the conservative movement was vehemently against the expansion of the 
government under Roosevelt’s New Deal programs.  Committed to protecting individual 
political liberties and private property, libertarians sought to redefine the relationship of 
the government to citizens by advocating much more limited government intervention in 
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the economy.  The traditionalist faction of the postwar conservative movement was 
fearful of the intellectual turn that cast out the notion of absolutes in exchange for a view 
of society in flux, its values contingent on historical and cultural circumstances.341    
Increasingly, they would also fear the permissiveness and challenge to bourgeois morality 
that became central to the counterculture of the 1960s.  Some conservatives of this era 
also distrusted mass society, fearing that it contributed to the loss of values that seemed to 
permeate the culture.342   
All conservatives were united in their commitment to anti-communism, as were 
liberals during this era.  Conservatives, however, understood the danger posed by 
communism—both domestically and abroad—as the fault of liberals.  Conservative 
intellectuals maintained that liberal leaders in the US had not understood fully the nature 
of communism, had foolishly appeased communist leaders in the past, and had appointed 
individuals of “dubious judgment and questionable” to critical foreign policy positions.343  
In sum, according to conservatives the bloated powers of the federal government, the 
moral morass of the nation, and the impending crisis of communism could be blamed on 
liberalism and its adherents. 
Conservatives in the mid-1950s tried to bring together these strands to cohere into 
a movement.  Central to this process was the creation of publications of conservative 
thought.  Though preceded by the mostly libertarian The Freeman and the traditionalist 
The Modern Age, perhaps the most important of these magazines was William F. 
Buckley’s National Review, founded in 1955.344  The National Review’s list of editors 
and contributors included a diversity of conservative intellectuals, its goal to continue the 
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attack on the left while uniting voices on the right.  As Lisa McGirr has illustrated, this 
print material was crucial to the organizing and development of the grassroots 
conservative movement of the 1960s.345  Not only did these magazines provide a forum 
for American conservatives to define themselves politically and ideologically, but they 
also disseminated conservative ideas to a growing segment of the population 
disenchanted with the nation’s liberalism but outside the intellectual circles that then 
formed the basis of the conservative movement. 
Though sharing a sense that they existed outside of mainstream American 
political, social, and economic thought, conservatives of this era—and today as well—
often held views in stark contradiction with one another.  Libertarians, for example, 
would disagree with the role social conservatives hoped the state would play in curbing 
behaviors like pre-marital sex, abortion, and homosexual acts.  Libertarians also may 
have been staunchly anti-communist, yet were suspicious of both the intrusion on privacy 
that the more vitriolic wing of the anti-communist faction advocated and the expanded 
size of the federal government required to fight communism strenuously abroad.  These 
factions would continue exist and get at the core of tensions within Republican politics 
and American conservatism more broadly.  It is apparent, for example, in the contrast 
between the MRC, with its embrace of the small government ideal of libertarianism, and 
Bozell’s other organization, the Parents Television Council (PTC), which has agitated for 
increased regulation of the broadcasting industry, primarily in the form of punitive 
indecency fines and limitations on media ownership. 
The MRC’s media critique, in line with postwar conservatism, has viewed 
liberalism as a totalizing worldview that dominates the mainstream media.  Bozell 
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defined this all-encompassing liberalism in the conclusion of Weapons of Mass 
Distortion, his 2004 book based on sixty-six studies and 607 quotations compiled by the 
MRC : “Liberalism looks at America and shakes its head in despair.  Liberalism sees 
America as not just flawed in its institutions, but faulty in its behavior.  Liberalism has 
not forgiven America for leading the Free World against world socialism in the twentieth 
century.”346  As this quotation indicates, for Bozell and the MRC, liberals are dreary 
pessimists who hate their country and institutions that shape it; they are anti-American, 
anti-capitalist, and implausibly moralistic.  It is this perspective, according to the MRC, 
that colors the media's presentation of current events.  It is also this perspective, 
according to Bozell and the MRC, which renders the media unequivocally hostile to all 
conservatives. 
In the view of the MRC, the media unabashedly promote abortion, feminism, and 
gay rights; loudly and incessantly beat the drum of environmentalism; routinely attack 
people of faith, saving an especial hatred for Christians; and supports affirmative action 
programs, which the center deems as reverse discrimination.  In the past, the MRC had 
excoriated the media for presenting communist nations as the moral equivalent of the 
United States, today for its lack of unwavering support of the Iraq war or the war on 
terror in which it ostensibly plays a part.  The MRC also has lambasted the media for 
favoring big government solutions to social problems and for rejecting the social and 
economic benefits inaugurated by Reagan-era reforms.  The liberal media, according to 
the MRC, has attacked each conservative platform--from economic libertarianism to 
social conservatism to neoconservatism--and has promulgated a view that not only is 
anti-conservative, but consequently and simultaneously, anti-American. 
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For example, a consistent complaint of the pages of MediaWatch in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s was that the media too often presented the Soviet Union as the moral 
equal of the United States, celebrated communist leaders, and intentionally ignored the 
human rights abuses that went along with communist regimes.  In the January 1988 issue 
of MediaWatch, for example, the MRC published a study on the way that the three major 
networks covered the Reagan-Gorbachev summit the previous December.  According to 
this study, the networks fifty-nine percent of the time presented the Soviet regime and/or 
its leader as the moral equal to the United States and fifty-six percent of the stories 
telecast presented the Soviet reform agenda as genuine.  In its interpretation of this 
coverage the MRC wrote: “If you tuned in news coverage of the December Reagan-
Gorbachev summit expecting to hear the Soviet line on détente, glasnost, Afghanistan, 
and the moral equivalence of the two powers, the networks certainly did not let you 
down.” 347 
This allegation, that journalists were mouthpieces for what amounted to 
communist propaganda, was a common theme for the MRC.  A March 1988 story in 
MediaWatch lambasted a broadcast on NBC’s Sunday Today Show on Cuba, and insisted 
that host Maria Shriver presented a rosy picture of the country and “mimicked her host’s 
[Fidel Castro] propaganda line” in her story. 348   Five years later, the MRC characterized 
an interview that Diane Sawyer conducted with Castro as having “the coziness of a 
People profile.”349 MediaWatch repeatedly denigrated Ted Turner’s 1988 documentary 
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Portrait of the Soviet Union, asserting that it “legitimized some of the greatest myths of 
the communist system” and agreed with TV critic Tom Shales’ assessment that the series 
was “more like a postcard from Binky and Biff at Camp Whitewash.”350  The MRC also 
was continually frustrated that, in reports on the war in Afghanistan, the networks did not 
fault the Soviets for the violence, but insteadn the Mujaheddin (Afghan freedom fighters).  
In April 1989, the MRC stated on the coverage of El Salvador, “[i]t was not the decade 
long crimes of the communists that concerned the networks when covering recent 
elections.  Instead, reporters concentrated almost exclusively on the atrocities of the 
right.”351 
Not only had the MRC all but accused the news media of being pro-communist, 
but it also had suggested that reporters are anti-American.  In particular, the MRC 
asserted that media coverage of U.S. involvement in Latin America had been 
inappropriately slanted against the actions of the United States.  An April 1988 story in 
MediaWatch revealed that the networks portrayed the “U.S. as the real villain” after 
President Reagan sent troops to Honduras after the Sandinistas had entered the country to 
destroy Contra camps.352  In December 1989, the MRC gave the PBS series America’s 
Century the Janet Cooke Award with this introduction: 
  When most Americans look back at the last ninety years, they see a period of 
greatness which could be rightly labeled “America’s Century.”  American 
Soldiers fought in two world wars to preserve freedom, then showered the 
benefits of our thriving free market on friend and former foe alike to rebuild from 
the devastation of war.  The U.S. fostered democracy and free enterprise around 
the world, lifting millions from misery and political oppression. 
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  The Soviets, of course, have a radically different view of the 20th Century.  
America waged imperialist wars in the Third World, oppressed the working class 
around the world, and ignored the voice of its own people. Americans might not 
begrudge the Soviets their opinion, but they would be shocked to find those same 
arguments promoted on public television. But the fact is that America’s Century, a 
PBS series aired in October and November, advocated such opinions with 
vigor.353 
In this introduction, the MRC fused its two recurring themes: that the media has 
functioned as a mouthpiece for a leftist and even communist political agenda and that it 
has consistently maligned the actions of the United States.  In this vein, the MRC 
illustrated that the media’s views contradict the anti-communist and neoconservative 
wing on the conservative movement, consistently articulating a view of foreign policy 
hostile to their perspective specifically, to the moral superiority of the United States more 
broadly. 
The MRC has continued this line of attack in its more current reports on news 
coverage of the Middle East.  In a 2007 of “Notable Quotables,” the MRC implicitly 
vilified a report by CNN correspondent Jack Cafferty in which he, according the center, 
suggested that Iran was the moral equivalent of the United States.  The MRC also 
ridiculed a Diane Sawyer report on Syria, using an identical frame as it had to attack 
Shriver’s visit to Cuba.  The MRC highlighted how Sawyer’s interview with Syrian 
women focused on their pro-family values, pride in their own culture, and lack of desire 
to live in a country like the United States.  Not only did Sawyer ignore the abuses against 
women in her piece, “the veteran ABC journalist repeatedly found America lacking in 
comparison to what seems to be a socialist paradise.”354  In its consideration of news 
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coverage of foreign policy, the MRC consistently has seen geopolitics through a fairly 
rigid binary: the virtuous United States and its malevolent, often socialistic, enemies.  For 
the MRC, the news media not only has propped up patently immoral nations, but in doing 
so has expressed its hostility towards and lack of recognition of America’s moral 
superiority.  To find the shades of gray is, in large part, to support the enemy.  
Throughout its publications, the MRC also has taken aim at coverage of domestic 
policies and social issues.  If in foreign affairs the news media has been anti-American 
and pro-Soviet, in domestic affairs it has been aggressively liberal. In these attacks, the 
MRC courted the social and cultural conservatives who advocate “traditional” values.  As 
such, continuous concerns of the MRC in MediaWatch were the media’s seeming 
embrace of progressive positions on abortion, affirmative action, feminism, and gun 
control.  In story after story, according to the MRC, the media has cast these issues in a 
way that explicitly favors the liberal position.  For example, one of the perennial 
preoccupations of MediaWatch was the way the media defines the different positions in 
the debate over abortion.  In a January 1989 study, the MRC found that in telecasts on 
ABC, CNN, CBS, and NBC, pro-choice advocates were referred to by their preferred 
label (“pro-choice”) ninety-seven percent of the time, while pro-life activists were given 
their preferred label (“pro-life”) only twenty-one percent of the time (other term used: 
anti-abortion).355  A September 1993 study reinforced this finding, indicating that the 
media continues to give preferential treatment to pro-choice supporters.356  In addition, 
the MRC has asserted that the media provides a skewed view of national support for 
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abortion by suggesting that a greater proportion of the population supports abortion rights 
than actually does. 
The MRC also has accused the media of a pro-feminist stance.  Indeed, in its first 
issue of “The Best of Notable Quotables,” the MRC selected the following quotation as a 
biased/humorous example of the press’s treatment of feminism.  In February 1988, ABC 
had chosen Betty Friedan as the “Person of the Week,” explained by Peter Jennings as 
follows: “And, so we choose Betty Friedan because she had the ability and the sensitivity 
to articulate the needs of women, which means she did us all a favor.”357  This 
quotation’s inclusion in “Notable Quotables” indicated that the MRC found it ludicrous 
or patently wrong, an assertion that was underscored in its coverage of the ABC segment 
in MediaWatch.  In the March 1988 issue of MediaWatch, the MRC awarded Jennings 
the Janet Cooke Award for this broadcast on Friedan.  The MRC suggested that Jennings 
had issued a far too glowing assessment of Friedan’s influence, ignoring the “concerns of 
millions of pro-life, family oriented women” and failing “to mention many of the 
negative effects her views have had on modern society” such as liberalized divorce laws, 
the legalization of abortion, and the fight for lesbian rights.  This adoration of Friedan, 
according to the MRC, highlights the media’s feminist sympathies at the expense of the 
views of “family-oriented women.”358 
According to the MRC, the media not only has advocated feminism, but 
affirmative action as well.  In its February 1993 issue of MediaWatch, the MRC included 
two stories that in its view highlighted the media’s embrace of affirmative action policy.  
In a quick “news bite,” the MRC criticized the networks’ coverage of the death of 
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Thurgood Marshall.  While telecasts celebrated Marshall as a civil rights advocate, they 
neglected to comment on the fact that “Marshall moved away from racial equality with 
his support of affirmative actions program.”  Interpreting affirmative action as a “game of 
racial advantage,” the MRC commented that the media had neglected to interpret 
properly Marshall’s record in light of his support for affirmative action.359  A story in the 
September 1993 issue of MediaWatch criticized a segment on CBS that discussed the 
failings of the D.C. police force.  The story suggested that the segment neglected to 
consider how affirmative action in the hiring of police officers “drove down standards 
and elevated irrelevant criteria” and thus greatly contributed to the problems facing the 
police force.360 With these stories in MediaWatch, the MRC has presented affirmative 
action as unjust and inefficient and has illustrated that the media was unwilling to 
entertain such assessments of the program. 
Another central pre-occupation of the MRC has been the media’s embrace of big 
government solutions to domestic problems, a pre-occupation that aligned the MRC with 
the libertarian strand of the conservative movement. First, the MRC constantly has 
asserted that the media finds problems where none exist.  For example, a continual 
complaint of the MRC has been that the media will find a way to interpret positive 
economic news negatively. In July 1988, the MRC gave CBS’s segment “American 
Profile” the Janet Cooke Award for presenting the impact of Reaganomics not as years of 
prosperity, but as a time when the gap between rich and poor expanded.  Not only did the 
MRC disagree with the latter assessment, but it faulted the network for not prominently 
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broadcasting the former.361  In a study published in the November 1988 issue of 
MediaWatch, the MRC asserted that ABC, CNN, CBS, and NBC reported that “despite 
the continuing economic boom, the networks depicted an overwhelmingly unhealthy 
economy.”362  The MRC often interpreted such stories as being part of the media’s pro-
Democratic agenda, seeing stories that denounce the health of the economy as helpful to 
reinforce the political strategies of the Democratic Party. 
The MRC also has shown how the news media consistently favors taxation over 
spending cuts to balance the budget or to diminish the deficit, and how journalists 
constantly turn to government intervention to solve problems like homelessness, 
environmental concerns, and health care.  The October 1989 winner of the Janet Cooke 
Award was CBS, CNN, and NBC for their positive coverage of a march to advocate 
federal funding for the homeless.363  A September 1993 MediaWatch study determined 
that 70 percent of stories on government-run health systems were overwhelmingly 
positive.364  ABC journalist Ned Potter won the October 1995 Janet Cooke Award for 
suggesting that global warming and the greenhouse effect were actual problems that had 
to be dealt with. 365 Dismissive of the benefits of increased government spending and 
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attention to domestic problems, the MRC continually has highlighted the purported 
agenda of the news media to expand the powers of the state over the lives of Americans. 
The MRC has wrapped conservatism in the American flag and has identified the 
alleged liberal bias of the mainstream media with a vicious anti-Americanism.  Its 
accomplishment, in this light, is twofold: it has argued that the media is hostile to each 
variant of contemporary conservatism and it has defined conservatism and American 
patriotism as one and the same.  For the MRC, the media’s persistent attack on 
conservative values not only represents the hegemonic perspective that guides them, but 
constitutes an attack on the American people themselves.  The MRC thus has conflated 
the interest of conservatives with a wider consideration of the public interest itself. 
 
THE MRC, THE “NEW CLASS,” AND THE NARRATIVE OF VICTIMIZATION 
In Weapons of Mass Distortion, Bozell summed up the position that the MRC has 
taken since its inception: “Reporters, editors, and producers routinely display an 
arrogance driven by an inflated sense of self worth.  They are the enlightened, the elite.  
This attitude cannot help but distort the way news is covered.”366   As this quotation 
indicates, the MRC has defined journalists and editors as the media elite and has argued 
that it is these individuals who exert control over the content of the media.  In line with 
this frame, the MRC emphatically has denied that media ownership plays a role in news 
content.  Bozell has characterized the contention that media ownership is of greater 
concern to media bias than the personnel of newsrooms as “the stuff of Berkeley coffee 
klatches.” 367 Baker, in a January 2005 interview, reiterated “it is the liberals who care 
about ownership.”  The elites of note for Bozell and Baker are not ones with economic 
                                                
366 Bozell, Weapons, 3. 
367 Ibid., 5. 
 197 
capital, but the day-to-day workers in media newsrooms.  Bozell, in Weapons of Mass 
Distortion, continued “like the old Outer Limits television series, the left still controls the 
transmission, still controls all that you see and hear.”368  This domination of the media 
has enabled the left, according to Bozell, to “control the public conversation, both 
political and cultural, in America.”369 
This construction of a liberal media elite first gained traction alongside a 
conservative effort in the 1960s to define conservatism as a populist political force.  
Recognizing the limitations of receiving widespread popular support on an economic 
libertarian agenda, conservatives changed their focus to cultural and social issues.  This 
change, according to Kevin Phillips, marked the transition from the Old Right 
(epitomized in the 1950s by Buckley) that was elitist, opposed to mass culture and 
politics, and interested in issues of national security and the free market, to a New Right 
that was populist and emphasized domestic issues like abortion, sex education, 
affirmative action, and feminism.370  If the Old Right targeted politicians and 
intellectuals, the New Right took aim at a “new class” of liberal elites who control the 
nation’s cultural institutions, primarily the academy and the media.  
In my analysis of the MRC here, I am recasting the language of the “new class,” 
which begun as a conservative strategy in the late 1960s.  According to this view, the 
significant elites in the nation are not the people with political or economic capital, but 
those who control the cultural and symbolic realm.  As Kevin Phillips wrote in 
Mediacracy (1975), “In increasing measure, America’s new mandarins are not the people 
who sell manufactured items but the people who shape and market ideas and 
                                                
368 Ibid., 10. 
369 Ibid., 10. Emphasis in original. 
370 William C. Berman, America’s Right Turn: From Nixon to Clinton (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001), 28. 
 198 
information.”371  The lines of the cultural divide in this schema are between producers 
(labor, businessmen) and non-producers (intellectuals, commentators, journalists).  This 
redefinition of alliances unites labor and capital in opposition to the “new class” of 
cultural elites who set a national agenda according to a liberal ideology.  According to 
critics of the “new class,” the liberal elites mask their own class interest in their advocacy 
for large government social welfare programs.  Furthermore, conservative critics of the 
“new class” emphasize that on social issues the liberal elite is out-of-step with and 
dismissive of the interests and values of the American populace.  The MRC, in its media 
activism, has codified and popularized this rhetoric. 
The view that the media is run by liberal elites not only positions conservatives 
like the MRC as fundamentally populist, but also recycles a conservative narrative of 
victimization. To borrow a concept from John Mitchell, the MRC’s claims epitomize the 
workings of “trauma envy.” Mitchell defines trauma as the “stunning wound that 
produces moral authority.”372  His discussion of the culture wars of the 1980s elaborates 
on what he means by trauma envy and is particularly salient to my discussion of the 
MRC. He argues that as the social foment of the 1960s exposed the victimization of 
oppressed groups and the ideological and institutional structures that undergirded it, it 
simultaneously provided moral authority to these groups and leveled ethical attacks 
against white privilege, patriarchy, and the hegemony of heteronormative values.  In an 
attempt to reclaim the moral authority conferred upon victims of social oppression, the 
right in the 1980s targeted left intellectuals in the academy as doing violence to the 
values and interests of conservatives.  Asserting that racism and sexism are traumas of 
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the past, conservatives argued that they themselves are victims of an ascendant leftist 
intellectual class who has taken over the academy.373    
For Mitchell, this move constituted trauma envy, a desire for moral authority by a 
group who had been characterized as the inflictor, rather than recipient of, injury.  
Importantly, for conservatives to make this claim, according to Mitchell, they asserted 
that the social conditions exposed in the 1960s had been remedied, and to continue to 
assert their existence was to foist an undue trauma upon society generally and to attack 
Americans with a conservative worldview specifically.  The MRC has continued the work 
of these conservatives by applying this narrative to a conservative victimization at the 
hands of a liberal media. The discourse of the MRC has propelled the new class rhetoric 
and, in turn has reclaimed a moral authority for conservatives by exposing the trauma 
inflicted upon them by liberal media elites. 
In building its argument that the media is run by liberal elites, the MRC 
continually has documented the political affiliations and views of journalists and editors, 
both on and off the air.  The revolving door section of MediaWatch had functioned 
explicitly for the purpose, as had many of the stories contained within the publication 
itself.  For example, a July 1988 MediaWatch study argued that “there are four times as 
many reporters, producers and executives shaping Big Media coverage with ties to liberal 
candidates and causes than to Republicans of any kind.”374  The MRC continually pointed 
to comments of journalists that indicated their political leanings and, consequently, their 
liberal bias.  Though over the years Lesley Stahl, Ted Koppel, and seemingly everyone 
who has worked for NPR or PBS, as well as other journalists were the target of MRC 
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attacks, former CBS anchor Dan Rather has born a lot of the brunt of this line of inquiry.  
Bozell dedicated a chapter of Weapons of Mass Distortion to Rather's political views and 
on-air/off-air comments and held him as a model for a liberal journalist whose biases 
pervade his news reporting.375 
Indeed, the MRC consistently has published the comments and behaviors of 
journalists off-the-air to make the case that the news media is run by liberals.  In a 
December 1989 MediaWatch story, the MRC reported on the “liberal Children’s Defense 
Fund, the major interest group behind the fashionably federalized Act for Better Child 
Care (ABC) bill calling for subsidies and regulation of day care, raised $400,000 at an 
enormously successful fundraiser November 30.”  The fundraiser was of note to the MRC 
because, “the media bigwigs who graced the $300-a-ticket bash for babysitting 
regulations: from CBS, 60 Minutes correspondent Ed Bradley and Sunday Morning host 
Charles Kurault; Washington Post Publisher Katherine Graham; MacNeil-Lehrer 
NewsHour anchor Jim Lehrer; Today co-host Jane Pauley; and National Public Radio’s 
Susan Stamberg.”376  As the MRC listed the journalists in attendance, it not only outed 
them as liberals.  In this, and in the numerous stories like it that the MRC has published, 
the Center extends its watchdog function not just to news reporting but to the actions and 
affiliations of journalists themselves.  Asserting that liberal journalists yield liberal 
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stories, the MRC has enlisted the biographies and behaviors of reporters in its campaign 
to persuade of intractable liberal media bias. 
The MRC not only has criticized the preponderance of liberals in newsrooms, but 
also the dearth of conservatives.  For example, in a 1993 article, the MRC noted the push 
to diversify news departments along racial and ethnic lines.  However, the Center stated, 
“These movements do not, however, include efforts to diversify the political ideology in 
newsrooms.”  The MRC continued, “The reality is that if you’re a conservative, gaining 
access to the news media can prove difficult.”  Furthermore, the push for ethnic diversity, 
the MRC anticipated, would intensify the absence of political diversity.  Citing a survey 
that “found minority journalists ‘are much more likely to call themselves Democrats’ 
(Blacks 70 percent, Asians 63 percent, Hispanics 59 percent, women 58 percent) than the 
average journalist (44 percent),” the MRC interpreted “this push for ‘diversity’ a catalyst 
for more ideological uniformity in the media.”377  This line of reasoning underscores the 
MRC’s contention that the news media is overrun with liberals.  More importantly, it 
articulates one of the central conceits of the organization.  The MRC not only equates 
racial discrimination with prejudice based on political views, but suggests that the latter is 
the far more pernicious and effective. 
One of the most vociferous complaints of the MRC has been over the treatment of 
Republicans and Democrats in the media.  According to the MRC, the media was 
unconscionably partisan in its reportage, denigrating Republicans at every turn while 
ignoring their accomplishments, dismissing the wrongdoings of Democrats while 
celebrating their actions.  As Bozell summarizes, “the news media routinely find fault 
with the actions and personal behavior of conservatives even when the accusations are 
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mere allegations.”  In turn, he continues, “these same reporters generally overlook 
changes of inappropriate behavior by liberals even when hard evidence is applied.”378  
For example, in 1988, the MRC accused the mainstream news media of hounding 
Attorney General Edward Meese for the allegations of improper conduct while letting 
Democratic Speaker of the House Jim Wright, who also had been accused of impropriety, 
off the hook.379  A MediaWatch study later that year suggested that the networks 
characterized Pat Robertson as an extremist who holds controversial opinions, while 
Jesse Jackson—an extremist on the left in the MRC’s view—escaped such description.380  
The MRC accounted for such discrepancies as blatant partisanship. 
This strategy, which highlights how the media rakes Republicans over the coals 
for crimes committed by Democrats as well, has been one of the MRC’s favorite 
strategies to support the current Bush administration in the wake of the scandals that has 
hit it.  For example, its March 7 media alert email focused on the TV “onslaught” of 
coverage of the Scooter Libby verdict, and comparing it to the lack of coverage in 2000 
of an aide to Gore for illegal funneling of money to Democratic campaigns.  On March 
14, 2007, the MRC criticized the media for its focus on the eight federal prosecutors who 
recently lost their jobs, complaining that the media had neglected to mention that Clinton, 
when he took office, fired 93 prosecutors.381 
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The media, according the MRC, not only favors Democrats as individuals but also 
gives preferential treatment to the Democratic Party.  In a front page story in 
MediaWatch in September/October 1988, the MRC announced that reporters on the three 
major broadcast networks and CNN employed a double standard in their coverage of the 
national conventions that summer.  This article asserted that journalists “in Atlanta 
fawned over the Democrats and their policies” and ignored controversies plaguing the 
party and its candidate, whereas at the Republican convention the networks highlighted 
controversies faced by Republicans.  In a number of articles leading up to the 1988 
presidential election, MediaWatch argued that the press maligned and went after nominee 
Bush while nominee Dukakis received primarily favorable attention.382 
Though the MRC conceded at times that the press took a harsh tack with 
President Clinton, it more stridently pointed out how the press had cut breaks for Clinton 
it had denied to the Republican presidents that preceded him.  In a page one article in the 
June 1993 issue of MediaWatch, the MRC reported that though Clinton’s proposed 
budget would add to the national debt, reporters did not fault Clinton—as they had 
Reagan and Bush—but praised him for his budget.383  In October 1995, MediaWatch had 
a story that charged the press with a “media buildup” to Clinton’s 1996 presidential bid, 
showering him with multiple positive stories despite his low performance ratings. 384  
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From the vantage point of the MRC, liberal reporters unfairly malign, vilify, and 
accuse Republican politicians, while they treat equally egregious behaviors by Democrats 
with kid gloves.  This is a pose that the MRC has struck continually since it began its 
work, and is the lens it uses to analyze news stories on the wrongdoings of conservative 
figures.  In this, the MRC continually transforms the reporting on the misconduct or 
crimes of conservative politicians into hit-jobs, regardless of the merit of the accusation 
or the profundity of the charge, by insisting that liberal politicians are not treated 
similarly in the press. Thus, in the work of the MRC, the conservative accused is always 
a victim, regardless of the crime, of an unabashed liberal media who holds him/her to an 
unfair standard.  Indeed, to read MRC publications is to sense that the only victims in 
American society are Republican politicians and conservative values, targeted by an 
unjust and unforgivably biased media.   
The MRC has addressed a wide array of social problems--homelessness, 
environmental concerns, access to health care, gender-based and race-based 
discrimination, economic inequities--as liberal canards: not real problems, but liberal 
fictions used as opportunities to tax individuals and restrict the free market.   In October 
1989, for example, the MRC gave CBS, CNN, and NBC the Janet Cooke Award for their 
coverage of a march aimed at garnering more federal funding for the homeless.385  The 
October 1995 Janet Cooke Award went to Ned Potter of ABC news for jumping of the 
“hyperbole bandwagon” on global warming.386  In March 2007, the MRC took aim at 
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Katie Couric for a story on CBS that celebrated a doctor who tries to help level the 
playing field for his poorer patients.  The coverage of these issues continually have 
incurred the ire of the MRC, as have reports that indicate that discrimination and civil 
rights violations still play a part in American society.   
 This position perhaps is best summed up by the quotation the Center chose 
Arthur Sulzberger’s words as its "Quote of the Year" of 2006 in its Awards for Worst 
Reporting: 
It wasn't supposed to be this way. You weren't supposed to be graduating into an 
America fighting a misbegotten war in a foreign land. You weren't supposed to be 
graduating into a world where we are still fighting for fundamental human rights, 
whether it's the rights of immigrants to start a new life, or the rights of gays to 
marry, or the rights of women to choose. You weren't supposed to be graduating 
into a world where oil still drove policy and environmentalists have to fight 
relentlessly for every gain. You weren't. But you are. And for that, I'm sorry.387 
In crowning this quotation the “Quote of the Year,” the MRC implicitly mocked its 
content, and suggested that criticism of the war or the integrity of the Bush 
administration, or the affirmation of civil rights and environmentalism as pressing 
problems, are ludicrous, laughable, and biased. To the MRC, to write about such issues is 
to reinforce the fiction that they still exist, to impose a liberal worldview on the American 
public, and to try to undermine conservative values rooted in ideologies of libertarianism, 
social traditionalism, and neoconservatism. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Ann Coulter, in Slander: Liberal Lies About the American Right, writes in her 
acknowledgments, “Novenas should be said to Brent Bozell and the Media Research 
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Center, who have been on the case long before I was.”388  Indeed.  In Slander, Coulter 
retreads much of the ground the MRC has walked for twenty years.  Coulter ascribes 
“total hegemonic control of all major means of news dissemination in America” to the 
left, who she accuses of savagery, paranoia, and elitism and, at one point, she likens to 
the Klan.  Furthermore, like the MRC, Coulter reinforces the new class paradigm and 
narrative of victimization by lambasting the media for the worldview it promulgates and 
for the overt and unconscionable hostility shown toward conservative figures and ideas in 
the mainstream media.  Slander spent six weeks on the New York Times paperback 
bestseller list, fifteen weeks on its hardcover list.389  Bernard Goldberg’s Bias, which 
similarly argues for widespread liberal media bias, spent eleven weeks on New York 
Times paperback bestseller list, twenty on its hardcover list.390   
Over its twenty year history, the MRC has contributed to the transformation of the 
national discourse on the media.  Bolstering conservative claims of liberal media bias 
with statistics, quotations, and studies, the MRC has inculcated widespread suspicion and 
distrust of the national news media.  According to Baker, the impact of the MRC’s work 
is evident in public opinion polls that cite a mounting cynicism and lack of faith in the 
mainstream press.391  The MRC, with conservative talk show hosts and pundits as its 
mouthpiece, thus has helped construct a discursive frame through which many Americans 
view the media. 
Though a divergence from those of previous media reformers, the actions of the 
MRC have been in-step with those of the larger conservative movement as it has 
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reinvented itself over the past thirty years as a populist movement. Unlike the media 
activists who came before it, the MRC has not filed petitions with the FCC nor has it tried 
to negotiate with broadcasting stations.  Instead, it has adopted the role of a national town 
crier, continually announcing the evils of the liberal media and their consequence for the 
health of democracy in the nation.  Furthermore, the MRC has intensified the assertion 
that the “elites” that matter are the ones who hold positions in the cultural—rather than 
political or economic—sphere, and has argued that the agenda of the elites in the media 
are hazardous to and stand at odds with that of the mainstream American public.   
The narrative of victimization and new class discourse that underlines the MRC's 
position maintains the fiction that conservatives are a marginalized group in the United 
States.  Drawing again on Mitchell’s analysis of the culture wars, the work of the MRC 
manages to deny the existence of prejudice or oppression toward any group, save 
conservatives.  Embedded in this discourse is both an erasure of structural and 
institutional prejudices still present in American society, and a recasting of claims of 
oppression as liberal flim-flam intended to further victimize conservatives. 
The MRC’s media reform efforts have taught Americans to see the media through 
the lens of contemporary conservatism.  In the process, it has presented a common enemy 
to bind a disparate conservative movement and has perpetuated the construction of 
liberals as elites, conservatives the common sense people who see through them.  The 
MRC thus has utilized its media reform work to continue the ascendance of conservative 
values and politics while paradoxically and effectively holding on to the mantle of 
victimization.  Indeed, for the MRC, to win the battle would not mean to root out liberal 
bias in the media, but increasingly to popularize the discursive frame it has created to see 
the media.  It is a battle that it seems to be winning.
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Chapter 6:  The Media Ownership Battles 
Michael Powell, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, almost 
received a pink slip in May 2003.  Members of Codepink Women For Peace, an anti-war 
activist group, interrupted an FCC open meeting as they tried to hand Powell his pink 
slip, not a dismissal form but literally a piece of frilly pink lingerie.  The group had used 
this tactic before with other public officials as a form of political theater intended to 
communicate the group’s disapproval of the individual’s job performance.  In 2003, when 
they approached Powell with his pink slip, Codepink Women were outraged with Powell 
and the Republicans at the FCC for the new media ownership rules they had proposed.392 
As part of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, Congress required the FCC to 
review its media ownership rules every two years.  In its review, the commission was to 
ascertain whether existing rules still served a public interest goal and to amend or repeal 
rules that had outlived their utility.  Late in 2002, for the third time since the passage of 
the act, the FCC began to review its six remaining ownership rules to determine whether 
to retain, loosen, or eliminate any of them.  Under the leadership of Powell, the FCC 
seemed poised to relax many of the media ownership rules that had undergirded media 
policy for decades.  It was this threat that led to a widespread public campaign to stem the 
tide of further deregulation.  This campaign to retain existing media ownership rules 
intensified in the summer of 2003, when the FCC officially announced its decision to 
loosen ownership requirements.  The battle over media ownership temporarily 
culminated in June 2004, when a US district court put a stay on some of the new rules 
                                                
392 Frank Ahrens, “Unlikely Alliances Forged in Fight Over Media Rules,” The Washington Post, May 20, 
2003, sec. E01. 
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and ordered the FCC to go back to the drawing board and explore the consequences of 
media ownership deregulation more thoroughly. 
The coalition that formed to fight for retention of the media ownership rules 
brought together unlikely political allies.  Joining committed media activists—like 
Consumer’s Union, Consumer Federation of America, United Church of Christ, and the 
Media Access Project—were public interest groups from disparate places on the political 
spectrum; some of these organizations included the National Rifle Association, NOW, 
NAACP, Move.org, the Family Research Council, the Parents Television Council, 
Children Now, Codepink, and the Future of Music Coalition.  Though these communities 
often imagined the stakes in the battle over media ownership in starkly different ways, 
they shared a belief that further deregulation would have severe consequences for a 
functioning democracy and a healthy polity. 
The activists had two major objections to the FCC’s actions.  The first centered on 
the new rules themselves and their impact on further media consolidation.  The activists 
feared that with the acquisition of increasingly more media properties would come a 
decrease in diversity of viewpoints on the air, an escalation of commercialism and 
indecency, and a homogeneity of programming that would sideline the creative 
community working outside of major entertainment companies.  In addition, the activists 
protested the process by which the FCC arrived at its new rules.  They accused the FCC 
of lack of transparency both in how it arrived at its decision and in the parameters of the 
new rules under consideration.  They also objected to the limited opportunities provided 
by the commission to hear public input and to comment on both the new rules themselves 
and the process by which the commission devised them. 
As this chapter will argue, the media ownership battles were not just fights over 
the shape of the media landscape.  They also were opportunities for individuals and 
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organizations across the political spectrum to take aim at the logic of deregulation that 
had defined American broadcasting policy for over twenty years.  Rooted in a 
marketplace approach to regulation, broadcasting policy had conflated the public with the 
consumer and assumed that the best way to serve its interest was to enable media 
companies to act unfettered by restrictive regulations.  The activists replaced the 
consumerist rhetoric with a civic discourse and reasserted the central role that 
communications play not just in the market but in the maintenance of a democratic 
society.  The attacks on the rules recast the public-as-consumer with a public-as-citizen 
model, and in the process reclaimed a definition of the public interest that had been 
shunted aside by the push for deregulation.  The criticisms of the FCC’s process served 
this purpose, as well as they posited a construction of the public rooted in a model of 
participatory democracy. The marketplace of ideas, in this schema, was not well-
supported by a free market ideology that allowed for high concentrations of ownership. 
Furthermore, the media ownership battles enfolded the anxieties over deregulation 
into an anti-corporation movement that has been ascendant since the 1990s.  If the 
criticisms of the activists focused on the FCC’s orientation toward the public, they also 
underlined the catastrophic consequences of escalating corporate power.  They positioned 
the interest of corporations as fundamentally opposed to a public interest, and suggested 
that the further consolidation of the media industries in-and-of itself would wreak havoc 
on the political and imaginative life of the nation.  The media ownership battles 
registered disapproval not only of the federal regulators, but the very system of corporate 
conglomerations that its policies had enabled. 
Finally, the media ownership activists also linked media consolidation to a 
debased and homogenous form of cultural expression.  Often paying particular attention 
to the impact of programming on children, this discourse tied the concentration of 
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ownership to the denigrated quality of media texts circulating on television.  In large part, 
this discourse resuscitated a mass culture critique of television that long had posited that a 
mass, commercial medium would yield sub-par cultural texts.  Indeed, though activists 
did not refer to television under deregulation as a “vast wasteland,” the substance of their 
critiques echoed this view that had looked with suspicion at the impact that 
commercialism and ad revenues had on the quality of programming.  The activists in 
2003 used a similar frame, yet displaced the emphasis on the funding structure with one 
on consolidated ownership.  This discourse naturalized a system of aesthetic hierarchy 
and made allegations based on a highly-maintained, yet unexamined, ideal of quality. 
 
THE 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT, DEREGULATION, AND REDEFINING 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Communications networks, according to Patricia Aufderheide, “are not any-old 
widget businesses, but the vehicles and instruments of our shared culture.”393  It is this 
sentiment that at times has guided broadcasting policy, and the court decisions upholding 
those policies, in which the FCC has imposed requirements or limitations on the 
broadcasting industry to secure that it fulfills its public interest obligations.  To a large 
degree, the move to deregulation in broadcasting begun in the 1980s reshifted this 
definition of communications.  Advocates of deregulation defined the public of  the 
public interest clause as consumers and asserted that the best way to serve this public 
would be to allow communications industries to act unfettered by government regulation.  
In other words, they maintained to help the vehicles of our shared culture to flourish was, 
in fact, to treat them as any-old widget businesses.   
                                                
393 Patricia Aufderheide, Communications Policy and the Public Interest (New York: The Guilford Press, 
1999), 2. 
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The 1996 Telecommunications Act marked an apotheosis of this move toward 
deregulation and the attending redefinition of the public that accompanied it.  It also 
provided the statutory requirement for the FCC to revisit its media ownership rules every 
two years to determine if they still served public interest objectives.  The battles over 
media ownership in 2003, in many ways, began with the 1996 Act.  The act prompted the 
FCC to reconsider its ownership rules and, according to Powell, the spirit of the act 
seemed to suggest that in the absence of compelling public interest goals, the rules should 
be amended or repealed.  Furthermore, the fight over the rules became an opportunity for 
citizens to defy and criticize the deregulatory model codified by the Telecommunications 
Act itself.  
FCC Chairman Mark Fowler, along with Daniel L. Brenner, articulated this shift 
to a deregulation model in their 1981 article “A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast 
Regulation.”  Defining broadcasters not “as fiduciaries of the public,” but rather as 
“marketplace competitors,” Fowler and Brenner advocated a model of regulation that 
enabled and facilitated competition and allowed the marketplace, rather than regulators, 
to determine broadcasters’ programming and business choices.  According to Fowler and 
Brenner, “the public’s interest, then, defines the public interest.”394  Conflating members 
of the public with consumers of broadcasting, and drawing on the proliferation of new 
technologies that expanded communications options, Fowler and Brenner not only 
presented a new paradigm for broadcasting regulation, but provided the language and 
discursive frame that regulators and legislators would use in their work dismantling a 
regulatory model that had imposed public interest restrictions and expectations on 
broadcasters for over thirty years. 
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Indeed, when President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act into law on 
February 8, 1996, he codified a system of deregulation that had defined communications 
policy since Fowler took over the FCC chairmanship in 1981.  The commission routinely 
abolished policies that had been created to spur competition, diversity or localism—the 
three pillars that had come to define the public interest requirements of broadcasters.  
Asserting that these goals could best be accomplished by a deregulated industry, the FCC 
rescinded, for example, the Fairness Doctrine, the Anti-Trafficking Rule, and the Prime 
Time Access Rule.395 It simplified the license renewal process and expanded the length of 
a license term.  Significantly for this discussion, in 1995 it completely repealed the 
Financial Interest and Syndication (Fin-Syn) rule, which had prevented networks from 
having a financial interest in any programming save news and restricted their syndication 
rights to international syndication.  The repeal of Fin-Syn enabled networks to own their 
entertainment programming, and resulted in many independent production companies 
becoming enfolded within the corporate frameworks of national networks. The 
commission also relaxed many of the ownership restrictions it had placed on how many 
stations a single entity could possess.  
The 1996 act reconceptualized how legislators, regulators, and the 
communications industry should view the media landscape.  As Aufderheide writes, the 
FCC had “repeatedly and unambiguously identified the public interest as being a 
competitive or a procompetitive environment.  This policy, which courts repeatedly have 
found in violation of congressional intent, is now, finally, congressional intent [with the 
                                                
395 The Anti-Trafficking Rule had required broadcast station owners to retain ownership of a station for 
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Television (New York: Routledge, 2005), 88-93. 
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passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act].”396  The act underscored how the era of 
digital communications necessitates a new approach to media technologies, one that not 
only accepts but also embraces the porousness between media that new distribution 
streams enable.  Previously, communications policy to a large degree had treated the 
different sectors of the communications industry—radio, television, cable, telephony, 
internet—as separate spokes of the communications wheel.  The 1996 act encouraged a 
media landscape that would allow media companies to cross over into different sectors to 
foment competition and innovation across media platforms.  Telephone providers could 
become cable providers, cable companies could own broadcast networks, cable or phone 
companies could provide internet services.  The Telecommunications Act, in other words, 
allowed for increased horizontal integration within a single communications sector, but 
also vertical integration across multiple sectors. 
The first part of the act focused on telephone services. Up until 1984, AT&T 
dominated virtually every aspect of telephony: long distance service, equipment 
manufacture, local exchange services.  Beginning in 1974, the Justice Department 
launched an antitrust suit against AT&T; furthermore, AT&T was involved with over 
seventy lawsuits at this time, most of which centered on challenging AT&T’s 
anticompetitive behaviors.  The Modified Final Judgment (MFJ), enacted in 1984, 
required AT&T to divest itself of its local exchange interests.397  Instead of one 
centralized service provider, seven new regional bell operating companies (RBOCs) 
would provide local exchange services to consumers.  AT&T primarily would function as 
a long-distance carrier.  In exchange, the RBOCs would be banned from providing long 
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distance or information services within their regions and could not manufacture customer 
equipment.398  The 1996 Act abolished the MFJ.  It opened up all interstate and intrastate 
telephone markets, though provided a series of detailed instructions to regulators as to 
how and when local exchanges could enter long distance markets and vice versa.  The act 
also required incumbent phone carriers to provide access to any of their facilities to new 
entrants in the telephony markets at regulated rates.  In short, the act opened the 
telephony sectors to competition, ending what had been a decades-long model of 
regulated monopolies.  However, in its intent to open up markets and spur competition, 
the act additionally created new layers of regulatory requirements and rules.  It managed 
to lift restrictions while simultaneously creating more regulatory hurdles.399 
If the act removed barriers to spur competition in the telephony sector, with 
regard to broadcasting and cable it removed barriers to enable further consolidation.  
Positing that the interests of over-the-air broadcasters were threatened by the diversifying 
and expanding media landscape, the act in essence shored up the interests of broadcast 
networks.  It did this in three ways: it enabled further ownership concentration, provided 
greater license security to broadcasters, and issued to them more spectrum use.  Key 
provisions included: 
 
• Radio: the act removed all national ownership caps and relaxed local ownership 
restrictions.  The local ownership caps fluctuated based on the size of a local 
market. 
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• Broadcast Television: a single owner could possess stations that reach up to 
thirty-five percent of the national audience. 
• Cross-Ownership: in the largest fifty markets, a single owner could have more 
than one television station per market or one radio and one television station in 
one market.  The act also allowed a single entity to own more than one network; 
however, one company cannot own more than one of the big four broadcast 
networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX).  The act permitted cross-ownership of cable 
systems and television networks. 
• License renewal: the length of broadcasting license was extended from five to 
eight years.  It prevented any entity from challenging an incumbent license unless 
the FCC had already found the licensee to be unfit for renewal.  It banned the 
FCC from finding licensees ineligible for renewal on public trusteeship grounds, 
with one exception: excessive violence in programming. 
• Spectrum use: the act provided additional spectrum use for free to broadcasters, 
who were expected to use the additional spectrum to start the transition from 
analog to digital television. 
• Cable: the act relaxed the rate regulation for cable that had been tightened in a 
1992 act.  It allowed phone companies to provide cable services and creates 
incentives for cable companies to enter into local phone service markets.  It also 
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maintained the provision that requires cable systems to carry local broadcast 
signals and to make available the programming they own to competitors.400 
Title V of the act, however, introduced a provision that strikes as somewhat 
schizophrenic given the turn toward deregulation: it heaped regulations on broadcasters 
to curtail the hazards of broadcast indecency.  This section required the broadcasting 
industry to establish a ratings system for its programming within one year, after which 
the FCC would take up the task.  It also established that television sets must contain V-
chips to receive signals labeling shows with ratings and that enable parents to block 
programming they deem inappropriate for their children.  It further made it a crime to use 
a telecommunications device to make obscene phone calls to a minor and required cable 
operators to block programming which a subscriber did not choose.401 
Labeled “watershed legislation,”402 the 1996 act not only transformed the media 
landscape but also codified an approach to telecommunications regulation that defined 
the industry and its users unmistakably within a market-based frame.   In removing or 
revising regulations, Congress worked to eliminate barriers to entry within the 
telecommunications sectors to encourage increased competition and innovation in the 
emerging digital environment.  As numerous scholars have noted, the act itself was a 
hodge-podge of rules, some realizing a new paradigm of telecommunications regulation, 
others maintaining entrenched ideas about the operations of media within society.  
Furthermore, according to scholars the act troubled the division of labor among 
regulatory bodies--states and localities, public utility commissions, Congress, the FCC – 
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and led to a robust period of litigious battles in the years to follow over who had primacy 
in enforcing and interpreting regulatory policies.403 
The media ownership battles are one such instance.  While the fight over the 
proposed FCC rules centered on the material contours of the culture industries, it also 
represented a struggle over congressional intent in the 1996 act and the vision of the 
media landscape embedded within it.  Additionally, the media ownership fight called into 
question the conception of a media universe so revolutionized by the proliferation of 
digital technologies that it rendered old ideas of the public interest obsolete.  In sum, the 
media ownership battles were not just an effort to stem the consolidation of the media, 
but also a challenge to the hegemonic logic of deregulation that had disenfranchised 
citizens by asserting, most strenuously in the 1996 act, that they were no more than 
consumers. 
 
THE PATH TO PROMETHEUS: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE OWNERSHIP BATTLES 
The adoption of new media ownership rules was, from the outset, a contested 
enterprise.  While Republican commissioners were both intent on revising the rules and 
doing so in a quick manner, the Democrats continually argued for a slower process that 
would solicit public input and carefully weigh the public interest consequences of future 
actions.404  Furthermore, members of Congress were at odds with the majority of the FCC 
on the desirability of diminished ownership rules and responded immediately when the 
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FCC passed its new rules in June 2003.  The 2003 media ownership battles not only 
yielded wide-reaching citizen activism, but exposed fissures and disagreements amongst 
governmental actors over the future of broadcasting policy and the role of the state in 
serving its citizens. 
In September 2002, the FCC began its third biennial review of its media 
ownership rules and issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to solicit public comment.  
Announced to be “the most comprehensive look at media ownership regulation ever 
undertaken by the FCC,” this process aimed to map an analytically consistent approach to 
media ownership, one rooted in empirical evidence that detailed the relationship between 
ownership and public interest goals of diversity, competition, and localism.405  Ostensibly 
on a fact-finding mission, the FCC commissioned twelve studies on the media 
marketplace, labeled the Media Ownership Working Group Studies, designed to provide 
the commission empirical evidence of the performance of stations.  In soliciting public 
comment, the FCC requested that parties filing should include empirical evidence to 
accompany their claims.  The FCC’s emphasis on empirical evidence resulted from two 
embarrassing court decisions.  In Fox Television Stations Inc. v. FCC and Sinclair 
Broadcasting Group, Inc. v. FCC, two U.S. courts faulted the FCC for not providing 
adequate evidence of to support how the national television ownership cap promoted 
diversity (Fox) or how the local television station ownership cap enabled diverse voices 
(Sinclair).  This time out, the FCC committed itself to mapping a comprehensive 
approach to media ownership, one that would derive from and gain legitimacy from hard 
data.406   
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Six rules were under consideration: 
 
• The ban that prohibits cross-ownership of a newspaper and broadcast stations in 
the same market. 
• The rule that places limits on how many radio stations a single entity could own 
in a single market.  In the largest markets, entities could own up to 8 stations; in 
the smallest, five.  This rule also limits the number of stations of AM or FM 
stations an entity can own in a single market.  For example, in the largest markets, 
an entity can own up to 8 stations, but only 5 can be in either the AM or FM band. 
• The ban that forbids mergers amongst the top four national broadcast networks. 
• The national ownership limit on television stations which, following the 1996 act, 
allowed a single entity to own stations that reach thirty-five percent of the 
national audience. 
• The rule that limits how may television stations a single entity could own in a 
single market.  It allows at most two television stations in a single market, 
provided that one of the stations is not ranked in the top four in the market. 
• The rule that limits how many television stations and radio stations a single entity 
can own in a single market.  Depending on the size of the market, an entity could 
own up to two television stations and a fixed number of radio stations.407 
The commission released the findings of its studies on October 1, 2002 to solicit public 
comment.  The results consistently reinforced the premises of deregulation and turned the 
                                                
407 “FCC Initiates.” 
 221 
relationship between media ownership restrictions and public interest goals--diversity, 
competition, and localism--on its head: they not only denied that ownership restrictions 
promoted these goals, but they suggested that they would better be met by the removal of 
ownership restrictions.  The studies underscored the proliferation of media outlets and 
consumer use of multiple outlets for news and public affairs information.  Furthermore, a 
study indicated that the growth of media outlets threatened the viability of over-the-air 
broadcasting, a threat compounded by the consequences of media ownership restrictions.  
One study found that local stations owned by national networks, as opposed to stations 
affiliated with but not owned by a network, produced more local news and public affairs 
programming.  Another study essentially skewered Fin-Syn and illustrated that the rule 
impinged upon, rather than promoted, diversity in programming.  An examination of 
diversity on radio stations post-1996 found that while diversity decreased marginally 
across local markets, it increased markedly within each local market.  The studies, in 
large part, reinforced the conceit that the marketplace model of deregulation served 
traditional public interest goals of diversity, localism, and competition.  Indeed, the 
studies pointed to continued restrictions as an impediment to realize these goals in an 
expanding media universe.408   
Controversies over how the FCC solicited public comment on the studies 
foreshadowed the parameters of the ownership battles to come.  Members of the public 
and Democratic Commissioner Michael Copps criticized the FCC for the size of the 
window allowed for public comment (sixty days) and for initially withholding the actual 
data the studies drew upon to reach their findings.  In a press release noting his 
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disapproval, Copps registered what would become his hallmark complaints against the 
process: that the FCC had failed to date to consider fully the implications of revising the 
ownership rules, especially the impact on minority and public service programming; that 
the FCC was betraying its requirement to allow the public to participate in the process; 
and that the speed through which the FCC was acting was irresponsible, unnecessary, and 
dangerous.  He stated, “We are under no mandate to resolve these issues by a certain 
date.  We must place making the right decision ahead of making a hasty decision.”  
Furthermore, Copps clarified that at “stake in this proceeding are our core values of 
localism, diversity, competition, and maintaining the multiplicity of voices and choices 
that undergird our marketplace of ideas and that sustain American democracy.”409 
Indeed, the public outrage over the media ownership rules centered both on the 
substance of changes to come and on the way that the FCC conducted the process.  
Opponents insisted that the FCC not only asked the wrong questions and relied on faulty 
evidence, but also sidelined the public and public interest groups from playing a 
meaningful role in the decision-making process.  At stake, then, were two distinct yet 
interrelated hazards to democracy: the danger posed by the consequences of increased 
media consolidation and the threat embodied by the fundamentally undemocratic way 
that the FCC conducted its procedures.  The FCC itself divided over both of these 
concerns, Copps and Republican Chairman Michael Powell coming to embody the 
opposing sides of the battle.   
One of the central areas of contestation was over the necessity for public hearings 
on media ownership.  The FCC held a public hearing in Richmond, VA on February 27, 
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2003.  In Powell’s view this hearing, coupled with the ability of members of the public to 
file comments online, satisfied the commission’s responsibility to field public comments.  
Copps, in contrast, pushed for multiple public hearings across the country, hearings that 
ultimately he and fellow Democratic commissioner Jonathan Adelstein convened without 
Powell or the other Republican commissioners (Kevin Martin and Kathleen Abernathy) 
present.  Powell’s and Copps’s opposing perspectives on the role of public hearings 
underscore their competing ideas about process and about what constitutes meaningful 
evidence and testimony.  Powell stated, “The Commission will continue to look for 
opportunities to ensure that we are soliciting input from the public both generally, and in 
association with the empirical studies which I believe provide the most important 
foundation for our decision in a manner that the courts will sustain.”410   For Powell, in 
particular, the ability of citizens to post comments online erased the need for public 
hearings.  Buoyed by the 13,000 comments received by February 2003, Powell remarked: 
“It is gratifying to witness first hand the unparalleled opportunities technology now 
provides the American public to participate in the democratic process.  This record 
clearly demonstrates that in the digital age, you don’t need a 19th century whistle stop tour 
to hear from America.”411  For Powell, then, the significance of expert opinion, expressed 
in the 12 studies, coupled with the ability of citizens to weigh in online erased the need 
for public hearings.  The premises behind this view—the faith in the data secured by the 
studies, the concomitant sacralization of empirical evidence, and the belief in the 
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widespread access to and use of digital technologies—would be some of the areas for 
which members of the media ownership coalition would take the chairman to task. 
Copps, who achieved heroic status along with Adelstein for members of the 
media ownership battle, fought for and scheduled additional hearings.  He maintained 
that “we need to have other hearings in diverse venues to flesh out the record needed for 
this single most important decision the Commission will make next year.  That means 
listening not just to one community, but giving mid-western and west coast Americans, 
for example, access to the FCC.”412  Press releases announcing additional hearings in 
cities like Seattle, Wash. and Durham, N.C., stated that “the purpose of the hearing is to 
give citizens outside of Washington, DC, an opportunity to voice their opinions about 
media concentration.”413  Asserting that the media ownership review process had 
implications for American democratic principles, Copps and Adelstein essentially 
disregarded Powell’s faith in the weight of the studies and his concern for a speedy 
resolution to the congressional requirement to review rules.  Striking a populist pose, the 
commissioners underscored how the refusal to conduct far-reaching public hearings was 
an abdication of the commission’s obligations as guardians of the public interest.  They 
scheduled and held thirteen additional public hearings, which the other commissioners 
did not attend.414 
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Adelstein and Copps, furthermore, tempered the relevance of the twelve 
ownership studies by insisting that the best way to understand the role of media in 
people’s lives is to talk to as many people as possible.  In other words, at stake in the 
disagreement was not only the process of rule-making, but the definition of what 
constitutes meaningful evidence and who should ascertain the contours of the media 
landscape.  It is a debate that dates back to the genesis of American broadcasting policy, 
in which regulators had to weigh the professional with the popular, the voices of publics 
versus the assessment of experts—who often represent, or are sympathetic to, the culture 
industries themselves. 
In addition to agitating for and holding public hearings, Copps and Adelstein 
requested that the FCC postpone its vote on its ownership rules, scheduled for June 2, 
2003.  In particular, they requested that the commission make public the actual new rules 
on the table for a vote to solicit feedback not just on the issue of media ownership 
broadly, but on the proposals under review specifically.415  Powell denied the request to 
postpone the vote, maintaining that the diversity, localism, and competition are “ill-
served by letting stand a body of rules that are unenforceable” and that Congress had set 
the pace of their decision-making process by statute (the 1996 act’s biennial review 
requirement).416  Powell neglected to comment on the other part of Copps and Adelstein’s 
request, to publicize the rules under review and officially solicit comment.  Some of the 
new proposals made their way into the popular press, and public interest groups filed 
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hundreds of thousands of comments with the FCC accordingly.  The overwhelming 
majority of the comments were in opposition to relaxing the ownership rules. 
On June 2, the FCC announced its new rules.  One of the six rules under review 
went unchanged: the ban prohibiting ownership of two of the big four networks.  The 
FCC basically retained the local ownership limits for radio, yet tweaked how it would 
calculate the size of a market.  To determine the size of a radio market under the 1996 
Act, the FCC should only count the number of commercial stations in the area.  In its 
2003 revision, the FCC included noncommercial stations in its head count, in essence 
raising the number of large and medium size markets and enabling the purchase of 
additional stations by a single owner.  The commission relaxed the other four rules, but 
did not completely repeal any of them.  It raised the national ownership cap for television 
stations from a thirty-five percent reach to a forty-five percent reach.  It also revised the 
local television ownership rule to allow entities to own up to three stations in markets 
with eighteen or more stations, in smaller markets (minimum of five stations) entities 
could own two stations.  Finally, it loosened cross-media ownership limits to allow in 
certain markets, where there are four to eight television stations, one of the following 
combinations: a daily newspaper, one television station, and half of the radio station limit 
for a market of its size; a newspaper and up to the limit of radio stations for a market of 
its size; two television stations and up to the radio station limit for a market of its size.  In 
the largest markets, those with nine or more television stations, the FCC eliminated all 
cross-ownership bans.417  Finally, the FCC rescinded its Failing Station Solicitation Rule.  
This rule had intended to increase the number of stations owned by minorities or women.  
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When a station owner of a failed, failing, or unbuilt station wanted to sell, under this rule 
the seller was required to solicit widely for purchasers.  Ideally, the rule would prohibit 
“good-old boy” deals and provide opportunities to women and minorities to get a 
foothold in local media markets.  
The rationale for the new rules, from the vantage point of the Republicans on the 
commission, was threefold: (1) Congress and the courts had required the FCC to amend 
or repeal rules no longer justifiable from a public interest perspective; gauging that 
diversity, localism, and competition were not furthered by the current rules, the FCC was 
under statutory obligation to revise them;  (2) the proliferation of media outlets had 
negated the need for strict ownership requirements because it had engendered a widely 
diverse array of media options for consumers; and (3) free over-the-air broadcasters were 
in peril because of this competition from new outlets; to ensure consumers have access to 
free broadcasting, therefore, the FCC relaxed its ownership rules to bolster the health of 
the allegedly flailing broadcasting industry.  In an op-ed to the New York Times entitled 
“New Rules, Old Rhetoric,” Powell touched on the latter justifications.  He wrote, “If the 
problem is lack of diversity among the media, then the fact is that the United States has 
the most diverse media marketplace in the world.  There are more media outlets, owners, 
variety and diversity now than at any point in our nation’s history.”418   He also pointed to 
the rise of cable’s popularity, at the expense of quality programming on broadcast 
networks, as a perilous trend that the new rules would ameliorate.  He stated, “the current 
debate has ignored a disturbing trend the new rules will do much to abate: the movement 
of high-quality content from free over-the-air broadcast television to cable and satellite.”  
Powell continued, “Quality prime-time viewing, long the strong suit of free television, 
has begun to erode, as demonstrated by HBO's 109 Emmy nominations this year. Indeed, 
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for the first time ever, cable surpassed free TV in prime-time viewing share last year. If 
they can reach more of the market, broadcasters will be able to better compete with cable 
and satellite.”419 
To bolster the rationale that media markets offered a diverse array of outlets, the 
FCC drew on both the twelve commissioned studies and on testimony by economists and 
consultants, many of whom represented the interests of the broadcast networks.  
Furthermore, in what would become one of the most-maligned and contentious 
justifications for revising the rules, the FCC mapped a Diversity Index model to ascertain 
the level of diversity within a specific community.  The petitioners in the Prometheus 
case would skewer the Diversity Index and poke holes in the assumptions that underlined 
it.  The assertion that, in our contemporary media environment, over-the-air broadcasting 
was in peril also was supported by expert testimony.  For example, Victor Miller of Bear, 
Stearns testified in Richmond that unless regulators diminish current pressures on 
broadcasters, “the viability of ‘free over-the-air television’ could be threatened.”420  To 
loosen ownership rules, in this schema, was to help save a dying industry, one 
fundamentally more democratic than cable that required subscription fees.  As Frank 
Ahrens reported in The Washington Post, “Media corporations are lobbying for 
ownership rules to be lifted, saying that money-losing networks could benefit from 
buying additional television stations, for instance.”421  For example, Jay Ireland, president 
of NBC Television Stations, told the commission at the hearing in Richmond, 
“Relaxation of the commission’s ownership rules will not diminish diversity.  What will 
diminish diversity is the loss of media outlets because they can no longer compete in 
                                                
419 Ibid., sec. A17. 
420 Victor B. Miller IV, “Opening Statement – Federal Communications Commission Hearing Addressing 
Ownership Rules, February 27, 2003 – Greater Richmond Convention Center – Richmond Virginia,” 5. 
421 Frank Ahrens, “Member of FCC Pushes Ownership Debate; Commissioner Plans Additional Hearings 
on Laws Governing Media Consolidation,” The Washington Post, February 6, 2003, sec. E04. 
 229 
today’s fragmented marketplace.”422 This too would come under attack by opponents to 
the new rules.  As Barry Diller commented, “Anybody who thinks they’re in trouble 
hasn’t read the profit statements of these companies.  The only way you can lose money 
in broadcasting is if someone steals it from you.”423 
However, from the perspective of the Republican commissioners, the new rules 
preserved public interest goals of diversity, localism, and competition while taking into 
consideration transformations in the media landscape and consumer use of myriad media 
outlets.  They also satisfied the statutory requirement to review ownership rules and the 
mandates by the courts to derive commission decisions with internally consistent analysis 
supported by empirical evidence.  From the perspective of the Democratic 
commissioners, the rules—alongside the process by which they came into being—
threatened the functioning of a healthy democracy and ignored important indices of 
diversity and localism.   
Members of Congress, who had expressed fear and skepticism about diminishing 
ownership restrictions, immediately denounced the FCC’s new rules.  Senator Ernest 
Hollings (D-S.C.) commented that the FCC “with this order had turned the people’s 
public interest commission into an instrument of corporate greed.”  Senator Olympia 
Snowe (R-Maine) agreed that the decision “most assuredly is a victory for free enterprise 
but it is not a victory for free speech.”  Senator Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.) labeled the rules 
“wrong-headed and destructive” and anticipated they would lead to “an orgy of mergers 
and acquisitions.”  Senator Joseph Lieberman  (D-Conn.) characterized the decision a 
“case of democratic malpractice.”424  While the Republican commissioners asserted that 
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increased media concentration could best serve the public interest, these comments 
clearly positioned media consolidation as antithetical to the interests of an imagined 
public.  In line with the discourse of many activists, senate opposition to the new rules 
posited an unholy alliance between the FCC and the industries it was to regulate and 
asserted that the victims of this partnership was the very public the commission was 
formed to protect. 
The Congressional Black, Hispanic, and Asian Pacific American Caucuses 
opposed the decision on the grounds that increased media consolidation would shut out 
minorities from ownership.425  In the weeks following the FCC’s announcement, Senators 
Olympia Snowe and Byron Dorgan sponsored a bill to reinstate the cross-ownership ban, 
Senators Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) and Hollings one to reinstate the thirty-five percent cap 
on national television station ownership and to reinstate the ban on newspaper-broadcast 
cross-ownership.426  The Senate Commerce Committee, under the leadership of Senator 
John McCain (R-Ariz.), voted to overturn the changes in media ownership rules.427  In 
September, the Senate voted by a margin of fifty-five to forty for a “resolution of 
disapproval” leveled against the FCC that vacated the new ownership rules.  President 
George W. Bush had threatened to veto any legislation that overturned the new rules, a 
chance that this bipartisan aggregate of senators was willing to face.428  At this time, a US 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia issued a stay on the media ownership rules until 
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it had a chance to hear evidence and rule on a case before it, Prometheus Radio Project v. 
FCC, in which a coalition of public interest groups challenged the FCC’s rules on 
procedural grounds.429 
In November 2003, however, members of Congress tempered their fury and 
fearlessness of a presidential veto.  Republican congressional leaders met with the White 
House and brokered a compromise on the issue of media ownership, focusing in 
particular on the new forty-five percent national television ownership cap.  What resulted 
was a rider to an omnibus spending bill, approved by both houses of Congress, which set 
the ownership cap at thirty-nine percent reach to a national audience.  As a result, NBC 
and ABC would be permitted to purchase additional stations; Fox and Viacom, who 
already had bought additional stations in anticipation of the FCC rulings, would be able 
to keep its stations but not to acquire anymore.  The compromise elicited not only 
outrage, but allegations of misconduct.  Hollings complained that the White House and 
Republican leaders “went into a closet, met with themselves, and announced a 
‘compromise’ on how many TV stations one company could own.”430  Mark Cooper of 
the Consumer Federation of America, one of the leading activist groups in opposition to 
the new rules, commented “the way these guys are doing legislation is outrageous.”431  
When the court of appeals heard the Prometheus case, therefore, the national television 
ownership rule was off the table for review as the compromise cap set by Congress late in 
2003 became law.   
Though members of Congress continually had expressed concern over the 
relaxation of ownership rules, undoubtedly the public outrage over the FCC’s new rules 
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played a role in their immediately swift response.  Indeed, in the months both leading up 
to and following the vote, a wide-reaching coalition of public interest groups, alongside 
individual members of the public, registered their disapproval with the FCC over 
continued media deregulation.  This protest took many forms: letters and emails to the 
commission, official petitions for reconsideration, guerilla street theater, and ultimately a 
court case leveled against the FCC.  As the next section will illustrate, activists imagined 
severe political and social consequences would result from increased consolidation.  For 
some, further deregulation would choke American democracy and take the teeth out of 
meaningful political discourse.  For others, with Clear Channel’s hegemony in radio 
haunting the discourse, further media consolidation would trample quality and creativity 
and open the door to increased commercialization and indecency on the airwaves. 
 
MEDIA CONSOLIDATION AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 
In May 2003, Brent Bozell testified in front of the FCC to register the disapproval 
of his organization, the Parents Television Council, to the loosening ownership rules.  
Representatives from over twenty-five groups testified that day, including the Family 
Research Council, the National Organization for Women, and Common Cause.  That the 
hearing brought together a motley assortment of organizations was not lost on Bozell.  He 
stated, “when all of us are united on an issue, then one of two things has happened.”  He 
continued, “Either the earth has spun off its axis and we have all lost our minds, or there 
is universal support for a concept.”432  Indeed, the atypical political alliances formed 
around the media ownership issue garnered substantial attention in both the mainstream 
and trade presses.  Ahrens in The Washington Post characterized the coalition as the 
                                                
432 Jeff Johnson, “Groups Warn FCC About Media Ownership Rules Changes,” CNSNews.com,  May 28, 
2003, http://www.cnsnews.com/Politics/archive/200305/POL20030528b.html (accessed January 3, 2007). 
 233 
fruits of “unexpected political alliances” and “ideologically disparate groups [who] share 
a common concern.”433  Susan Crabtree, in Variety, referred to opponents to the new 
rules as “a chorus of diverse critics covering the political spectrum.”434 
The FCC received over one million emails and letters from members of the 
public, an almost absolute majority (over ninety-nine percent) were opposed to relaxing 
media ownership rules.435  Around 300,000 members of the National Rifle Association 
alone wrote to the FCC; close to 150,000 members of moveon.org filed comments.  
Many citizens and representatives of public interest groups additionally testified in front 
of the FCC and Congress, and filed more formal petitions with the commission 
addressing why diminished ownership rules would harm the public interest.  The 
apotheosis of the activism at this stage was the June 2004 ruling in the Prometheus case, 
in which the court ordered the FCC to re-conduct its investigation of public interest 
impact of its ownership rules. 
In some ways, both opponents and advocates of the new rules used a similar 
vocabulary to talk about what constitutes the public interest and to identify the core issues 
at play in the current regulatory climate.  As Christine Becker notes in her analysis of the 
rhetoric surrounding the reversal of Fin-Syn, both sides of the issue employed the 
concepts of diversity and competition, yet defined each in incompatible ways.436  For 
advocates of deregulation, diversity referred to the multiplicity of media outlets and the 
myriad choices in media consumers had at their disposal.  For example, in a comment to 
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the FCC, Clear Channel stated that consumers “in the modern media marketplace face an 
embarrassment of riches in terms of the choices available to them for their news and 
entertainment.”437  Fox, Viacom, NBC and Telemundo concurred: “American consumers 
today have unprecedented access to a diverse array of media choices that would have 
been utterly unfathomable when most of the Commission’s ownership rules were first put 
into place.”438  Significantly, diversity and competition here are laced in the language of 
consumerism and refer to the options consumers have in a marketplace of multiple media 
outlets.  It is this definition that animated the changes of the 1996 Telecommunication 
Act and is a logic that undergirded the Commission’s decision to relax its ownership rule. 
Opponents to deregulation defined diversity in two ways, diversity of ownership 
and diversity of opinion, and posited that the two were indelibly intertwined.  The 
Consumer Federation of America, in comments to the FCC, summed up this position: 
“Independent ownership of outlets is critical because outlets that are commonly owned 
are less likely to provide diverse points of view.  Owners have a tendency to impose their 
preferences and biases on the media they control.”439  This rhetoric, in which the needs of 
the public are positioned as access to multiple viewpoints and perspectives, was 
ubiquitous in the avalanche of comments and testimony the FCC received. Asserting that 
the marketplace of ideas could not be served by the unregulated mechanisms of the media 
marketplace, activists and concerned citizens tied increased media consolidation to the 
dissipation of democracy and the unchecked power of the state enabled by the 
cooperation of the expanding media conglomerates themselves.   
In other words, as in other media reform activism cases, at issue here was not just 
the parameters of conglomerate control over the media, but fears over the 
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disenfranchisement of the American populace.  This return to the language of citizenship 
speaks to a deep concern over the ascendance of a deregulated corporate environment, the 
conflation of consumerism and citizenship common at this political moment, and the 
anxieties over its impact on the machinations of democracy and politics.  Indeed, the 
media ownership debates enfolded media reform activism within a broader anti-
corporation movement that had gained currency since the 1990s.  For example, Naomi 
Klein’s No Logo, Kalle Lasn’s Culture Jam and Adbusters magazine, Eric Schlosser’s 
Fast Food Nation, along with the films of Michael Moore, Barbara Ehrenreich’s exposes 
on minimum wage and white collar workers, and Thomas Frank’s entire oeuvre of 
writings pointed to a growing skepticism and antagonism to a perceived hegemony of 
corporate power.440  Critics often vilified the expansion of corporations by focusing on 
the material consequences, in particular reprehensible labor practices, and the symbolic 
ramifications—the increasingly commodified cultural environment.  The media reform 
activism over the 2003 ownership rules amplified the political impact, in particular the 
threat to a functioning democracy resulting from the expansion of corporate power.  
Though scholars and critics have explored the impact of an increasingly consolidated 
media landscape dating back at least to Ben Bagdikian’s The Media Monopoly (1983), 
the 2003 ownership fights marked a moment when this issue captured the attention of a 
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wide array of social reformers of all political stripes who saw great peril in the expansion 
of media corporations.441 
A recurring trope of the activist discourse was appeals to the fragility of the First 
Amendment in a concentrated media environment.  This line of reasoning, in which an 
increasingly concentrated media oligopoly will harm democracy irrevocably, draws on 
what Robert Britt Horwitz has identified as the two predominant interpretations of the 
First Amendment: literal and narrowly interventionist.  According to Horwitz, the courts 
have interpreted the free speech clause primarily in two, ostensibly contradictory ways.  
The first, the literal interpretation, restricts the government from impinging on the speech 
rights of individuals or the press.  This definition speaks to what the government cannot 
do.  The second, however, interprets the First Amendment as charging the government to 
facilitate the conditions by which a diversity of views and opinions can be expressed; its 
focus is on what the state should do.  If the first interpretation protects the rights of 
speakers, the second protects the rights of listeners—of a public who should have access 
to a variety of viewpoints.  As Horwitz illustrates, the history of broadcasting policy has 
often pitted these two definitions against each other.442  For example, broadcasters argued 
in the 1969 Red Lion case that the Fairness Doctrine infringed upon the First Amendment 
rights of broadcasters and drew on the literal definition of the clause.  The Supreme 
Court, siding with the FCC, asserted that the second definition, one that prioritizes a 
vibrant marketplace of ideas, trumped the broadcasters’ claims to individual free speech 
rights. 
Both interpretations of the First Amendment were in play in the attacks of 
activists on the new media ownership rules.  For example, in a letter to the membership, 
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NRA executive vice president Wayne La Pierre wrote that the current rules (before the 
June 2 revisions) prevented “giant media conglomerates from gaining monopoly over 
what your fellow Americans can read in their newspapers, see on T.V. and hear on the 
radio.  And they have prevented gun-hating media giants like AOL Time Warner, 
Viacom/CBS and Disney/ABC from silencing your NRA when we’ve needed to take our 
message directly to the American people in critical legislative and political battles.”443    
If the new rules were to pass, according to La Pierre, “a half-dozen anti-gun zealots in the 
top-echelons of the media industry will have the unchallenged power to keep us off the 
air and shut down your NRA’s efforts to communicate wit the American people.”  At the 
end of the letter, after asking members to send postcards to the FCC commissioners, La 
Pierre asked, “Please don’t let a handful of media executives win this battle and gain 
monopoly control over what the American people read, see, hear and think.”444  La 
Pierre’s remarks suggested that further media consolidation threatens the free speech 
rights of the NRA and of the public more broadly, the former to speak to fellow citizens, 
the latter to hear diverse opinions on issues like gun control.  He furthermore drew a 
direct connection between the increased control of media conglomerates and the decrease 
in democratic protections to American citizens. 
Interestingly, the anti-war activists who participated in the fight against the media 
ownership rules used a near-identical argument.  At the Richmond hearing in February 
2003, Dan Preston and Jenny Crumwiller of the Anti-War Video Fund told the 
commissioners that the organization had created a short advertisement that registered the 
group’s opposition to the Iraq war that they had hoped to air in the Washington area on 
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the night of Bush’s State of the Union Address when he was to make his case for war.  
The ad was a montage of Americans making statements about the war.  Comcast, the 
only cable provider in the DC area, at the last minute refused to air the ad.  So too did the 
major networks, save the CBS affiliate. Crumwiller stated, “Whether by government or 
by corporation, centralized control of the media is un-American.  When this happened, I 
felt like I was in Iraq.”445  She continued, “In terms of control over content, in terms of 
democracy, one corporation is one choice.”  Preston elaborated, “You and the audience 
don’t know what you’re not seeing.  You don’t hear the voices that have been silenced.  
If fewer and fewer people own the microphones, the diversity of voices in our democracy 
will be strangled.”446  Much like the NRA, the anti-war activists argued that media 
consolidation not only limits who has access to speak, but what citizens are allowed to 
hear. 
In a similar vein, the chair of the Green Party in Tucson, Ariz., Ann Samuelson, 
wrote to Powell, Copps, and Adelstein to articulate the impact of further deregulation on 
third parties.  She wrote, “If these regulations are relaxed to encourage mass media 
conglomeration we will have even less of a voice and our positions will be even less 
represented.  I know of cases where even paid advertisements have been rejected by 
mainstream media simply because they do not express the mainstream position on 
issues.”447  Echoing the concerns of the anti-war activists, Samuelson posited that 
consolidation of the media yields consolidation of political discourse and asserted that the 
larger the corporation, the smaller the possibility for divergent viewpoints to reach the 
American polity.  David Vearle Palmer, of Vancouver, Wash., echoed Samuelson’s 
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concerns: “I am appalled that you would even consider expanding the percentages of 
media ownership.  Most of the major media channels are already controlled by the 
political left.  Fox News is the only major dissenting voice.  This ruling makes it easy for 
those who control the media to now wipe out any fairness in news reporting.”448  As the 
juxtaposition of these quotations reveal, members of the political left and right, in 
addition to the organizations who represent widely different poles of the political 
spectrum, both feared that concentrated media ownership would stifle the plurality of 
voices in American political discourse. 
Many of the letters sent to the commissioners argued that media consolidation 
would trample on the First Amendment protections of the Constitution.  Two-hundred 
seventy six members of the Center for Digital Democracy sent the FCC commissioners a 
letter that argued that the “rules were adopted to ensure that the public would receive a 
diverse range of viewpoints from the media, and not simply the opinions of a handful of 
media conglomerates.”449  Christine Gerl from Phoenix wrote to Powell: “I am one of the 
millions of public voices who are tired of the monopolistic manipulation of your powers.  
TV, the airwaves, publishing are avenues of free speech, and you are letting them be 
controlled by 5 conglomerates.  I don’t think that the Framers of the Bill of Rights had 
this in mind when they wrote the First Amendment.”450  Michael Lewis from Eugene, 
Ore. stated in a letter to all the commissioners, “The importance of vibrant free speech 
and free press, as a fundamental obligation of your organization, transcends the financial 
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grabbing by Clear Channel, Viacom, and other large corporations.  You should be setting 
policies to protect the public, not to protect these large and financially oriented 
institutions.”  Tim and Debbie Richards from Overland Park, Kans., in a letter to 
Abernathy claimed, “Indirectly, but very effectively, this can limit free speech and put the 
ability to manipulate public opinion in the hands of a few people.  Please do not ease the 
restrictions on media ownership.  Local diversity must be maintained to support a free 
nation.”451  Erma Sebek, from Wilbur, Nebr., summed up the interventionist 
interpretation of the First Amendment so common in the correspondence with the FCC: 
“The American people deserve to hear more than one viewpoint on important issues.  For 
the sake of our democracy and our freedom I urge you to continue the broadcast 
ownership protections that for decades have helped to ensure a healthy political debate in 
our country.”452 
These comments not only underscored the link between free speech and media 
consolidation, but also a definition of the public interest itself.  What emerged from many 
of the comments to the FCC was the position that the interests of the public are 
antithetical to the interests of media corporations and that the FCC, in its approach to 
media ownership, has functioned as a handmaiden to the corruption of American political 
discourse by shoring up the power of media corporations.  Many of the individuals 
writing to the commission resuscitated the rhetoric of 1960s and 1970s era activism, one 
that asserted public ownership of the airwaves and demanded public service of both 
media companies and the commission itself.   They in essence drew a line in the sand, 
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with the FCC and media conglomerates treasonously holding hands on one side, the 
harmed American public who is the rightful owner of the airwaves on the other.  In the 
process, they implicitly refuted the logic of deregulation that had defined the interests of 
the public in primarily in consumer-based language, and reasserted the civic obligations 
of media companies and the public guardianship role of the FCC.  The opponents to the 
rules, in other words, reclaimed their identities as citizens vis-à-vis the media and 
rejected the logic that conflated their interests with that of the media conglomerates 
themselves. 
Letters to the FCC by members of the public underscored this point.  A letter sent 
by many individuals, including Carolyn Ostrander of Camarillo, CA and Suzanne Beers 
of Laytonville, Calif., articulated this position: “Eliminating these last protections of the 
public trust would constitute a complete abandonment of the FCC’s mission to ensure 
that our airwaves, which are owned by all Americans, are used in a manner which 
ensures the diverse range of voices and opinions needed in a healthy democracy.  Loss of 
these protections would constitute a huge and unacceptable giveaway of public resources 
and political power to a few large and powerful media companies.”453 Toni Ciardullo, of 
Seattle, Wash., agreed in a letter to Powell, “The airwaves belong to the American people 
and you have abrogated your duty to the people and instead have made the airwaves the 
property of the very rich.  You have no right to bring your ideology to the fore.  Do you 
really want to turn your back on the right of the American people to be informed, to have 
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the right to debate and consider changes to their property.   Shame on you.”454  Lyndie 
Kehanek asserted in her letter to the Commission, “The media belong to the people.  Do 
not sell us out.”455 
Embedded in these comments was a construction of an American public—the 
people—that are at the base of the American democratic experiment.  Clearly, here the 
people are in opposition to the powerful, in particular media conglomerates and the state, 
though beneath is a contradictory vision of the American people.  On the one hand, the 
public retains tremendous power as the rightful owners of the airwaves to whom media 
companies owe public service.  On the other, the public is that which is acted upon by the 
commission and the media conglomerates, robbed of its power to participate 
knowledgably in a democratic public sphere.  Furthermore, this construction posited a 
unified American public, unfairly disempowered by the contemporary state of the media, 
and hence erased the divisions, distinctions, and power differentials that have continued 
to characterize the American populace.  The people or public of this discourse, at its base, 
was an imagined public, a national community hungry for vibrant political discourse and 
victimized by the invasive role of corporations in their lives.  In other words, the public, 
as often is the case for media reform activists, is perhaps another name for the interests 
and positions of the activists themselves. 
If much of the discourse replaced the public-as-consumer with the public-as-
citizen, it further suggested that the expanded power of corporations in the United States 
would eviscerate American democracy entirely.  Many of the letters to the Commission 
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connected the escalating hegemony of a few media corporations to the potential rise of a 
fascist or totalitarian state.  Gene Verlon Moser wrote to Adelstein, “HAVE YOU 
REALIZED THAT HITLER GOT IN POWER BY THE MONOPOLY OF THE 
BROADCAST IND.? DO YOU REALISE THE POWER THAT CASTRO HAD FROM 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE BROADCAST IND.?”456  Conjuring up fears of monopolies 
not only in broadcasting, but in transportation systems as well, Moser concluded, “A 
FREE SOCIETY NEEDS COMP. DIVERSITY AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR 
ALL INVOLVED.  LET’S KEEP OUR COUNTRY FREE FROM HITLERS AND 
CASTRO AND SUCH.”457  Kim Butler, in an email to the commissioners, evoked 
similar concerns: “Your efforts to do what the Communist party couldn’t do in 50 years 
are an ominous sign for the future of the country.  The control of 1000s of media outlets 
by a handful of people that are homogeneous in their thoughts ensures that the last 
vestiges of FREE thought will reside outside our borders.”458  Art Nugent, from Visalia, 
Calif., agreed, “I just pray this madness is reversed before we all walk in lockstep thanks 
to the select group of broadcasters who will control the public by controlling the public 
airwaves.”459  Here, political domination was indistinguishable from corporate monopoly.  
If the free market rhetoric that underscored deregulation suggested that democracy and 
consumer choice were one in the same, the logic here argued that the concentrated 
powers of corporations would have frightening consequences for the political health of 
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the nation.  Furthermore, this rhetoric echoed cold war anxieties over state-run media.  
The intensity of the anxiety here pointed to a fear that consolidated media, functioning as 
the mouthpiece for the state, would yield a totalitarian control over the hearts and minds 
of the public. 
While the rules themselves posed a threat to a democracy, so too did the process 
by which the FCC conducted its review and revision of media ownership restrictions.  As 
I will discuss below, the petitioners in the Prometheus case primarily focused on what 
they argued was misconduct on the part of the FCC.  However, members of the public 
also pointed to the secretive and speedy process by which the commission, under the 
leadership of Powell, carried out its review.  One citizen, in a postcard to the FCC, wrote:  
Your current process is corrupt and contrary to a transparent, public-serving 
democracy – secret proposals, restricted public notice and testimony, luxury 
junkets (AKA bribery and ex parte contact), lack of open debate and balanced 
input.  Michael Powell and many (but not all) of your members are corrupt and in 
the pockets of the media.  He and the commission have forgotten that the FCC is 
there for the public interest, not media consolidators interested in excess profit 
and providing biased and limited access to information!!!460   
Ann Samuelson, the Green Party Chair from Arizona, agreed: “By closing the hearing 
process, you are closing off the democratic process as well.”461  She continued, “At least 
allow us to see the regulation changes before they are formally voted on, and put off the 
change in regulations another 60 or 90 days so more of the American public can hear of 
these proposed changes and weigh in with their opinion.  After all, we are by law the 
owners of the public airwaves.”462  A petition signed by forty people in Pennsylvania 
stated, “A recent Pew Research Council study showed that 72% of Americans had never 
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even heard about possible changes in the rules.  We call upon you to hold well-publicized 
additional public hearings and to postpone the vote scheduled on June 2, 2003, until there 
has been adequate debate among lawmakers and the public on the far-reaching 
consequences of media consolidation.”463  Brittmarie Janson Perez summed up this 
position in a letter to Powell: “your rush to approve lasting changes which may 
negatively affect the American people, your determination to do so behind closed doors, 
refusing to allow the issues at hand to be discussed broadly and openly, is not only 
suspicious, it is anti-democratic.”464 
The opaqueness of the process—the initial unwillingness to release the data of the 
studies, the refusal to publicize the content of the rules before the FCC voted on them, the 
hostility to holding public hearings—had received a healthy amount of press, in no small 
part due to the agitations of Copps and Adelstein and members of Congress.  
Furthermore, the patina of impropriety intensified as the Center for Public Integrity noted 
that, during the media ownership review process, the FCC held seventy closed-door 
sessions with interests representing the broadcasting industry, four with public interest 
advocates.465  However, the clamoring in these letters for a more open process, one that 
would have engaged a more wholesale swath of the American citizenry, pointed again to 
how members of the public dressed their protest here in the language of citizenship.  
Indeed, from this vantage point, the FCC’s new rules not only struck a blow against a 
vibrant political discourse, but against participatory democracy as well. 
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The perils of further media consolidation on democracy fired the fears and 
imaginations of people from all points on the political spectrum, ranging from members 
of organized groups and movements to concerned individual citizens.  Their opposition, 
as this section has illustrated, not only registered their desire to prevent or rescind the 
new rules, but also to undo the assumptions regarding the relationship between the media, 
their regulators, and the public that had been ascendant since the 1980s.  Furthermore, 
this protest—which characterized expanding corporate power as a threat to cherished 
values of free speech and a healthy political discourse—enfolded media reform within a 
wider anti-corporate movement that increasingly had gained public momentum since the 
1990s.  At stake in this battle, from this vantage point, was therefore not just the structure 
of the entertainment industry, but the state of American democracy, the role of the 
corporation in American life, and the paradigm of deregulation that had defined 
broadcasting regulation for over twenty years. 
 
COPING WITH CLEAR CHANNEL: MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND THE HAZARDS TO 
CREATIVE PROGRAMMING 
David Croteau, a professor at Virginia Commonwealth University, testified in 
front of the FCC at its Richmond hearing in February 2003.  In large part, the purpose of 
his testimony was to debunk that technological change, and the subsequent 
transformations in media outlets, had increased the diversity of what the media had to 
offer audiences.  “New media outlets,” he argued, “often do NOT mean new media 
content.”466  He noted that, after the repeal of Fin-Syn, broadcast networks owned eighty 
percent of their prime-time programming, effectively shutting out independent producers.  
Furthermore, he continued, broadcast networks and cable providers controlled ninety 
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percent of the most popular cable networks and the most popular websites primarily were 
owned by the very same media companies that control other parts of the industry.467  To 
underscore how much worse the situation could get, Croteau pointed to the radio market 
in Richmond post-1996.  After the deregulation of radio, Clear Channel purchased six 
stations in Richmond, according to Croteau, “resulting in a loss of competition and the 
loss of local content in favor of homogenized national programming.”  He concluded, 
“the deregulation of radio ownership has been a disaster for Richmond and many other 
communities across the country.  This experience should be a cautionary tale in 
considering any future rule changes.”468 
Croteau’s testimony touched on many points that would recur in the battle over 
media ownership regulation.  Of central concern to opponents was the impact further 
deregulation would have on the creative community and consequently on the quality of 
entertainment brought into our homes. Increased commercialization, formulaic plot lines, 
homogeneity in worldview, escalating indecency and violence, absence of local 
programming--these were some of the projections of what would dominate the airwaves 
should the media ownership rules dissipate.  The example of Clear Channel and its 
impact on the radio industry haunted many people and its example, in Croteau’s 
language, hovered as a “cautionary tale” over many of the discussions on media 
ownership. 
Much like the discourse over democracy and citizenship, this concern crossed 
political lines.  Individuals and organizations from disparate points on the political 
spectrum often used a consistent discursive frame to argue against further media 
consolidation.  In particular, they argued that media concentration hampered creativity, 




heterogeneity, and quality.  For many of the opponents, with Clear Channel as its most 
extreme example, this situation robbed audiences of the pleasures and exposure to a rich 
imaginative life.  For others, the most deleterious impact of media concentration would 
be on children’s programming and on the health of the nation’s youth.  But what 
underlined all these arguments was a denial of one of the central conceits of the 
Republican commissioners and the media industries themselves: that concentration would 
yield more diverse, better programming.  In insisting on ownership restrictions, and in 
maintaining that consolidation hampers content, these activists revived and adapted mass 
culture critiques of broadcasting and the attending discourse of aesthetic hierarchies that 
have accompanied them. 
One of the most vocal opponents of the new rules was New York Times columnist 
and former Nixon speech-writer William Safire.  In a column in January 2003, Safire 
posed the following question: “Should we totally deregulate the public airwaves and 
permit the dwindling of major media down to a precious few?  Should we reduce choices 
available to cantankerous individualists who do not want their information and 
entertainment limited by increasingly massive mass media?”469  Tackling the argument 
that the proliferation of outlets is evidence of a vibrant competitive marketplace, Safire 
countered that the top twenty Internet sites and cable channels were controlled by major 
media conglomerates like Disney, AOL Time Warner, and G.E.  According to Safire, 
“the truth is that media mergers have narrowed the range of information and 
entertainment available to people of all ideologies.”470  To illustrate his point, he advised 
his readers: “Take a listen to what’s happened to local radio in one short wave of 
deregulation: the great cacophony of different sounds and voices is being amalgamated 
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and homogenized.”471  Safire reiterated this view in a column in May 2003: “We’ve 
already seen what happened when the F.C.C. allowed the monopolization of local radio: 
today three companies own half the stations in America, delivering a homogenized 
product that neglects local news coverage and dictates music sales.”472 
The Future of Music Coalition (FMC), one of the most active groups opposing 
further deregulation, codified many of Safire’s concerns.  Formed in 2000 to chart the 
impact of deregulation and to advocate for musicians, the FMC in 2003 fought against 
the ownership rules in three ways: it analyzed the comments made to the FCC by May 
2003 and exposed results which found that the overwhelming majority were opposed to 
the rules; it filed a letter with over 800 signatures—including thirty high profile 
musicians—opposing new ownership rules;473 and it publicized its investigation of the 
impact on radio deregulation to illustrate the nefarious consequences of media 
consolidation on localism, ethnic diversity, and quality.  Like Safire, the FMC 
interrogated claims of “diversity” and “competition” to show that, in a deregulated 
market, these qualities diminish. Characterizing radio programming post-1996 as “bland 
and formulaic,” executive director Jenny Toomey stated that the FMC “found 561 
instances of format redundancy nationwide” which lead to “massive missed opportunities 
for variety.”474  She summed up that deregulation “has led to less competition, fewer 
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viewpoints and less diversity in programming.  Substantial ethnic, regional and economic 
populations are not provided the services to which they are entitled.”475  With the 
performance of Clear Channel as its touchstone, this discourse that linked media 
deregulation to the homoegeneity in the media—in substance, performance, and 
viewpoint—united conservative Safire with liberal artists like Patti Smith and the Indigo 
Girls, unusual political allies with a shared concern that the quality of expressive culture 
would diminish with increased media consolidation. 
In addition to the impact of the 1996 act, artists pointed to the broader edifice of 
deregulation and its effects on the quality of entertainment programming.  Tom 
Fontana—representing Writers Guild of America East and the Caucus for Television 
Producers, Writers and Directors—testified before the Senate to the hazardous 
consequences of the repeal of Fin-Syn.  He pointed to how large conglomerates, in the 
post Fin-Syn era, bought up many independent production companies. This union, of 
production companies and the media companies who own the means of distribution, for 
Fontana portended peril for the quality of television programming and betrayed the rich 
heritage of programming enabled by FCC protections.  MTM, where Fontana began his 
career, had “nurtured several generations of TV’s best talent, including many minorities 
and women.  But, as I said, MTM is no more.”476  Fontana also told stories about Norman 
Lear who, after his series All in the Family initially was rejected by ABC, “took his idea 
to CBS.  Because ABC did not own or control Mr. Lear’s production company, he was 
free to take his show elsewhere and I think we are all richer for the freedom he enjoyed.”   
Similarly, a network had asked Marcy Carsey, producer of The Cosby Show, “to turn the 
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middleclass Dr. Huxtable into a cigar smoking Las Vegas entertainer.  Cosby and Carsey 
stuck by their guns and went to another network, NBC.  They could do that because they 
were protected by the FCC rules.”477  Fontana summed up: “Television is democracy.  It 
is our only national town hall.  Television is where divergent points of view can be 
expressed, where conflicting opinions can be argued not just within one’s segment of 
‘Meet the Press,’ but from program to program.”478   
The impact of deregulation on non-news programming, and the “cautionary tale” 
of Clear Channel, also animated many of the letters sent to the FCC.  Dan Heinzkill of 
Portland, Ore. told the commissioners and his federal representatives:  
Radio station play-list diversity is already limited in the Oregon metropolis of 1.5 
million people.  There is more interesting radio in Eugene, Oregon and Seattle, 
Washington.  The recording industry is suffering because it’s diverse range of 
artists cannot be heard on radio.  People buy music when they can hear it for free 
on the public air waves.  Every year, because of radio station consolidation, the 
possibility of me hearing new music diminishes.479   
Zeljiko Ivanek of New York echoed many of these concerns in a letter to the FCC; he 
told, “When the Telecommunications Act of 1996 loosened rules on radio ownership, 
again we were assured only good could flow from this, and instead we’ve watched Clear 
Channel Communications grow into a virtual monopoly, with a serious erosion in choice 
and local content.”480  Angela M. Hibbard from Detroit also pointed to the deregulation 
of radio as cause for concern: “Several years ago, when you first loosened the rules and 
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media conglomerates began to gobble up multiple stations in a geographic area, we lost 
Detroit’s only classical music station because it wasn’t profitable.”481  She continued, 
“When profit governs the airwaves, the people lose variety in broadcasting.”482   
These arguments, which drew on the discourse of quality, echoed some of the 
most entrenched criticisms of broadcasting, both radio and television, dating back to its 
earliest years.  Though the specific vocabulary of the “wasteland” is missing here, the 
sentiment pervades many of these arguments.   In this line of reasoning, not only is a lack 
of choice and variety compromised by media consolidation, but also true artistic 
innovation and creativity.  While in the past critics used this rhetoric to attack the 
commercial underpinnings of broadcasting, in this case they linked it to media 
consolidation and deregulation.  The contemporary media environment—from radio 
behemoth Clear Channel to a post Fin-Syn televisual universe—yielded what often has 
constituted the worst sins of mass culture: formulaic programming, lack of creative 
innovation, and a fundamental conservatism in approach to narrative.  Indeed, this 
argument mirrored the discourse of activists nearly 20 years prior who had petitioned 
Congress to create a public broadcasting system on the grounds that commercial 
broadcasting was incapable of producing the diverse and aesthetically innovative 
programming that a noncommercial system could yield.  In essence, much of the critique 
of media consolidation applied this argument to a mediascape controlled by 
conglomerates  
If the rhetoric of quality was tied to issues of aesthetics, it was also linked to 
concerns over children.  Bozell and his Parents Television Council (PTC) was one of the 
                                                
481 Letter from Angela Hibbard to the Directors, dated May 23, 2003, available on the Federal 
Communications Commission website, docket 02-277, http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/cgi-
bin/websql/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.hts (accessed March 17, 2007). 
482 Ibid. 
 253 
most vociferous critics against relaxing ownership rules primarily because of the impact 
it would have on the quality of children’s programming.  In testimony at the Richmond 
hearing, Bozell cited research that documents how four broadcast networks and two cable 
providers dominate television.  To be sure, deregulation had bolstered the industry 
leaders but, Bozell asked, “what about the public which this Commission and the industry 
profess to serve?”483  Speaking on behalf of the 750,000 members of the PTC, Bozell 
characterized the public’s sense of the performance of the media:  
[T]hey are disgusted, revolted, fed up, horrified, I don’t know how else to 
underscore this, by the raw sewage of the ultra violence, the graphic sex, the 
raunchy language that is flooding into their living rooms day and night through 
the television screen and poisoning the minds of an entire generation of 
youngsters whose parents’ concerns are dismissed by an industry that admonishes 
them instead to stand guard over the TV sets, perhaps with a baseball bat to keep 
impressionable children away.484   
He concluded by suggesting, “the public is demanding that television shape up and stop 
poisoning the culture.” 
To be sure, the fears of the impact of mass culture on children are as old as mass 
culture itself.  The construction of children as an audience of innocents in need of special 
attention has held such cultural sway that in the midst of widespread deregulation, the 
FCC and Congress imposed additional regulations and restrictions on broadcasters to 
improve their programming for children.  What is significant about Bozell’s testimony, 
however, is the connection he drew between media consolidation and the encroachment 
of “raw sewage” in television programming.  For Bozell, concentrated media ownership 
could rob local communities over their ability to articulate to the media that serve them 
the basic standards of decency they find responsible.  In testimony before Congress, he 
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characterized the “megacorporations” who dominate broadcasting as entities who “could 
care less who they offend and now want even more control of the airwaves where they 
can offend even more.”485  If some defined the decrease in quality to diminished creative 
and diverse shows, for Bozell and the PTC it marked a decrease in the standards of 
decency and morality of the content available to children.  For Bozell and the PTC, the 
indices of decency fall along the lines of sexuality and violence. 
Children Now, a children’s advocacy organization, also put the needs of children 
in the center of debates over media consolidation.  In its arguments against further media 
consolidation, Children Now positioned children as in need of especial protections and 
adapted the discourse of quality and diversity to considerations of programming 
specifically for children.  In testimony to the FCC at a public hearing in San Francisco, 
representatives of Children Now made four cases for why children will suffer at the 
expense of expanded media concentration.  Children Now argued that media 
consolidation would lead to less original programming for children, as children’s shows 
already were “repurposed” (shared between cable and broadcasting partners); it would 
stem innovation in children’s programming, as financial pressures would lead executives 
to replicate existing successful shows; it would decrease the local programming available 
to children; and it would amp up the amount of commercialism on television.  In 
conclusion, “the history of children’s television demonstrates that commercial 
broadcasters will not voluntarily serve children’s needs.  It is essential that the 
Commission retain the current ownership rules to promote the diversity, competition and 
localism to create a media environment worthy of our nation’s children.”486  In May 
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2003, Children Now released a report that proved, based on a study of Los Angeles, that 
increased consolidation yielded less children’s programming more broadly, and less 
diversity and innovation within the shows aired on stations.487 
The argument of Children Now recalls those of other organizations and citizens 
concerned over the quality of programming in a deregulated mediascape, yet it is tinged 
with a moral urgency enabled by the centrality of children to it.  Indeed, as this section 
has illustrated, the controversy over media ownership rules resuscitated entrenched 
critiques of mass culture, ones that linked corporate ownership and commercial financing 
to a debased and denigrated form of culture.  If media consolidation posed a threat to 
American political discourse, it similarly jeopardized the imaginative life of the nation, 
from its children on upwards.  The performance of Clear Channel, and the impact of the 
deregulation of radio and repeal of rules like Fin-Syn, intensified fears that further media 
consolidation would cement an entertainment wasteland, one governed by the logic of 
corporate spreadsheets rather than the tastes and yearnings of a heterogeneous, 
fundamentally local, American public. 
 
PROMETHEUS RADIO PROJECT ET AL V. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 
Media reform campaigns often repeat one story, one illustrative anecdote, which 
sums up both the tone and substance of their complaints.  For members of the National 
Organization for Women in the 1970s, the story centered on a WABC-TV newscast that 
snubbed female Olympic medalists, but instead aired a segment on a pancake-eating 
contest.   For some of the activists involved in the 2003 media ownership battles, 
especially the petitioners in the Prometheus case, the anecdote focused on the Diversity 
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Index (DI), a schematic the FCC had devised to calculate the diversity of outlets available 
to audiences within a single media market.  The DI played a central role in the FCC’s 
determination that certain of its media ownership rules were antiquated.  Opponents to 
deregulation held up the DI as evidence of the incompetence and malfeasance embedded 
within the media ownership review process.  They demonstrated the inanity of the DI 
through a well-circulated example.  A broadcasting station run by Dutchess County 
Community College, according to the DI, had greater market reach than The New York 
Times.  This anecdote both appeared in the mainstream press and in a petition for 
reconsideration filed by the Consumer Federation of America and Consumers Union 
under the heading “The Diversity Index Produces Absurd Results.”488  And it made its 
way into the briefs filed in the Prometheus Radio Project case and into the judges’ ruling 
in the case, which sided with the petitioners and sent three of the FCC’s ownership rules 
back to the commission.489    
The judges handed down the ruling in Prometheus in June 2004, delivering the 
first tangible victory to the bipartisan coalition and thousands of citizens who had 
registered their disapproval for relaxed ownership rules for well over a year.  Josh Silver 
of Free Press, a media activist and lobbying group formed late in 2002, said of the 
decision: “This is a tremendous victory for the millions of citizens who have been 
writing, emailing and calling the FCC and Congress to protest the lax media ownership 
protections. The Court's decision affirms what citizens have been saying: Protecting our 
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democratic media system means stopping Big Media from getting even bigger.”490  
Indeed, the ruling in Prometheus buoyed the momentum of a burgeoning media reform 
movement, who in the years to follow would tackle issues like net neutrality, low-power 
FM radio, and media ownership. 
The court initially had issued a stay on the FCC’s new media ownership rules in 
September 2003 until it had had an opportunity to hear the case against them.  In its 
decision in Prometheus, the court affirmed the FCC’s jurisdiction over media ownership 
regulations.  It found, however, that the commission had not provided sufficient 
justification and evidence to legitimate its ownership rules on local television ownership, 
local radio ownership, or cross-ownership in media markets.  The court continued the 
stay on these rules until the commission had further revisited, revised, or repealed them.  
In sum, the court held that the FCC’s rules were not inherently violations of the law; 
rather, the process and questionable reasoning behind them were.491   
The Prometheus case not only stayed further media deregulation, but also 
legitimated the allegations of misconduct leveled at the FCC.  The petitioners—who 
included Prometheus Radio Project, Media Alliance, National Council of the Churches of 
Christ in the United States, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, Center for Digital 
Democracy, Consumers Union, and Consumer Federation of America—argued that the 
FCC’s actions violated the Administrative Procedures Act, disregarded the “public 
interest” clause at the center of broadcasting policy, and misinterpreted the section of the 
1996 act that required the agency to review its ownership rules.   However, as they wrote 
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in their reply brief for the case, at the bottom of this action was a check on the FCC itself.  
“This appeal is not about the exercise of agency expertise and judgment,” they wrote.  
Instead it is “about the abdication of administrative responsibility and the substitution of 
ideology and rhetoric for evidence and analysis.”492  Ironically, it was Powell’s expressed 
hope that this review of the ownership rules would uphold scrutiny and ostensibly based 
his decisions on empirical evidence and analysis.  As the Prometheus petitioners argued, 
and the court agreed, the FCC’s logic was inconsistent, mired in faulty reasoning, and 
ignored the realities of the media landscape.  Furthermore, the process by which the FCC 
acted, according to the petitioners and the court, violated its obligations to the public. 
Beneath the arguments in the Prometheus case was not only accusations of 
misconduct and incompetence, but a rejection of the logic of deregulation itself.  One of 
the main rhetorical strategies employed in the petitioners’ briefs was to dismantle the 
relationship, at the core of the FCC’s reasoning, that a diversity of outlets yielded a 
diversity of viewpoints.  At the center of this argument was an analysis of how people 
used the media rooted in real-world, rather than hypothetical, experiences.493  
Furthermore, the petitioners repeatedly emphasized that the FCC sped through the 
process without giving the public time to comment.  In large part, the Prometheus case 
was not just about repealing the ownership rules, but about redressing the workings of a 
regulatory agency who, according to this view, had abandoned the very public it was 
charged with protecting.  Significantly, representatives from many of the larger media 
companies also filed suit against the FCC and charged that the rules were overly intrusive 
and failed to serve the public interest.  In their logic, concentrated media companies were 
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better able to furnish diversity, competition, and localism than smaller ones.  
Furthermore, they argued that the anti-trust wing of the Justice Department was sufficient 
to prevent anti-trust activity, rendering the FCC’s ownership rules redundant. 
The complaints over the Diversity Index get at the core of the petitioners’ 
complaints.  In spring 2003, the press reported on a “Diversity Index” that the FCC was 
to use as a substitute for numerical caps in its consideration of cross-ownership rules.  
The public did not get a chance to review or comment on the DI, and though Copps and 
Adelstein asked to delay the June vote until there had been a window for public 
comment, the chairman declined and the vote went ahead on schedule.  Similarly, though 
the FCC had requested public comment on the twelve studies produced by the Media 
Ownership Working Group, it did not release the data on which the researchers based 
their studies until two days after the original comment window had closed.  For the 
petitioners, these behaviors violated the Administrative Procedures Act, which required 
of regulatory agencies a notice and comments process.494 
The DI was also fundamentally flawed, according to the petitioners.  The FCC 
determined that the best way to gauge diversity was to assess how many local news 
outlets existed within a single market.  It assumed equal market shares for every media 
outlet in a single market.  The DI, in other words, was to be a guide to determine, based 
on the market share of a media company’s current holdings, whether the acquisition of 
additional holdings would threaten the diversity of views in the market.  However, the 
schematic often considered media outlets that produced no local news as a substantial 
voice within a community, oftentimes weighted more than actual news sources.  For 
example, the DI assigned the same percentage to all radio stations, even though some 
stations did not produce any local news.  It assigned a high percentage, twelve and one-
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half percent, to the Internet despite the fact that the Internet was not a significant source 
of local news and for many people just repurposed national news from major media 
companies.  As the petitioners wrote in a brief, “the Commission waves its hands at the 
Internet and presumes abundance local news sources without foundation.”495  They 
continued, “In making its ‘local’ Internet findings, the FCC simply asserted there was 
local news on the Internet without pointing to anything to support that finding.”496  And 
while the DI weighted some media outlets too heavily, it neglected to include magazines 
and cable in its calculations of the diversity of a market.  “The Order cannot rationally 
conclude,” they wrote, “that cable and magazines should have no weight for cross-
ownership purposes while at the same time, and based on equally if not more compelling 
data, make the opposite determination for the Internet.”497 
The DI modified the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a tool used by anti-trust 
enforcement agencies, like the Department of Justice, to analyze proposed mergers.  This 
tack, which in some ways assumed that media industries were just like any other 
industries when it came to market share and monopoly considerations, exemplified 
Fowler’s marketplace approach to broadcasting.  It is in line with testimony by an 
economist representing the networks that any ownership restrictions imposed by the FCC 
were in large part redundant because anti-trust mechanisms in the Justice Department 
would be sufficient.  It is an approach that saw media companies as, in large part, in the 
widget business and shunted aside the view that communications occupies a unique role 
within society.  When the petitioners attacked the DI, they both chipped away at its faulty 
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reasoning and at the misguided premise upon which it was based.  They wrote that the 
FCC’s “modifications to the HHI result in a meaningless formula that contradicts 
mainstream antitrust analysis and fails to reflect the quite different roles of 
communications regulation and antitrust.”498  
The petitioners also attacked logical inconsistencies in the FCC’s reasoning, 
inconsistencies that across the board favored the interests of media conglomerates.  For 
example, most of the new rules determined how many media outlets an entity could own 
based on how many exist within a single market; one can own more television stations, 
for instance, in larger markets.  However, the way the FCC counted media outlets was 
inconsistent across the rules. In particular, the erratic application of the UHF discount 
elicited particular ire.  When calculating the national reach of the stations owned by an 
entity which, according the 1996 act, could reach thirty-five percent, the FCC halved the 
reach of UHF stations; if a VHF station reached 100 percent of its audience, then a UHF 
reached fifty percent.  The UHF discount enabled entities to increase the number of 
stations it owned if among them were UHF stations.  However, the FCC did not apply the 
UHF discount to its calculation of media outlets for cross-ownership purposes.  When 
determining how many voices existed in a media market, VHF and UHF stations were 
weighted identically.499   
Another area of inconsistency attacked by the petitioners was the FCC’s standard 
of when it would set aside its rules.  According to the order that detailed the new rules, 
the FCC would consider mergers, which ordinarily would violate its rules, on a case-by-
case basis.  However, the order did not allow citizens or competitors to oppose mergers 
on a case-by-case basis.500  The FCC could anticipate how media corporations could 
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make a case for setting aside existing rules but could not imagine that citizens or smaller 
media companies could provide compelling arguments against increased consolidation.  
The petitioners in Prometheus thus concretized allegations of misconduct leveled at the 
FCC, and illustrated that the logical inconsistencies and irrationalities upon which the 
commission based its rules always led to the same conclusion: they enabled the 
expansion and increased consolidation of media conglomerates.  
In the Prometheus ruling, the judges issued a stay on a number of the FCC’s rules.  
In particular, it required the FCC to re-examine its cross-media limits and its limits on 
both local radio and television station ownership.  The court also ordered the FCC to 
justify or change its approach to setting the limits, chastising the commission for the 
illogical Diversity Index.  It also ruled that the FCC must reconsider or justify its repeal 
of the Failed Station Solicitation Rule.  The suspect rules, according to the court, all 
reflected the same error: “an unjustified assumption that media outlets of the same type 
make an equal contribution to diversity and competition in local markets.”501     
The court was especially critical of the Diversity Index. While it affirmed the 
FCC’s decision to discount cable on the basis that cable is not a significant contributor to 
local news, it argued that the same logic should have pushed the commission to disregard 
the Internet, which instead it allotted a twelve and one-half percent market share.  The 
court also took the FCC to task for assigning an equal market share to all outlets of the 
same media in its Diversity Index; in other words, for assigning the same percentage to 
all television stations, radio stations, newspapers, etc. within a given m market.  It wrote, 
“there is no dispute that the assignment of equal market shares generates absurd 
results.”502  It raised the example of the Dutchess Community College station, which 
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received an equal share to stations owned by ABC and a greater weight than the New 
York Times.  The court also advised the FCC that, while it revisits its Diversity Index, it 
solicit public comments on its new schematic to fulfill its procedural obligations and to 
avoid constructing a similarly flawed system in the future.503 
Importantly, the court also rejected the arguments of the representatives of the 
media industries that the FCC not only went too far with its ownership rules, but that 
restrictions themselves were unnecessary because of the Justice Department’s anti-trust 
work.  According to the court, the FCC “ensures that license transfers serve public 
interest goals of diversity, competition, and localism, while the antitrust authorities have 
a different purpose: ensuring that merging companies do not raise prices about 
competitive levels.”504  In this sentence, the court reasserted that regulation of the media 
industries require a fundamentally different set of criteria than regulation of other 
industries and denied that a competitive marketplace is analogous to a fulfilled public 
interest. 
Many of its decisions, according to the court, were not rooted in logical or rational 
explanations, were indeed inconsistent, were not based on reliable or thorough evidence, 
and did not consider fully the implications of the rules on public interest goals.  While it 
upheld the commission’s authority and judgment in many arenas, the court required the 
FCC to reconsider not only its conclusions but also the process by which it came to them. 
And while the Prometheus case was a victory for activists in the practical sense—it 
remanded a number of the FCC’s ownership rules—it was also a symbolic victory, 
functioning as a check on the commission’s power to construct a vision of the media 
landscape hospitable to media deregulation unmoored in reliable evidence or reasoning.    
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The media ownership battles had taken center stage at the three national media 
reform conferences organized by Freepress since 2003.  The conferences have escalated 
in attendance, the most recent in Memphis attracting well over 3000 participants.  
Notably absent from the conferences were representatives of conservative groups.  At the 
recent 2007 conference, I asked one of the Freepress organizers about whether 
conservatives were welcome and invited to the events.  He responded that they were, but 
that the organizers would not go out of their way to make the conference hospitable to 
conservative activists.  He pointed to that year’s keynote speaker, Jane Fonda, as one of 
the reasons why conservatives may have stayed away. As this chapter has illustrated, 
however, the battle against relaxed media ownership rules engaged activists across the 
political spectrum.  Liberals and conservatives alike argued that an increasingly 
consolidated mediascape would threaten the political health of the nation and would 
contribute to the coarsening of American culture.  They also challenged the workings of 
the FCC, which not only seemed to favor the interests of corporations over the public, but 
registered its disdain for the public by conducting its review process under a steady cloak 
of secrecy.   
Indeed, the bipartisan coalition exposed fissures within contemporary 
conservatism itself.  Powell, the architect of the new rules, defined himself as a “Reagan-
era child,”505 and in his approach to deregulation gestured toward the libertarian strand of 
the modern conservative movement. Both Bozell and Safire noted their own discomfort 
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as conservatives of their own advocacy for increased regulation, yet did it anyway.  What 
the media ownership battles illuminate is the limitations, even for conservatives, of free 
market ideology.  When the business under consideration is communications, the 
economic efficiencies of large-scale corporations lose out to fears over the hegemony of 
views, political and cultural, that would dominate.  Not coincidentally, conservatives’ 
fear of a more consolidated media was linked to its characterization of the media as 
fundamentally liberal. 
By writing millions of letters and emails to the commission, by testifying in front 
of Congress and the FCC, and by filing a suit in a federal court, activists registered their 
disapproval not only of the rules themselves, but of the logic of deregulation that they 
embodied.  At issue here was the marketplace approach to regulation, one that reduced 
publics to consumers and dissipated distinctions between media industries differ and any 
old widget businesses.  In mounting their attack on the media ownership rules, the 
activists displaced the public-as-consumer with a public-as-citizen construct and 
reasserted that the media produce not just profits and audiences but, in the language of 
Aufderheide, the “instruments of our shared culture.”  In addition, they retread over 
familiar discourses of aesthetic hierarchy and quality, displacing the fears over 
commercial media with anxieties over consolidated media. 
Furthermore, the media ownership battles enlisted the culture industries within a 
more broad-based attack on the escalating power of corporations.  At its most basic, the 
attacks on the ownership rules posited that big media corporations have a negative impact 
on society—on political discourse, on children, on the creative community, on the 
imaginations and passions of the public that consumes their texts.  In this way, the media 
ownership fights were part of a wider movement committed to exposing the deleterious 
effects of large corporations on the most cherished values of society.  Similarly, they 
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were an excoriation of the workings of a government that enabled the expansion of 




This dissertation has examined how social movements have enfolded television 
reform within their wider efforts for social change.  The premise of their campaigns has 
been that the images and narratives that appear on our television screens have an impact 
on the ideas that circulate in our culture and on the behaviors performed by our citizens.  
In television, they have seen an instrument that could repair or exacerbate discrimination, 
edify or stupefy the citizenry, intensify or reconcile social inequalities, tilt the political 
inclinations of the polity, and function as either the mouthpiece or the watchdog of the 
state.  By staging campaigns to alter the policies, structure, and programming of 
television, these activists have engaged television within wider battles to change the 
direction of social and political life in the United States.  Television here is constructed 
through the social imaginary of reformers, who see within it the hopes and failures of 
progress and social change. 
However, as this dissertation has argued, television reform fights often have been 
about more than just television itself.  The structure of broadcasting in the United States, 
at the intersection of commerce and regulation, has enabled reformers to use television 
reform to make larger civil rights claims: to expose their own exclusion from the body 
politic and to argue for their inclusion within it.  Drawing on the central role of the 
“public” within broadcasting policy, they have centered their rhetorical appeals on 
expanding the definition of who constitutes the broadcasting public while they 
simultaneously have argued that they have been omitted from it.  In other words, the 
reformers in this dissertation both assert their membership within the public, while they 
maintain that they have been marginalized and had their civic rights denied.  In the 
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context of media reform battles, the performance of public-ness has involved situating 
themselves both within and without the broadcasting public.  The activists have 
challenged the institutional definition of the public and, in the process, have opened it up 
to include their own needs and goals. 
Furthermore, this definition of the public differs drastically from how the activists 
in this dissertation construct television’s audience.  As the case studies have illustrated, 
television activists consistently have imagined television audiences are uncritical 
consumers, passively accepting the images and ideas that pass over their screens.  This 
view assumes a monolithic audience whose values and views of the world are shaped by 
the texts that they consume.  Indeed, it is this construction of the audience that has lent an 
urgency to the reformers’ campaigns.  For them, television is a crucial battleground 
because of its tremendous power over its audiences.  To be sure, the audience referred to 
by the reformers is an imagined entity, one that does not reflect actual behaviors, but 
rather reformers’ projections of how audiences behave.  Yet this is a discourse that 
continually animates television reform campaigns and, as such, reinforces a view of 
television audiences as disempowered and passive.  This construction stands in marked 
contrast to the active citizens of the campaigns themselves, and to the performance of 
public-ness that is often at the heart of their rhetorical strategies. 
At its base, this dissertation also has aimed to expand our understanding of 
production and reception of popular culture to include considerations of regulation, 
policy, and reform.  The audience of television is not only consumers, but also citizens 
who lay legal claim to the culture industries who serve them.  In this, this dissertation has 
enlarged the lens we use to examine resistance to popular culture by looking at how 
activists have used political processes to transform cultural texts that play such a huge 
role in our lives.  Furthermore, the structure and regulation of broadcasting also has 
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shaped how members of the public have viewed not only their relationship to the 
medium, but the function of the texts themselves.   
In the process, I also have tried to illuminate the messiness and contradictions 
embodied in constructions of the state, the industry, and the public.   At various moments, 
Congress, the FCC, and the courts have been at odds over the interpretation of statute, the 
rights of the public, and the protections to be afforded to the broadcasting industry.  The 
FCC itself often has been a divided agency, as commissioners stridently have disagreed 
over how what its mandate is and how best to fill it.  The industry has both courted and 
shunned regulation and has acted as an ally and an adversary to the reformers who have 
tried to change its practices.  Perhaps most importantly, this dissertation has documented 
the variations amongst reformers themselves.  Not only have activists employed different 
strategies, but they have imagined the “problem” of television and the medium’s social 
role in disparate ways.  
 
DOES TELEVISION REFORM MATTER? 
One of the questions that I have been asked repeatedly as I have worked on this 
project is the extent to which television reform battles actually have changed television.  
If the goals of activists have been to engender a television system that has myriad and 
responsible representations of women and minorities, includes a vibrant alternative to 
commercial broadcasting that airs experimental and high quality programming, 
broadcasts substantive and thorough newscasts, then does the current state of television 
indicate the failure of these efforts?  Are the media corporations so powerful, and their 
federal regulators so complicit, that actual meaningful reform is rendered infeasible?  In 
short, given the history I have charted in these pages, have activists played a significant 
role in the development of American television? 
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Another way of looking at this issue is to ask to what extent have television 
reformers actually challenged the machinations of the broadcasting industry.  Streeter 
suggests that the tenets of corporate liberalism have guided how policymakers have 
structured the development of broadcasting policy.  One of the questions that has stayed 
with me throughout my research on this project is whether, and to what extent, the 
reformers under discussion here have operated outside of the principles and logic of 
corporate liberalism.  Indeed, one of the criticisms of television reform activism is that 
the activists themselves have legitimated the structural and ideological underpinnings of 
American broadcasting.  Chon Noriega argues that when, for example, activists in the 
1970s filed petitions-to-deny the license renewals of broadcasters, they were working 
within the system for change and, in the process, reifying the system itself.  For Noriega, 
these activists were not posing any meaningful challenge to the practices of American 
broadcasters.506  Instead, as they used the openings available to them, they implicitly 
accepted and naturalized the marginal place that broadcasters and broadcasting policy 
had carved for members of the public.  As the chapters of this dissertation have attested, 
this criticism is completely valid.  In mounting their reform campaigns, the activists 
under discussion here uniformly have accepted the contours of a broadcasting system 
primarily under the control of private media corporations.  Their efforts have not sought 
to overhaul the system nor fundamentally to rethink who should have control over the 
airwaves. 
In some sense, and from this perspective, this dissertation charts a declension 
narrative.  Though reformers have contributed to how we think about television and 
television’s public, their gains in changing the material conditions of broadcasting can 
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best be characterized as modest.  As Streeter points out, though Congress has retained 
public ownership of the airwaves, the broadcasting license practically has functioned as 
the bestowal of private property rights to broadcasters.  The revocation or denial of 
renewal of a license has been an exceptionally rare occurrence in the history of 
broadcasting, and licensees typically have laid exclusive claim to access over the 
airwaves.507  Indeed, even the successes of reformers have been short-lived or contained.  
The petitioners in the WLBT case successfully expanded the rights of citizens to 
participate in broadcasting policy and, through the courts, denied license renewal to the 
station owners of WLBT.  However, despite the flurry of activism that followed the 
decision, the gains of reformers often were to politicize the content of television 
programming and mobilize supporters to see television as part of wider social 
movements.  Very few licenses were revoked and within a decade activists all but ceased 
to file petitions with the FCC.  Though petitioners in the Prometheus case were able to 
stay the FCC’s new ownership rules, it is likely that in the the FCC will continue on the 
path of media deregulation.  Though public television has survived numerous attacks for 
the political right, it increasingly relies on corporate financing and the distinction 
between commercial and public broadcasting gradually has become harder to define. 
I would like to posit two retorts to this declension narrative.  Though activists on 
the political left have seen short-lived gains, conservative reformers have had much more 
success.  Red Channels cast a shadow on the development of television and effectively 
functioned as a blacklist during the cold war.  While the MRC continues to claim that 
conservatives are unfairly maligned and victimized by newscasts, telecasts on both 
commercial and public broadcasting have increased the number of conservative 
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States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 231. 
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perspectives on their shows.  Indeed, as two studies from 2006 illustrate, the number of 
conservative and Republican viewpoints on Sunday morning talk shows and on the Jim 
Lehrer Newshour outnumber those of liberals or Democrats.508  The work of the Parents 
Television Council to counter broadcast indecency has resulted in legislation to raise 
indecency fines on broadcasters ten-fold.  The libertarian free market discourse continues 
to animate discussions of broadcasting policy and to bolster arguments for further 
deregulation.  If the history of television reform activism reads like a failure, it is because 
it is told from the perspective of activists on the political left.  For activists on the right, 
the gains have been much more tangible. 
Second, this dissertation at its core has sought to ask a different question.  For 
Noriega and others, the issue has been to what extent social movements have challenged, 
in a fundamental and meaningful way, the structure and ideological premises of 
American broadcasting.  To rephrase, what have social movements done for substantive 
media reform?  The focus of this dissertation, however, has been on what media reform 
has done for social movements.  A central argument of this dissertation is that television 
reform campaigns always have been about more than changing the practices and policies 
of broadcasters.  The starting point for these activists has not been that something is 
terribly wrong with our media institutions, but that something is wrong with American 
society.  For reformers, television is implicated in the problem, its reform tied to the 
solution.  The goal here has not been to argue that these television reform fights radically 
have transformed American television, but to illustrate how twentieth century social 
movements continually have enlisted television reform campaigns as part of their wider 
                                                
508 “Study Finds Lack of Balance, Diversity, Public at PBS NewsHour,” Action Alert, Fairness and 
Accuracy in Reporting, 4 October 2006. http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2971; “If It’s Sunday, It’s 
Conservative: An Analysis of the Sunday Talk Show Guests on ABC, CBS, and NBC 1997-2005,” A 
Report by Media Matters, available at: 
http://mediamatters.org/static/pdf/MMFA_Sunday_Show_Report.pdf. 
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social justice goals.  As reform efforts have waged legal and political fights, this 
dissertation foregrounds the battles over cultural expression and mediated images as a 
central part of American reform movements in the twentieth century.  In this, the purpose 
is to complicate the history of twentieth century reform and to illustrate the deep 





Overview of Major American Broadcasting Policy Decisions 
 
 
1899 Guglielmo Marconi arrives in New York to demonstrate his 
wireless telegraph invention. 
 
1912 Congress passes Radio Act of 1912 which gives the Commerce 
Department the power to assign frequencies and to license 
radio operators.  This act marks the first time that the federal 
government exerted its authority over wireless communication 
and crafted a policy that ranked how it was to be used.   
 
1922-25       Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover holds four National 
Radio Conferences which brings together individuals 
representing the interests of the government, technicians 
(scientists and engineers), and representatives of the radio 
industry to map out a policy for broadcasting. 
 
1927       Congress passes Radio Act of 1927 which establishes the   
Federal Radio Commission (FRC) to allocate broadcasting 
licenses to applicants best capable of serving the “public 
interest, convenience, and necessity.” 
 
1934 Congress passes Federal Communications Act, establishes 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). 
 
1941 FCC issues Report on Chain Broadcasting that outlines 
restrictions and modifications on the network-affiliate 
relationship. 
 
FCC passes the Mayflower Doctrine which prohibits 
broadcasters from editorializing on the air. 
 
FCC establishes restrictions on radio station ownership. 
 
1943 Supreme Court rules in National Broadcasting Co.  v. United 
States that the FCC has the power to regulate radio networks, 
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and affirms that the scarcity of the spectrum legitimates the 
public interest responsibilities imposed on broadcasters. 
 
1946 FCC issues its “Blue Book,” Public Service Responsibilities of 
Broadcasters that defines for broadcasters how the FCC would 
ascertain whether license renewal applicants had fulfilled their 
public interest obligations.   
 
1949 FCC establishes the Fairness Doctrine which imposes an 
affirmative obligation on broadcasters to air controversial issues 
and to provide time to both sides of the issue. 
 
 
1952 FCC issues its Sixth Order and Report, ending the four year 
freeze on licensing television stations. The Commission 
approves licensing stations in both the Very High Frequency 
(VHF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) bandwidths. It also 
reserves 242 licenses for noncommercial, educational 
broadcasters. 
 
1956 FCC implements its 7-7-7 rule, which prohibits a single entity 
from owning more than seven AM stations, seven FM stations, 
and seven television stations nationally. 
 
1960  FCC issues Programming Policy Statement which outlines 14 
elements necessary for broadcasters to fulfill their public 
interest obligations. It also requires broadcasters to ascertain the 
needs of the communities they serve. 
 
1961 Chairman Newton Minow addresses the National Association 
of Broadcasters and calls for broadcasters to live up to their 
public service responsibilities. In this speech, he famously 
refers to television as a “vast wasteland.” 
 
1962 Congress passes the All-Channel Receiver Act and the 
Educational Television Facilities Act. The first act requires 
television set manufacturers to produce television sets that can 
receive both VHF and UHF signals. The second act allocates 
federal money to states to establish or enhance educational 
broadcasting services. 
 
FCC decides that the Fairness Doctrine can apply to 
advertising, a decision affirmed by the U.S. District Court. The 
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expansion of the Fairness Doctrine results from a complaint 
filed by John Banzhaf III against CBS’s New York stations who 
requested airtime, under the Fairness Doctrine, to respond to 
claims in cigarette ads. 
 
FCC passes the Anti-Trafficking Rule which requires owners to 
wait three years before they can sell a station. 
 
1966 U.S. District Court rules on Office of Communication of United 
Church of Christ vs. Federal Communications Commission. 
The case provides members of the public legal standing to 
participate in broadcast license renewal hearings. 
 
1967 Congress passes the Public Broadcasting Act which creates the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, a private nonprofit 
corporation to promote public broadcasting. 
 
1969        Supreme Court, in Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal  
Communications Commission, upholds the Fairness Doctrine. 
 
1970 FCC establishes the Prime Time Access Rule (PTAR) and the 
Financing and Syndication Rule (Fin-Syn). The PTAR 
restricted stations to 3 hours of network programming during 
prime-time, in the hopes that that the fourth hour would be 
filled by local programming.  Fin-Syn forbade networks from 
having a financial interest in, and domestic syndication rights 
for, its entertainment programming.   
 
1975 FCC bans cross-ownership of broadcasting stations and 
newspapers. 
 
1978 Supreme Court rules in favor of the FCC in Federal 
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation that the 
FCC has the authority to determine what constitutes indecency 
and to prohibit indecent broadcasts during periods when 
children are likely to be a part of the broadcasting audience.  
 
FCC establishes policies to favor minority ownership of 
broadcasting stations. 
     
1981 FCC replaces the license renewal process, which had required a  
detailed report, with a “postcard renewal process.”  
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1982 FCC extends terms of broadcasting licenses, which previously 
had been set at three years. Radio broadcasters’ license terms 
are raised to seven years, television broadcasters to five years. 
 
       1984       FCC eliminates the Anti-Trafficking Rule. 
 
        FCC raises the 7-7-7 ownership rule to a 12-12-12 rule. 
    
Supreme Court rules in Federal Communications Commission 
v. League of Women Voters that the amendment to the Public 
Broadcasting Act which forbids editorializing on a 
noncommercial station violates the First Amendment. This 
ruling is the first time the Court finds a broadcasting regulation 
to be unconstitutional. 
 
1985 FCC eliminates the numerical cap on television station 
ownership and replaces with an “audience reach” limit. The 
limit holds that no entity can own television stations that reach 
more than 25 percent of that national television audience.        
 
1987 FCC repeals the Fairness Doctrine. Congress passes a bill to 
legislate the Fairness Doctrine which is vetoed by President 
Reagan. 
 
1990 Congress passes the Children’s Television Act which requires 
broadcasters to air at least three hours of educational 
programming per week and places limits on advertising during 
children’s programming. 
 
1995 Fin-Syn Rule and the Prime Time Access Rule are eliminated 
entirely. 
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